ALLIANCE THEORY: UNDERSTANDING TURKEY'S CHANGING ALLIANCE BEHAVIOR WITHIN NATO by Rodriguez, Peter Sr.
Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive
DSpace Repository
Theses and Dissertations 1. Thesis and Dissertation Collection, all items
2020-06
ALLIANCE THEORY: UNDERSTANDING
TURKEY'S CHANGING ALLIANCE BEHAVIOR
WITHIN NATO
Rodriguez, Peter Sr.
Monterey, CA; Naval Postgraduate School
http://hdl.handle.net/10945/65433
This publication is a work of the U.S. Government as defined in Title 17, United
States Code, Section 101. Copyright protection is not available for this work in the
United States.








ALLIANCE THEORY: UNDERSTANDING TURKEY’S 
CHANGING ALLIANCE BEHAVIOR WITHIN NATO 
by 
Peter Rodriguez Sr. 
June 2020 
Thesis Advisor: Ryan Gingeras 
Second Reader: David S. Yost 
 
Approved for public release. Distribution is unlimited. 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE  Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188 
 Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing 
instruction, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of 
information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions 
for reducing this burden, to Washington headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson 
Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302, and to the Office of Management and Budget, Paperwork Reduction Project 
(0704-0188) Washington, DC, 20503. 
 1. AGENCY USE ONLY 
(Leave blank)  
2. REPORT DATE 
 June 2020  
3. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED 
 Master’s thesis 
 4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE 
ALLIANCE THEORY: UNDERSTANDING TURKEY’S CHANGING 
ALLIANCE BEHAVIOR WITHIN NATO 
 5. FUNDING NUMBERS 
 
  
 6. AUTHOR(S) Peter Rodriguez Sr. 
 7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, CA 93943-5000 
 8. PERFORMING 
ORGANIZATION REPORT 
NUMBER 
 9. SPONSORING / MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND 
ADDRESS(ES) 
N/A 
 10. SPONSORING / 
MONITORING AGENCY 
REPORT NUMBER 
 11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES The views expressed in this thesis are those of the author and do not reflect the 
official policy or position of the Department of Defense or the U.S. Government. 
 12a. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT 
Approved for public release. Distribution is unlimited.  
12b. DISTRIBUTION CODE 
 A 
13. ABSTRACT (maximum 200 words)     
 The current multipolar international system is fraught with uncertainty for states seeking security 
assurances. Alliances are tools of statecraft used to enhance the security of their members. Over the past 
seventy years, NATO has successfully achieved its raison d’être—collective defense. Yet, Turkey, a NATO 
ally since 1952, has increasingly diverged from its traditional alliance behavior. This has called into question 
Turkey’s future role in NATO. Why would Ankara forge an informal alliance with Moscow and purchase 
Russia’s S-400, knowing that it would jeopardize NATO’s security and undermine the Alliance’s cohesion? 
This thesis merges two complementary alliance theories with Turkish identity politics to explore the factors 
driving Turkey’s perplexing behavior. Turkey’s shifting alliance behavior is the result of increasing distrust 
between Turkey and the Alliance, structural changes to the international system, differing threat perceptions, 
and the Justice and Development Party’s Ottoman Islamist ideology. These factors collided during the 
Syrian War as Turkey’s and the rest of the Alliance’s security interests misaligned. Consequently, NATO’s 
internal threat level surpassed its shared external threat level—severely eroding the Alliance’s cohesion and 
compelling Turkey to change its alliance behavior. Despite Ankara’s worrisome behavior, Turkey remains a 
vital NATO ally. Thus, the Alliance should seek to mend the rift, lest Turkey continue its divergent course. 
 14. SUBJECT TERMS 
NATO, Turkey, alliance, alliance theory, alliance behavior, international relations, 
nationalism, S-400, security, defense, Erdogan, United States, strategy, foreign policy, 
foreign affairs, Syria, Russia, Middle East 
 15. NUMBER OF 
PAGES 
 179 
 16. PRICE CODE 




 18. SECURITY 
CLASSIFICATION OF THIS 
PAGE 
Unclassified 








NSN 7540-01-280-5500 Standard Form 298 (Rev. 2-89) 
Prescribed by ANSI Std. 239-18 
i 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
ii 
Approved for public release. Distribution is unlimited. 
ALLIANCE THEORY: UNDERSTANDING TURKEY’S CHANGING 
ALLIANCE BEHAVIOR WITHIN NATO 
Peter Rodriguez Sr. 
Major, United States Marine Corps 
BS, Northern Arizona University, 2004 
Submitted in partial fulfillment of the 
requirements for the degree of 
MASTER OF ARTS IN SECURITY STUDIES  
(EUROPE AND EURASIA) 
from the 
NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL 
June 2020 
Approved by: Ryan Gingeras 
 Advisor 
 David S. Yost 
 Second Reader 
 Afshon P. Ostovar 
 Associate Chair for Research 
 Department of National Security Affairs 
iii 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
iv 
ABSTRACT 
 The current multipolar international system is fraught with uncertainty for states 
seeking security assurances. Alliances are tools of statecraft used to enhance the security 
of their members. Over the past seventy years, NATO has successfully achieved its 
raison d’être—collective defense. Yet, Turkey, a NATO ally since 1952, has increasingly 
diverged from its traditional alliance behavior. This has called into question Turkey’s 
future role in NATO. Why would Ankara forge an informal alliance with Moscow and 
purchase Russia’s S-400, knowing that it would jeopardize NATO’s security and 
undermine the Alliance’s cohesion? This thesis merges two complementary alliance 
theories with Turkish identity politics to explore the factors driving Turkey’s perplexing 
behavior. Turkey’s shifting alliance behavior is the result of increasing distrust between 
Turkey and the Alliance, structural changes to the international system, differing threat 
perceptions, and the Justice and Development Party’s Ottoman Islamist ideology. These 
factors collided during the Syrian War as Turkey’s and the rest of the Alliance’s security 
interests misaligned. Consequently, NATO’s internal threat level surpassed its shared 
external threat level—severely eroding the Alliance’s cohesion and compelling Turkey to 
change its alliance behavior. Despite Ankara’s worrisome behavior, Turkey remains a 
vital NATO ally. Thus, the Alliance should seek to mend the rift, lest Turkey continue its 
divergent course. 
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A. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION 
Turkey has been an important member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
(NATO) since 1952. However, with the advent of the Syrian War in 2011 and the 
subsequent event that followed, Turkey’s shared security interests with its fellow NATO 
allies have increasingly diverged. Turkey’s shifting alliance behavior has most notably 
manifested in Ankara’s informal alliance with Moscow in Syria since 2016 and its decision 
to purchase Russia’s advanced S-400 surface to air missile defense system in 2017. Both 
decisions are worrisome because they directly undermine the NATO Alliance by calling 
into question its overall solidarity and raison d’être—collective defense. This paper applies 
a hybrid alliance theoretical framework to seek an answer to the following question: what 
factors led to Ankara’s security cooperation with Moscow in Syria and its decision to 
acquire the S-400 despite the assessment of the United States and its other fellow NATO 
allies that both decisions jeopardize the integrity, security, and overall cohesion of the 
Alliance? 
B. SIGNIFICANCE OF THE RESEARCH QUESTION 
Since the failed coup attempt on Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan in July 
2016, an informal alliance between Ankara and Moscow has become increasingly 
discernable.1  Then in February 2017, Turkey’s former Defense Minister Fikri Isik 
announced Ankara’s intent to purchase Russia’s advanced S-400 surface-to-air missile 
system.2  Despite overwhelming concern from the Alliance, diplomatic pressure from 
Washington, and the United States’ offer to sell Ankara the PATRIOT air missile defense 
 
1 Michael A. Reynolds, “Turkey and Russia: A Remarkable Rapprochement,” The Texas National 
Security Review, Policy Roundtable: The Future of Turkey’s Foreign Policy, October 24, 2019, 23–37; 
Kemal Kirişci, Turkey and the West: Fault Lines in a Troubled Alliance (Brookings Institution Press, 
2017), 73. 
2 “Bakan Fikri Işık’tan S–400 açıklaması,” CNNTurk, February 22, 2017, accessed February 23, 2017, 
http://www.cnnturk.com/turkiye/bakanfikriisiktans400aciklamasi, from Sitki Egeli, “Making Sense of 
Turkey’s Air and Missile Defense Merry-Go-Round,” All Azimuth 8, no. 1 (2019): 81. 
2 
system, Turkey received its first delivery of the S-400 in July 2019.3  Thus, signifying that 
the relationship between Turkey and the West had reached rock bottom. Ankara’s recent 
alliance behavior is of great consternation to the United States and NATO. Turkey is the 
only NATO ally currently conducting military foreign sales and security cooperation with 
Russia.4  Ankara’s S-400 acquisition weakens the Alliance’s security and erodes the 
Alliance’s cohesion. Moreover, Turkey’s recent alliance behavior calls into question 
NATO’s collective defense rationale, as well as Turkey’s future role within the Alliance.5  
Indeed, Turkey’s informal alliance with Russia and its acquisition of the S-400 exemplify 
an increasingly divergent trend between Turkey and the West with regards to domestic and 
foreign policy goals at large.  
Since its establishment on April 4, 1949, NATO has remained “the single most 
important contributor to security, stability and peace in Europe and North America.”6  
Alliance solidarity and cohesion arguably have been the bedrock for NATO’s enduring 
success. As a NATO ally since 1952, Turkey has maintained an important role in upholding 
its collective defense posture—acting as a frontline state that has contributed to the 
protection of Europe’s eastern and southern flanks. Situated at the crossroads of Europe, 
the Middle East, and Asia, Turkey’s strategic location strengthens the Alliance’s influence 
and extends its strategic reach by safeguarding strategic waterways, providing NATO with 
key logistical and staging bases for military operations, and helping to maintain regional 
stability in the volatile Middle East. Moreover, Turkey’s army is the second largest in all 
 
3 Suzan Fraser, “Despite U.S. Warnings, Russian S-400 Systems Land in Turkey,” AP News, July 12, 
2019, https://apnews.com/6fa91d466e444fcf94b507a9325d0a09. 
4 Doyle Hodges, “Security and Politics at the Center of the World: The Future of U.S.-Turkish-
Russian Relations,” The Texas National Security Review, Policy Roundtable: The Future of Turkey’s 
Foreign Policy, October 24, 2019, 3. 
5 Jim Zanotti and Clayton Thomas, “Turkey: Background and U.S. Relations In Brief,” Congressional 
Report (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, August 14, 2019), 2, 9;  Doug Bandow, “Time 
to Kick the Islamizing Turkey Out of NATO,” The American Conservative, July 25, 2019, 
https://www.theamericanconservative.com/articles/time-to-kick-the-islamizing-turkey-out-of-nato/. 
6 Nicholas Burns and Douglas Lute, “NATO at Seventy: An Alliance in Crisis,” Belfer Center for 
Science and International Affairs (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard Kennedy School, February 2019), 1, 
https://www.belfercenter.org/NATO70. 
3 
of NATO.7  Undoubtedly, Turkey’s role in NATO has been a significant reason for the 
Alliance’s success.  
Despite Turkey’s membership in NATO, tensions between Turkey and its fellow 
NATO allies periodically occurred throughout the Cold War—notably during the Cuban 
Missile Crisis (1962–3), the Cyprus Crisis involving President Johnson’s letter (1963–4), 
and the Turkish invasion of Cyprus (1974).8  Nevertheless, NATO overcame these internal 
tensions. As William Hale notes, “Although relations with western governments were not 
always entirely harmonious, Turkey had no other foreign policy interests which clearly 
conflicted with those of the main western powers, so the alliance seems to have been 
perceived as firm on both sides.”9 
However, with the emergence of the Justice and Development Party (AKP) as 
Turkey’s ruling political party in 2002, Turkey’s foreign policy began to slowly diverge 
from that of its fellow NATO allies. Around 2010, this diverging trend increasingly 
accelerated and became more discernable—likely due to the instability in the region caused 
from the Arab Spring (2010), the Libyan War (2011), the Syrian War (2011), and ensuing 
refugee crisis. Turkey’s diverging domestic and foreign policies with the West have 
widened as the country has experienced considerable illiberal backsliding, especially after 
the failed coup attempt in July 2016.10  Following the coup attempt, Erdoğan implement a 
state of emergency. The “gift from God,” as Erdoğan called the coup attempt, enabled the 
ruler to consolidate his political authority—transforming the secular country into an 
authoritarian populist regime.11  Since 2016, numerous human rights violations have been 
reported, forced refugee reparations have been observed, and the arrests of journalists and 
 
7 Mustafa Kibaroglu and Ayşegul Kibaroglu, Global Security Watch-Turkey (Westport, Connecticut; 
London: Praeger Security International, 2009), ix. 
8 William Hale, Turkish Foreign Policy since 1774, 3rd edition (London; New York: Routledge, 
2013), 98–101, 106–8, 111–15. 
9 Hale, 88. 
10 “Turkey,” Turkey (Washington, D.C.: Freedom House, January 30, 2019), 
https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2019/turkey. 
11 Marc Champion, “Coup Was ‘Gift from God’ forErdoğan Planning a New Turkey,” Bloomberg, 
July 17, 2016, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-07-17/coup-was-a-gift-from-god-says-
erdogan-who-plans-a-new-turkey. 
4 
press censorship have reached an all-time high.12  It seems in the midst of this turmoil, 
primordial attachment has taken primacy over the secular diversity Turkey once 
symbolized.13  Overall, Turkey’s recent domestic and foreign policy trends appear to 
contradict Atatürk’s Kemalist principles,14 the ideals and principles codified in the 
preamble of the Alliance’s treaty, and undermine NATO’s collective security.15 
Compounding these concerns is the growing relationship between Turkey and 
Russia. Russia has historically opposed the NATO and has sought disintegration of the 
Alliance. Russia’s increasingly aggressive behavior, including its invasion of Georgia, the 
annexation of Crimea, its malign activities in eastern Ukraine, and its growing global 
influence are perceived by the West as a challenge to the status quo international order—
what the 2018 U.S. National Defense Strategy calls “the reemergence of long-term, 
strategic competition” by the “revisionist powers” of Russia and China.16  Both countries 
seek to challenge the United States and undermine the credibility of the United States 
alliance structure in Europe and the Asia-Pacific region.17  Consequently, the competition 
threatens the security, stability, and peace that the NATO Alliance has preserved since its 
formation. Thus, the importance of having a cohesive, strong Alliance has taken on a 
criticality not seen since the Cold War era. Indeed, as stated in the United States National 
Defense Strategy of 2018, “our [U.S.] network of alliances and partnerships remain [s] the 
 
12 Christopher Brandt et al., “Freedom in the World 2019,” Democracy in Retreat (Washington, D.C.: 
Freedom House, January 15, 2019), 11, https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/freedom-world-
2019/democracy-in-retreat. 
13 Clifford Geertz, “The Integrative Revolution. Primordial Sentiments and Civil Politics in the New 
States,” in Old Societies and New States: The Quest for Modernity in Asia and Africa, ed. Clifford Geertz 
(London: Free Press of Glencoe, 1963), 109. 
14 Erik J. Zürcher, Turkey: A Modern History, 4th Edition. (London; New York: I.B. Tauris & Co. 
Ltd, 2017), 183. 
15 NATO Information Service, NATO Facts and Figures (Brussels: NATO, 1976), 300–303. 
16 Jim Mattis, “Summary of the 2018 National Defense Strategy” (United States Office of the 
Secretary of Defense, 2018), 2, https://dod.defense.gov/Portals/1/.../2018-National-Defense-Strategy-
Summary.pdf. 
17 “Dunford Describes U.S. Great Power Competition with Russia, China,” U.S. Department of 
Defense, accessed August 28, 2019, https://www.defense.gov/Newsroom/News/Article/Article/1791811/
dunford-describes-us-great-power-competition-with-russia-china/. 
5 
backbone of global security.”18  Turkey’s shifting alliance behavior threatens the strategic 
partnership it has had with the United States for over seventy years and the cohesion of the 
NATO Alliance.  
Aside from Turkey’s informal alliance with Russia in Syria, Ankara’s S-400 
decision raises significant challenges and implications for the NATO Alliance’s future. 
Key concerns include NATO security, Alliance interoperability, Russian intelligence 
collection, the effectiveness of the F-35’s capabilities, an apparent shift in Ankara’s 
international alignment, and the continued cohesion of NATO.19  A strategic dissonance 
between Turkey and its NATO allies has become increasingly apparent. Turkey’s recent 
behavior does not bode well for the future of the Alliance and the principles of the Treaty 
preamble.20  Consequently, many experts have called into question Turkey’s continued 
role and membership within the Alliance.21  Hence, understanding the factors for Turkey’s 
diverging security interests away from its traditional fellow allies requires examining the 
origins of the Alliance and Turkey’s role within it.    
C. LITERATURE REVIEW 
During the Cold War, foreign policy was an area of Turkish studies that received 
relatively little scholarly attention.22  However, since the end of the Cold War, scholarly 
literature on Turkish foreign policy has significantly increased. Observers and scholars 
disagree over the key variables that have influenced Turkish foreign policymaking in the 
Post–Cold War era. Consequently, academic circles have formulated distinct schools of 
thought regarding the transformation of Turkish foreign policy in the Post–Cold War era. 
 
18 Mattis, “Summary of the 2018 National Defense Strategy,” 2. 
19 Jim Zanotti and Clayton Thomas, “Turkey: Background and U.S. Relations in Brief,” 
Congressional Report CR44000 (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, August 14, 2019). 
20 Aurel Sari, “Can Turkey Be Expelled from NATO?  It’s Legally Possible, Whether or Not 
Politically Prudent,” Just Security, October 15, 2019, https://www.justsecurity.org/66574/can-turkey-be-
expelled-from-nato/. 
21 “Judy Asks: Is Turkey Weakening NATO?,” Carnegie Europe, accessed February 21, 2019, 
https://carnegieeurope.eu/strategiceurope/73174. 
22 Philip Robins, “The Foreign Policy of Turkey,” in The Foreign Policies of Middle East States, ed. 
Raymond Hinnebusch and Anoushiravan Ehteshami (Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc., 
2002), 311. 
6 
This literature review begins by providing a brief synopsis of the existing literature specific 
to the examination of Turkey’s S-400 decision. Next, the review examines the existing 
literature on Turkey’s foreign policy. Scholars have generally taken a theoretical approach 
to analyze Turkish foreign policy. Therefore, the literature review discusses the two 
approaches most often applied by scholars—realism and constructivism. Finally, the 
literature review concludes with a synthesis of the study’s observations.  
1. Synopsis of Existing Literature 
The events surrounding Turkey’s S-400 decision are ongoing and highly dynamic. 
Ankara’s first official announcement regarding the agreement to purchase Russia’s S-400 
occurred in 2017, and Turkey received its first delivery of S-400 equipment in July 2019.23  
Because the decision is fairly recent and fluid there is not an extensive body of existing 
scholarly literature on the causal factors behind Turkey’s decision to purchase Russia’s S-
400. Most literature regarding Turkey’s purchase of the S-400 consists of works by media 
outlets, think tanks, and scholarly journals on the internet. Since the body of literature is 
small, this literature review broadens its aperture by examining the scholarly literature on 
Turkish foreign policy. Foreign policy writ large is an immense topic. Therefore, it must 
be noted that the study remains primarily focused on the security aspect within Turkey’s 
foreign policy (i.e., the S-400 and Turkey’s relationship with the Alliance).  
2. Variables of Turkey’s Foreign Policy 
Turkey’s geography is located at the crossroads of multiple cultural and political 
fault lines. The multidimensional fault lines significantly influence the country’s identity, 
politics, and foreign policy. Additionally, they make understanding the factors contributing 
to Turkey’s foreign policy extremely complex. On one hand, the country’s geographical 
fault between the East and the West endows Turkey with an enduring strategic location 
with international relevance. Therefore, Turkey has often been made the objective of war 
and conquest by other ambitious states throughout history.24  On the other hand, Turkey’s 
 
23 Zanotti and Thomas, “Turkey: Background and U.S. Relations in Brief.” 
24 Hale, Turkish Foreign Policy since 1774, 5. 
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cultural fault line makes it difficult for the country to conceptualize a homogeneous 
national identity or self-image. Samuel P. Huntington wrote that Turkey is the “classic torn 
country…identifiable by two phenomena…[its] leaders refer to them [Turkey] as a ‘bridge’ 
between two cultures, and observers describe them [it] as Janus-faced.”25  Erik Zürcher 
writes that Turkey’s geography inherently makes the country “not fully a part of either, or, 
alternatively, part of both.”26   
These complex dynamics make it difficult for scholars to agree on the main factors 
that shape the country’s foreign policy. Despite their disagreements, scholars tend to agree 
that the end of the Cold War had a significant effect on the transformation of the country’s 
foreign policy. However, these schools of thought diverge over how this important event 
has influenced Turkish foreign policymaking in the Post–Cold War era. On one hand the 
body of literature focuses on the role of identity in Turkish domestic politics—contending 
that Turkey’s cultural and political dynamics are the main factors in explaining Turkey’s 
changing foreign policy. On the other hand, some scholars identify changes in the 
international system and the transformation of the security environment as the main drivers 
of Turkish foreign policymaking.  
Generally, these two distinct arguments fall under two International Relations (IR) 
schools of thought—realism and constructivism. Realist contend that Turkish foreign 
policymaking is primarily influenced by the country’s need for security, self-help or 
autonomy, and the accumulation of material assets to increase its relative gains (power). 
Constructivists assert that Turkish foreign policy is shaped primarily by domestic variables 
such as individuals, culture, and identity. The following section discusses these two schools 
of thought, along with the associated scholarly literature.  
a. International Relations   
International Relations (IR) as an academic discipline seeks to understand the 
nature of state behavior, interactions, and the variations of potential outcomes. Outside the 
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Edition (New York, NY: Simon & Schuster Paperbacks, 2011), 138–39. 
26 Zürcher, Turkey: A Modern History, 367. 
8 
academic discipline, the term international relations is used to describe relations between 
states, organizations, and individuals at the global level—also known as international 
politics or geopolitics.27  IR theories are tools for analyzing international relations or 
foreign policy.28  The IR theories of realism and constructivism are two of the main tools 
that can be applied to enhance the understanding of foreign policy by nation-states. Both 
theories share three basic assumptions—states desire to survive; states are sovereign 
entities, with no political superior; and states exist in a system of anarchy sometimes called 
the international system.29  Although they acknowledge these important assumptions, 
constructivism and realism are vastly dissimilar in the role, influence, and level of unitary 
actors; in the interpretations of motives of state behavior and their interactions; and how 
they characterize the international system. Despite differences between these theories, it is 
important to examine both to gain a holistic appreciation of the factors influencing foreign 
policymaking. Indeed, as Peter Katzenstein and Nobuo Okawara keenly observe, extolling 
one theory while excluding the other “ultimately hinders efforts to understand the 
complexities of the real world.”30  The next section discusses each of the IR theories in 
greater detail.   
b. Realism 
Realism adheres to the core elements of statism, survival, and self-help. The theory 
primarily focuses on the state as the principal, unitary actor in international relations—as 
opposed to the individual or society which constructivism considers. Realists acknowledge 
these other actors but assume that their powers and influence are limited within the 
 
27 Stephen McGlinchey, ed., International Relations (Bristol, England: E-International Relations, 
2017), 2. 
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international system.31  Another important assumption that realists make is that state 
decision-makers are rational actors. In other words, they assume that rational decision-
making leads to the pursuit of the state’s national interest.32  Realists believe that states are 
forced to compete against one another because of the egotistical nature of the anarchic 
system. Thus, states are compelled to pursue material advantages—in geography, natural 
resources, wealth, manpower, and military capabilities—to increase their relative power 
and security for ensuring state survival in the competition with other states.  
Despite realism’s contributions to the study of foreign policy, some IR theorists 
have criticized its formulation of variables. Realists rely primarily on the state as the unitary 
actor. Therefore, critics contend, the theory fails to appropriately consider other important 
variables, such as ruling elites, domestic institutions, and societal ideations, which may 
explain foreign policymaking. For example, constructivists argue that “Explanations based 
primarily on interests and the material distribution of power cannot fully account for 
important international phenomena and that analysis of the social construction of state 
identities ought to precede, and may even explain, the genesis of state interests.”33  Despite 
its flaws, realism’s assumptions that the most important variables in foreign policymaking 
are measures to ensure the state’s survival, security, and prosperity are difficult to dispute. 
Moreover, these variables are easier to distinguish and simpler to apply in the analysis of 
foreign policy in comparison to the social and ideological elements that constructivism 
seeks to understand. 
 
31 Sandrina Antunes and Isabel Camisao, “Realism,” in International Relations Theory, ed. Stephen 
McGlinchey, Rosie Walters, and Christian Scheinpflug (Bristol, England: E-International Relations, 2017), 
15–21. 
32 Sandrina Antunes and Isabel Camisao, “Realism,” in International Relations Theory, ed. Stephen 
McGlinchey, Rosie Walters, and Christian Scheinpflug (Bristol, England: E-International Relations, 2017), 
15–21. 
33 Mlada Bukovansky, “American Identity and Neutral Rights from Independence to the War of 
1812,” International Organization 51, no. 2 (Spring 1997): 209. cited in Yucel Bozdaglıoglu, Turkish 
Foreign Policy and Turkish Identity: A Constructivist Approach (New York & London: Routledge, 2003), 
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c. Constructivism  
Constructivism is primarily focused on the social dimension. Constructivist theory 
is founded on the assumption that ideas, beliefs, identities, and norms are important factors 
that shape state interests and the nature of international relations.34  Constructivists 
emphasize the importance of historical and societal influences in shaping state behavior.35  
They believe that a state’s behavior is based on the schemas of self-identity—self-image, 
interests, and interactions with other states.36  Moreover, constructivists contend that the 
anarchic system, state identity, and state interests evolve. This directly contradicts the 
realist argument that the anarchic system and the interests of the state are static. 
Constructivism allows for a system of anarchy in which a wide range of outcomes is 
possible because an extensive spectrum of behavior is compatible with the need to survive 
under anarchy.37  In the words of a renowned constructivist, Alexander Wendt, “anarchy 
is what states make of it.”38   
There is little doubt that constructivist ideational variables, such as culture and 
identity, have an impact on the way a state interprets threats and formulates strategy. 
However, the limitations of constructivism must be underlined. The social variables used 
in the constructivist approach are difficult to understand, measure, and test. Determining 
how and to what degree these factors contribute to the making of foreign policy is 
exceedingly challenging. To reduce uncertainties in the application of the theory, large 
quantities of accurate empirical data must be collected. This requires massive amounts of 
personal data that are impossible to corroborate for truthfulness.39  Therefore, the validity 
of these variables is subject to much conjecture. Still, constructivism addresses factors and 
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concepts that are generally neglected by realism and other mainstream IR theories.40  Thus, 
it is necessary to examine the constructivist scholarly literature regarding Turkish foreign 
policy. 
d. Interpretation of Turkish Foreign Policy: A Realist Approach  
Scholars who contend that Turkish foreign policymaking is primarily influenced by 
the country’s need for security, autonomy, and material assets to increase its relative gains 
(power) tend to fall under the realist school of thought. As noted previously, realism 
contends that the nature of the system of anarchy forces competition among states, 
establishing interests that help the state to increase its relative power and security.  
These scholars claim the end of the Cold War was the impetus of Turkey’s changing 
foreign policy. Indeed, Yevgeniya Gaber contends that “changes in the nature and 
conceptualization of the international system” constituted the most significant engine for 
change to Turkey’s foreign policy.41  Why was the end of the Cold War so significant for 
Turkey?  First, it significantly altered Turkey’s strategic position, changing it from a 
periphery state to a central one.42  This loosened the constraints on Turkish foreign policy 
and enabled it to pursue a more independent, activist course.43  Second, the dissolution of 
the Soviet Union called into question NATO’s continued existence, and therefore, Turkey’s 
security assurance was threatened.44   
Lars Haugom claims Turkish foreign policy has increasingly demonstrated a realist 
approach, especially since 2014.45  He argues that Turkish foreign policy has always been 
 
40 Theys, “Constructivism.” 
41 Yevgeniya Gaber, “Turkish-American Relations in the Post–Cold War Era: Reconsidering the 
Power Balance Equation,” in Change and Adaptation in Turkish Foreign Policy, ed. Kılıç Buğra Kanat, 
Ahmet Selim Tekelioglu, and Kadir Ustun (Ankara: SETA Publications, 2014), 19–20. 
42 Lars Haugom, “Turkish Foreign Policy underErdoğan: A Change in International Orientation?,” 
Comparative Strategy 38, no. 3 (May 4, 2019): 209, https://doi.org/10.1080/01495933.2019.1606662. 
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44 Lawrence S. Kaplan, NATO Divided, NATO United: The Evolution of an Alliance (Westport, CT: 
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about security; however, it was after 2014 that this became more apparent to observers. 
Philip Robins makes a similar claim. Robins states that the imperative of security has often 
dictated Turkish foreign policy, especially if it involved the Kurdish Workers’ Party 
(PKK).46  Although Ankara adopted Davutoğlu’s strategic depth strategy, which was 
predicated on a shared history and culture with its neighbors, Haugom argues that Turkey’s 
“national security has for long periods dominated matters of state and has remained a 
primary concern in Turkish foreign policy.”47  Eda Kuşku-Sönmez makes a similar 
observation in her quantitative analysis of Turkey’s foreign policy under the Justice and 
Development Party (AKP) between January 2009 and October 2016, asserting that 
Turkey’s bilateral and multilateral engagements with its neighbors demonstrated that 
security dominated the Turkish agenda in these discussions during the period examined.48   
According to Haugom, Ankara has placed a primacy on transactional-based 
preferences to foreign policy decisions—not ideational or values-based preferences.49   
Highlighting events in Syria and within Turkey’s borders, Haugom contends recent 
changes in Turkish foreign policy are the result of an endemic deteriorating security 
environment in the Middle East. Consequently, he writes that Ankara has been more 
willing to enter “into flexible alliances with erstwhile adversaries (Russia and Iran) to 
achieve certain security and defense goals, and even at the peril of upsetting established 
relations with Western allies.”50  Emre Iseri and Oguz Dilek, in their analysis of Turkish 
foreign policy, make similar observations—claiming that as a result of the waning of the 
influence of the United States in the region surrounding Turkey, Ankara has had to forge 
closer relations and agreements with Russia and Iran.51   
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Although the recent assertiveness of Turkish foreign policy has caused a rift 
between Turkey and the West, Haugom holds that the benefits of remaining close to the 
West and in the NATO Alliance outweigh the benefits that a reorientation to the East would 
provide. Ultimately, the recent changes in Turkish foreign policy do “not appear to herald 
a change in Turkey’s international orientation either toward realignment or 
nonalignment.”52   
e. Interpretation of Turkish Foreign Policy: A Constructivist Approach 
Scholars who claim Turkish foreign policy is shaped primarily by internal or 
domestic variables—such as, individuals, culture, and identity—generally fall under the 
constructivist school of thought.53  Constructivists contend that foreign policy is a product 
of self-perception and social interaction at the individual, state, and international levels.  
Since before the creation of the Republic of Turkey in 1923, the country’s cultural 
fault lines have created challenges in the conceptualization of a homogeneous Turkish 
identity because of the complexity, dynamism, ideological differences, and competition 
within Turkey. Indeed, Lisel Hintz states that identity is at the root of Turkey’s recent and 
puzzling shifts in foreign policy.54  According to Hintz, Turkish “foreign policy serves as 
an alternative arena to domestic politics in which these contests over identity take place.”55  
Like Hintz, Hasan Kosebalaban emphasizes the importance of domestic identities in 
explaining Turkey’s foreign policy preferences and interests. However, he contends that 
identity politics are primarily used as a tool to advance the Turkish foreign policy agenda. 
In his view, it is not used as a tool to advance one identity group’s domination of the 
country’s domestic realm, as Hintz contends.56   
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How can identity drive a nation-state’s foreign policy?  Hintz develops and applies 
inside-out contestation theory, which “contends that elites who face obstacles or threats to 
their attempts to spread their own proposal [ideation] in the domestic political arena choose 
to take their struggle outside to the foreign policy arena.”57  Identity proposals will use the 
country’s foreign affairs as a means to strengthen their domestic agenda by engaging with 
transnational advocacy networks, invoking international organizations’ accession criteria, 
or mobilizing a diaspora.  
According to Hintz, there are four distinct and coherent Turkish identity 
proposals—Republican Nationalism, Ottoman Islamism, Pan-Turkic Nationalism, and 
Western Liberalism.58  Although some of the beliefs within each proposal may overlap, 
each of the four groups competes for identity hegemony within Turkey by increasing its 
support at home. Once power and legitimacy are achieved, the proposal then systematically 
transforms the domestic institutions such as military, judiciary, and educational systems to 
advance the proposal’s ideation and block the other proposals from contesting its 
hegemony.59  Kosebalaban also categorizes Turkish identity into four groups but labels 
them slightly differently—secularist nationalism, Islamic nationalism, secular liberalism, 
and Islamic liberalism. Unlike Hintz, Kosebalaban provides an in-depth analysis of the 
history of how these groups emerged throughout Turkey’s history as a republic. He claims 
that there were two classic fault lines in Turkish politics: Islamism versus secularism, and 
liberalism versus nationalism—each having distinct ideas of who they consider to be 
friends, enemies, and rivals.60  The historical interactions between these fault lines have 
thus created the contemporary groups observed today.  
Hintz’s theory helps to explain the vexing foreign policy changes that have been 
observed under the ruling AKP (Ottoman Islamism). Republican Nationalism, which 
adopts the principles of Turkey’s founding father (Mustafa Kemal Atatürk), has long 
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dominated identity politics in Turkey.61  This group came close to achieving hegemony 
but has lately been eclipsed by the rise of the Ottoman Islamism proposal—the AKP. Since 
coming to power in 2002, the AKP has deployed this effective strategy to advance its 
interests by taking the contest to the foreign policy area and by engaging with international 
institutions. Thus, the AKP was able to: first, circumvent the Republican Nationalists by 
pushing a European Union (EU)-oriented agenda; then, increase its power base at home to 
replace the Republican Nationalist-dominated domestic institutions with its group; and 
finally, begin implementing its true Ottoman Islamist domestic and foreign policy 
agenda.62   
Conversely, Kosebalaban argues that identity politics within Turkey have 
influenced foreign affairs in a much more traditional manner. Although identity politics 
influence Turkish foreign policymaking, external factors such as material distribution and 
normative pressures by international institutions still factor heavily in Turkey’s foreign 
policy. Moreover, he contends that the ruling AKP’s foreign policy does not demonstrate 
a radical departure from Turkey’s traditional approach. Contrary to Hintz’s analysis and 
description of the AKP’s (Ottoman Islamism) ideological principles, Kosebalaban writes 
“despite the fact that conservative identity and worldview of the AKP leadership has 
influenced certain foreign policy decisions, its overall liberal, pro-Western, and globalist 
dimensions have often complemented its pro-Islamic orientation.”63  However, 
Kosebalaban warns that Turkish foreign policy may change if prospects for accession to 
the EU do not make progress.64   
Although these scholars adopt a constructivist approach to analyzing Turkish 
foreign policy, they develop significantly different assumptions of the ideology of the 
identity groups, notably their motives and outcomes—specifically with regards to the AKP. 
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Furthermore, because their findings are dissimilar, the scholars develop vastly different 
recommendations for improving the relations between Turkey and the West.  
f. Synthesis of Literature Review 
Understanding the main factors that have influenced Turkey’s recent security 
interests within its foreign policy is indeed a challenging endeavor. As the literature review 
demonstrates, Turkish foreign policy is a contested field of study with vastly different 
approaches and conclusions. Yet, examining both the realist and constructivist schools of 
thought provides a more comprehensive understanding of the dynamics behind Turkish 
foreign policymaking. Each school of thought has its own set of strengths and weaknesses. 
No single theory can fully explain the complex realities of international politics.65  Stephen 
Walt writes, “Each of these competing perspectives captures important aspects of world 
politics.”66  In Walt’s view, “we are better off with a diverse array of competing ideas 
rather than a single theoretical orthodoxy…we should encourage the heterogeneity.”67   
The literature review demonstrates a deficiency in the field of Turkish foreign 
policy with regards to the role alliance behavior may play in shaping the security aspect of 
foreign policy decision making. Alliance theory is a discipline within IR that studies the 
factors that cause states to form alliances, how they manage them, what leads to their 
disintegration. Although alliance theory has been used in the analysis of the NATO 
Alliance for many case studies, the theoretical approach specific to Turkey and its role in 
the Alliance is wanting. A search for scholarly literature on Turkey using an alliance 
theoretical approach to examine its foreign policy reveals only one study that was written 
prior to 2010.68  Considering Turkey is a NATO member state, that its decision to purchase 
the S-400 jeopardizes the Alliance by weakening NATO’s security, and there is no alliance 
theory literature published on Turkey in NATO since 2010—it is prudent to examine 
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Turkey’s S-400 decision using an alliance theoretical approach. By doing so, the study 
seeks to contribute to the scholarly understanding of the factors that have contributed to 
Turkey’s foreign policy divergence with its NATO allies, while offering additional insight 
into NATO alliance behavior.  
D. POTENTIAL EXPLANATIONS AND HYPOTHESES 
The purpose of this study is to discover the key causal factors which influenced 
Turkey’s decision to purchase Russia’s S-400. The literature review suggests that two 
overarching factors stand out: the changing security environment and Turkish identity 
politics. This study builds upon the conclusion of the literature review, while applying an 
alliance theoretical approach to the case study. The alliance theory framework and the 
theses logic for the application of the framework will be discussed in Chapter II.  
This study hypothesizes that during the Cold War, perceptions of Soviet aggression 
created a mutually shared level of external threat across NATO. The high external threat 
level not only kept the internal threat level low, but also suppressed the domestic and 
cultural cleavages amongst the Alliance members because security remains paramount to 
state survival.69  Subsequently, the alliance cohesion remained relatively strong amongst 
the member states.70  The high external threat level also suppressed the differences that 
existed in domestic and cultural cleavages among Alliance members because security is 
paramount in state survival.71  Consequently, the alliance cohesion was strong and Turkish 
foreign policy remained relatively aligned with its fellow NATO allies.  
The collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War significantly altered 
NATO and the entire international system. Many scholars and politicians assumed liberal 
democracy would flourish and the possibility of global conflict would be less likely to 
occur.72  The collapse of the Soviet Union created both opportunities and challenges for 
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Turkey and NATO. The external threat against NATO no longer existed. Paradoxically, as 
an external threat level diminishes, the internal threat level grows for alliances in general. 
The end of the Cold War had two major implications that influenced the Alliance’s 
external-internal threat level phenomenon.  
First, the priorities of the Alliance transformed. Whereas before security was 
paramount, now the values and ideals embodied in the Treaty’s preamble gained increased 
relevance. For Turkey, domestic and cultural cleavages, which were suppressed during the 
Cold War, began to take on greater influence in Turkish foreign policy73 because the 
reduction in the external threat level had diminished Ankara’s need for the Alliance.74  
Turkey developed an increasingly divergent and independent foreign policy aimed at 
accumulating greater influences in the Middle East. Turkey’s new foreign policy, known 
as the ‘strategic depth’ doctrine, called for an active engagement with the country’s 
neighbors and emphasized their shared cultural, religious, and historical linkages that were 
forged during the Ottoman Empire’s rule.75  Consequently, the reversal in the Alliance’s 
priorities increased the internal threat level within the Alliance.  
Second, the collapse of the Soviet Union was a destabilizing force on many of its 
former satellites. Conflict arose in the regions surrounding Turkey—the Middle East and 
the Balkans. The proximity of the conflicts and instability at large significantly impacted 
Turkish national security—including War on Terror (2001-Present), the Iraq War (2003–
2014), the Arab Spring (2010), the Libyan War (2011), the Syrian War and its ensuing 
refugee crisis (2011–present), and an emboldened PKK organization. The emergence of 
these new threats increased the Alliance’s external threat levels once again. Yet, unlike the 
effect Soviet expansionism had on the Alliance’s mutual external threat levels, the new 
threats were perceived with differing levels of concern and urgency between Turkey and 
its fellow allies. The disparity in threat perceptions was the result of the geographic 
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proximity to the threat. The closer a threat is to a state, the greater the danger it poses to 
that state—and many of the new threats encircled Turkey.76  Recent historical examples 
illuminate the differing threat perceptions. Since the end of the Cold War, Turkey has 
requested security assistance from the Alliance in the form of air defense capabilities on at 
least three occasions. However, certain members within the Alliance demonstrated 
hesitancy in contributing to Turkey’s security concerns on several occasions—the Gulf 
War (1990–1991),77 the Iraq War (2003–2014),78 and the Syrian War (2011–Present).79   
In the end, Turkey’s requested security requirements were fulfilled by its fellow 
NATO allies in each of these wars, but Turkish skepticism about the West grew, along with 
the Alliance’s internal threat levels—resulting in the erosion of cohesion and trust.80  When 
a state’s allies demonstrate a perceived unwillingness to accommodate its security 
concerns, that state is more likely to seek security assistance outside the alliance.81   
Another important example of the increase in the internal level of threat and 
subsequent, erosion of cohesion is the disagreement over the Alliance’s approach to 
fighting the Islamic State (IS) in Syria. The United States and other NATO allies have 
supported Syrian Kurdish-led militias with reported links to the PKK, a terrorist 
organization that has been at war with Turkey since 1984 and is responsible for the death 
of over 40,000 Turks.82   
The study hypothesizes the factors for Turkey’s purchase of the S-400 as well as 
its ongoing foreign policy dissonance has been caused by a combination of differing 
perceptions by member states over the level of external threat and the increasing internal 
 
76 Walt, The Origins of Alliances, 23. 
77 David S. Yost, NATO’s Balancing Act (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace, 2014), 
40. 
78 Kirişci, Turkey and the West, 197. 
79 Kılıç Buğra Kanat et al., US-Turkey Relations Under the AK Party: An Almanac (Istanbul, Turkey: 
SETA Publications, 2017), 161. 
80 Patricia A. Weitsman, Dangerous Alliances: Proponents of Peace, Weapons of War (Stanford, 
California: Stanford University Press, 2004), 25–28. 
81 Walt, The Origins of Alliances, 30. 
82 Zanotti and Thomas, “Turkey: Background and U.S. Relations in Brief,” 1. 
20 
threat level within the Alliance. Moreover, the identity proposals of the current Turkish 
ruling political alliance between the AKP and the Nationalist Action Party (MHP) share an 
anti-Western view and both wish for stronger relations in the East.83  Overall, this toxic 
combination has undermined the Alliance’s cohesion. Consequently, Turkey has chosen to 
distance itself with the West and seek alternative solutions to address the country’s 
perceived threats outside the Alliance. Meanwhile, Russia identified and exploited the 
growing rift in the Alliance, offering to sell the S-400 to Ankara.  
E. RESEARCH DESIGN 
This thesis will apply the theoretical framework of Stephen M. Walt’s Balance of 
Threat Theory (BoT) as the primary theory to examine the case study.84  To reinforce his 
seminal work, theoretical concepts by Patricia Weitsman on internal threat levels and 
alliance cohesion85 will be included as well as the identity proposals developed by Lisel 
Hintz.86  Both Weitsman’s and Hintz’s work enrich the foundational theory by Walt’s. 
Weitsman’s concepts of internal threats and the effect it has on alliance cohesion add an 
important variable to examine, especially in preexisting alliances. Meanwhile, Hintz’s 
work which focuses on identity proposals within Turkey greatly contributes to providing a 
more holistic understanding of what the Turkish ruling elite perceives as a threat. All three 
scholars work, the variables that will be used, and the theses logic will be discussed in 
Chapter II. The focus of the thesis is to examine what variables have changed from 
Turkey’s accession to NATO in 1952 to Ankara’s decision to purchase Russia’s S-400. To 
gain a greater perspective for Turkey’s current foreign policy dissonance, the thesis will 
examine the case study using a historical analysis approach.  
The study will consist of a qualitative analysis and will derive its data from both 
primary and secondary sources. These include interviews of state officials, official 
government archives, government websites, academic books and journals, and research 
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institute reports. Process tracing will be used to establish the causal relationship between 
the independent variables and the dependent variables, while considering the dominant 
identity proposal of the Turkish regime during the periods examined.  
1. Thesis Limitations  
The thesis is primarily an exercise in IR theory, not Turkish studies. Although, the 
study is an interplay between historical investigation and theory, Turkey’s history and 
culture are too complex to examine completely for the purpose of this thesis. Additionally, 
measuring the importance of each different theoretical variable is challenging because it is 
exceedingly difficult to know the inner workings of state elites’ minds and the inherent 
secrecy of a state’s foreign policy decision making and design. As Sergey Kireyev writes, 
“In many aspects, political theory forms a subjective structure of this abstract science. 
Perhaps, it is since unlike natural sciences or mathematics, social sciences often lack the 
privilege of testing the theories in absolute and unadulterated conditions.”87  In an attempt 
to mitigate these limitations, the study uses three methods. First, the study makes use of 
primary sources (elite interviews, speeches, and government archives) to aid in identifying 
the causal factors most important to the actors in a situation or instance. Second, the study 
relies on secondary sources (area experts) to examine Turkey and the Alliance. Finally, the 
study uses Hintz’s description of current identify proposals in Turkey to aid in gaining a 
greater understanding of the values and beliefs of Turkey’s ruling elites.  
Considering the area of interest for this thesis is on the security aspect of alliances 
and state foreign policy, the primary focus of the thesis will be on the military aspect of 
alliance formation and behavior. The study is premised on the importance of the NATO 
Alliance in contributing to U.S. national security and for ensuring the preservation of 
Western values, peace, and security globally. Because Turkey is a NATO member, the 
study is interested in the role that alliance behavior plays in the shaping of an alliance 
member’s own foreign policy. Specifically, the thesis considers how alliance behavior and 
interactions can either strengthen alliance cohesion or weaken it. The thesis defines the 
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term “the West” as those nations which have adopted and are committed to liberal-
democratic values, democratic institutions, and liberal international institutions. In general, 
these include the nations of North America and Europe, as well as Australia, New Zealand, 
and Japan. The terms “NATO,” “the Transatlantic Alliance,” and “the Alliance” are 
synonymous unless otherwise indicated. Reference is also made to “the allies”—the 
independent and sovereign states which make up the treaty-based coalition that is NATO. 
Additional theoretical terminology and definitions used in this study will be provided. 
F. THESIS OVERVIEW AND DRAFT CHAPTER OUTLINE 
The thesis is organized as follows. Chapter II consists of the theoretical 
frameworks, concepts, and the logic behind the thesis’s application and approach. First, a 
brief overview on alliances and their importance in statecraft will be discussed. Then, 
Stephen Walt’s balance of threat theory (BoT), which is the primary theoretical framework 
applied to this thesis will be discussed; followed by Patricia Weitsman’s theoretical 
contributions; and Lisel Hintz’s description of the ideas, principles, and beliefs of the 
Turkish ruling elite. The aim of the chapter is to enhance the reader’s understanding of the 
key variables the thesis’s modified theoretical framework applies in the examination of the 
case study. Chapter III examines and discusses the historical context of the key events that 
took place during the first half of the twentieth century that led to the formation of the 
NATO Alliance. The chapter first analyzes how the implications of the First World War 
led to seminal events in the making of the Republic of Turkey. Next, the origins of the 
NATO Alliance are examined, along with its raison d’être. Finally, the chapter examines 
the reasons for Turkey’s accession to NATO in 1952. Chapter IV applies the theoretical 
framework to examine Turkey’s alliance behavior (see Figure 1) during the period from its 
accession to the Alliance to the Ankara’s recent alliance behavior and decision making in 
2019. The chapter is primarily divided into three main sections. The first examines 
Turkey’s alliance behavior during the Cold War. The second examines the significance the 
Cold War had on the structure of the international system, NATO, and Turkish foreign 
policy outlook. The third section examines Turkey’s alliance behavior in the Post–Cold 
War Era. This section will analyze key Middle East conflicts that influenced Turkey’s 
perception of the West and increased it threat perceptions in comparison to the rest of the 
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Alliance—specifically after the advent of the Syrian War because it is after this period 
when Turkey’s alliance behavior and Ankara’s decision making became increasingly 
discernable. The aim of the chapter is to identify and compare Turkey’s traditional alliance 
behavior with that of the country’s recent alliance behavior to potentially detect variations 
that may deepen the understanding of Turkey’s divergent security policy with regards to 
its informal alliance with Russia in Syria and Ankara’s decision to purchase the Russian S-
400. Chapter V concludes with a synthesis of the study’s findings and recommendations. 
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II. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORKS, CONCEPTS, AND LOGIC 
Alliances are an essential element of statecraft and are a critical component of 
international politics. States consider alliances as tools for protecting and furthering their 
national interests.88  Therefore, alliances traditionally fall under the security component of 
foreign policy. Yet, arguably foreign policy is primarily a derivative of the state’s domestic 
situation.89  As Sangit Dwivedi writes, “Whether it is domestic politics or international 
politics, the logic and the reason of alliances and counter-alliances is quite an accepted 
phenomenon. Therefore, they cannot be studied apart from other security policies, enmities 
and rivalries to which they are designed to respond.”90   
Since 2013, Turkey’s domestic and foreign policies have repeatedly contradicted 
the polices of other Atlantic members and the values codified in the North Atlantic Treaty’s 
preamble. Turkey’s security cooperation with Russia in Syria after 2016, as well as the 
recent acquisition of Russia’s S-400 air-missile defense system in 2019 are perhaps the 
most obvious example of Turkey’s divergent alliance behavior. Why has Turkey’s alliance 
behavior changed from balancing with its longtime allies to tethering with Russia?  
Moreover, why would Turkey purchase Russia’s S-400 knowing that it would jeopardize 
NATO’s security and undermine the Alliance’s cohesion?  This thesis applies an alliance 
theoretical framework to examine this perplexing case study. In doing so, the thesis seeks 
to contribute to the scholarly understanding of Turkey’s recent alliance behavior. The 
chapter proceeds as follows. First, it discusses the importance of alliances to states within 
the international system. Next, the chapter examines the theoretical framework, concepts, 
and variables that will be applied in the case study. Finally, the chapter explains the logic 
in using the theoretical approach.  
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A. THE IMPORTANCE OF ALLIANCE THEORY  
Alliance theory is a discipline within the field of International Relations (IR). While 
IR seeks to understand how and why states interact, alliance theory examines the formation, 
efficacy, and disintegration of alliances among sovereign political units. The concept of 
alliances is as old as war itself. Indeed, alliances and war are intrinsically linked because 
alliances are formed primarily to increase a state’s security. The Greek historian 
Thucydides’ book, History of the Peloponnesian War, written during the fifth century B.C., 
provides a clear account of the important role alliances play in statecraft and state 
security.91  Alliances are a critical component within the study of international politics 
because they are considered tools of the state which are created to maximize its security 
against perceived threats.92  The concepts within the study of alliance theory contribute 
greatly to state policymaking and play a crucial role in the making of a state’s national 
strategy.93   
The main purpose of an alliance is to safeguard its member states against dangers 
that threaten state sovereignty and territorial integrity. In other words, the top priority of 
creating and maintaining an alliance is to enhance the individual state’s security level. Yet, 
alliances can serve other goals for states as well. Alliances can manage or mitigate the 
likelihood of inter-state tension and conflict both inside and outside an alliance.94  Within 
an alliance, institutional processes may enhance transparency, trust, cooperation, and 
solidarity between allies. Additionally, alliances can reduce the chance of conflict with 
non-member states by deterring aggression by combining the aggregate power and security 
of the alliance members. Thus, alliances can be used as a tool to promote peace and stability 
within the international system. On the other hand, alliances may create a perception of 
 
91 Thucydides, History of the Peloponnesian War, The Penguin Classics (Harmondsworth, Middlesex, 
England; Penguin Books, 1972). 
92 Kenneth Waltz, Man, the State, and War: A Theoretical Analysis, 2001 Edition (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 2001), 168; Stephen M. Walt, The Origins of Alliances (Ithaca; London: 
Cornell University Press, 1987), 32;  Weitsman, Dangerous Alliances: Proponents of Peace, Weapons of 
War, 25–26. 
93 Walt, The Origins of Alliances, 262. 
94 Weitsman, Dangerous Alliances: Proponents of Peace, Weapons of War, 21–24. 
27 
threat to non-member states. This may in turn encourage states to form rival counter-
alliances to balance against the perceived danger. Because of this behavior, a security 
dilemma may arise. Paradoxically, alliance formation can also promote instability and 
conflict.95   
The primary framework for explaining how international relations are understood 
is categorized into three images or political units—man (the first image), the state (the 
second image), and the international system (the third image).96  Alliance theoreticians 
acknowledge that more than one image can shape a state’s international interactions. As 
Kenneth Waltz wrote, “So fundamental are man, the state, and the state system [or 
international system] in any attempt to understand international relations that seldom does 
an analyst, however wedded to one image, entirely overlook the other two.”97  
Nevertheless, scholars debate over what image is the primary factor in explaining 
international relations. The first image theory focuses on the nature of people and argues 
that states are a reflection of human nature—regardless of the belief that human nature is 
innately good (as argued by Rousseau) or inherently corrupt and selfish (as held by 
Hobbes).98  The second image theory focuses on the nature of the state regime and its 
institutions and argues that the state’s domestic structure is the determining factor in its 
behavior (e.g. Marxism and democratic peace theory).99  The third image theory focuses 
on the international system and argues that its nature drives state behavior (i.e., structural 
realism and liberalism).100  Regardless of image, alliances are a tool of statecraft and play 
a crucial role in international politics. As Stephen M. Walt notes, “the forces that shape 
international alliances are among the most important in international politics.”101  
Moreover, Patricia Weitsman writes, “Military alliances shape worlds. They embody the 
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patterns of conflict and cooperation in international politics.”102  Alliances, for better or 
worse, have a significant impact on the nature and outlook of the international system and 
are a critical component in a state’s foreign policy, national security, and grand strategy. 
Considering the significant role NATO has had in international politics over the last 
seventy years, it is both appropriate and essential to examine Turkey’s recent alliance 
behavior about its S-400 decision using an alliance theoretical approach.  
This thesis examines Turkey’s alliance behavior using the theoretical framework of 
Stephen M. Walt. It also incorporates concepts of Patricia Weitsman’s theory of alliance 
formation and cohesion. The thesis draws primarily from Walt’s balance of threat theory 
(BoT), discussed in his book, The Origins of Alliances.103  Patricia Weitsman’s theory of 
alliance formation and cohesion, discussed in her book, Dangerous Alliances: Proponents 
of Peace, Weapons of War, also contributes to the thesis.104  Weitsman’s theoretical 
concepts regarding internal levels of threat and alliance cohesion complement Walt’s 
seminal work—thus, providing a more comprehensive understanding of alliance 
behavior.105   
B. STEPHEN M. WALT: BALANCE OF THREAT THEORY (BOT)  
Stephen M. Walt’s central thesis posits that the primary reason states form alliances 
is to balance against the greatest threat.106  Walt contends that there are four main factors 
(or variables) that determine a threat: power, geographic proximity, offensive capabilities, 
and perceived intentions.107  Walt notes that in most instances a state facing an external 
threat “will align with others to oppose the states [or non-state actors] posing the threat.”108  
This form of alliance behavior is called balancing.  
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Although the title of the book may imply that his study is relevant only to explaining 
alliance formation, his theory provides a rich understanding of alliance behavior writ large. 
As Oliver Stuenkel writes, “Walt integrates a range of domestic variables (including 
perceptions and intentions) into the realist model, turning it into a far more sophisticated 
and applicable theory.”109  Walt’s work holds particular value to this thesis for two 
additional reasons. First, his study primarily focuses on alliance behavior within the Middle 
East,110 a region including Turkey in which Ankara has been increasingly active since the 
AKP came to power. Second, Walt analyzes ideology, foreign aid, and political penetration 
as possible variables for explaining alliance behavior. His examination of these additional 
variables provides valuable and relevant insight into this thesis topic. Overall, considering 
the emphasis placed on Turkey’s S-400 decision, his detailed study, and the theoretical 
framework he develops are significant to this thesis indeed. The exhaustive methodology 
Walt uses to test his theory allows it to be applicable across the international political 
spectrum.111  Ultimately, Walt’s theory is an important contribution to the discipline of 
alliance theory and remains widely accepted among IR scholars.112      
1. Balancing vs. Bandwagoning 
When a foreign power poses a threat to another state, the threatened state will most 
likely either ally with the source of danger (bandwagon) or ally against it (balance).113  In 
general, these two distinct actions are the most common and widely accepted forms of 
alliance behavior exhibited among states when facing a threat. Walt argues that balancing 
is a far more common occurrence than bandwagoning.114   Balancing behavior enables 
states facing a common threat to combine their capabilities. Thus, balancing creates 
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alliances that are more capable of countering a common threat.115  Yet, Walt notes that 
balancing is not universal.116   
On occasion, a state may choose to bandwagon. Weak states that perceive their 
allies to be unreliable and regard the threatening state as appeasable are especially prone 
to bandwagoning behavior.117  There are two main forms of logic behind bandwagoning 
behavior. The first is an act of appeasement to the threatening state. Walt writes, “By 
aligning with an ascendant state or coalition, the bandwagoner may hope to avoid an attack 
by diverting it elsewhere.”118  The second form of logic is to “align with the dominant side 
in wartime in order to share the spoils of victory” and increase the bandwagoning state’s 
chances to influence the war termination negotiations.119  Ultimately, however, the 
decision to bandwagon is based on “the hope that such a step will moderate its [ the 
threatening power’s] aggressive intentions.”120 
Nevertheless, bandwagoning is more dangerous than balancing because 
bandwagoning increases the threatening state’s total power and influence over the 
bandwagoning state. In other words, the potential loss of some or all its sovereignty 
increases for states that bandwagon. Moreover, it requires the bandwagoning state to place 
“trust in its [the threatening power’s]  continued forbearance.”121  Walt writes, “Because 
perceptions are unreliable and intentions can change, it is safer to balance against potential 
threats than to rely on the hope that a state will remain benevolently disposed.”122  
Consequently, balancing is more common an bandwagoning because an alignment that 
preserves most of a state’s interests and freedom of action is preferable to accepting 
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subordination.123   Regardless of the state’s decision to balance or bandwagon, it is 
important to note that both balancing and bandwagoning behavior are responses caused by 
a perceived threat.124    
2. Key Variables: Threat Level Components in Alliance Behavior 
An imposing threat, whether real or perceived, is the main causal factor for alliance 
formation and behavior. When states are confronted with an imposing threat, states will 
likely seek to balance against it by increasing their capabilities, in addition to seeking an 
alliance; and if a state is already part of an alliance, it will seek assistance from its fellow 
allies.125  By now it is clear that threats are the key cause of alliance behavior, but what 
are the key factors that make a threat?  Walt acknowledges the influence that power has in 
alliance behavior: “The power of other states can be either a liability or an asset, depending 
on where it is located, what it can do, and how it is used.”126  Still, power alone cannot 
explain alliance behavior. According to Walt, there are four main components to a threat: 
power, geographic proximity, offensive capabilities, and, in particular, perceived 
intentions.127  He cautions that the weight each factor has on a state’s alliance behavior 
will ultimately vary.128  Therefore, he notes that specific “historical case studies provide 
the most detailed evidence regarding the causes of a particular alliance” and thus offer the 
best method to deepen understanding of specific interactions.129     
a. Aggregate Power 
Aggregate power or total power is the combination of a state’s total resources (the 
population, economic capacity, industrial output, military capability, political cohesion, 
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and technological advancements) and the state’s distribution capability.130   A state’s total 
power can have varying effects on other states. It may attract other states or threaten 
them.131  Therefore, although aggregate power is a significant threat component, other 
factors must be considered as well.   
b. Geographic Proximity  
Geographic proximity is an important component of a threat because the closer a 
state is to another, the easier it is to project influence on other states. Walt contends, 
“Because the ability to project power declines with distance, states that are nearby pose a 
greater threat than those that are far away. Other things being equal, therefore, states are 
more likely to make their alliance choices in response to nearby powers than in response 
to those that are distant.”132  Like aggregate power, geographic proximity alone is unable 
to explain what behavior a state is more likely to choose. However, Walt notes that smaller 
states that share a border with a great power are more likely to bandwagon with it than with 
a distant, non-contiguous great power, especially if the nearby “great power” has 
demonstrated its capability and willingness to intervene and command obedience.133  Walt 
notes that states within a shared region are more distrustful of one another than of states 
far away. Therefore, they generally seek alliances with states outside the region.134  
c. Offensive Capabilities 
Offensive power refers to a state’s capabilities to threaten another state’s 
sovereignty or territorial integrity.135  Walt notes that offensive power is “closely related 
but not identical to aggregate power.”136  A key element in offensive capabilities is a 
state’s willingness to utilize them against another state. Although perceptions are a distinct 
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component of a threat, they are closely related to offensive capabilities because they shape 
how states are viewed. For example, a state that has a large arsenal and is perceived to 
behave aggressively will likely cause the threatened state to balance against it.137 
d. Perceived Intentions  
Understanding how and what a state perceives as a threat is essential to 
comprehending alliance behavior. Walt argues that perceptions “play an especially crucial 
role in alliance choices.”138  Indeed, Walt contends that perceived intentions are more 
important than power for forming a threat.139  Why are perceptions so crucial?  As Walt 
observers, “Because power can be used either to threaten or to support other states, how 
states perceive the ways that others will use their power becomes paramount.”140  Beyond 
power, other factors that shape a state’s threat perceptions can include rhetoric, behavior, 
beliefs, ideology, and history.  
e. Other Variables for Consideration  
As noted previously, Walt holds that the four main variables that determine a threat 
are power, geographic proximity, offensive capabilities, and perceived intentions. Yet, 
Walt also examines other important and less obvious variables that may encourage certain 
alliance behavior, including ideology, foreign aid, political penetration, and nationalism. 
Though Walt contends these other variables are not decisive in determining alliance 
behavior, they are worth briefly noting, in view of the relevance they may have in shaping 
Turkey’s recent security decision making. 
(1) Ideology 
Ideology can either reinforce alliance behavior or create divisions among states. On 
one hand, shared ideology can reinforce state alignment and is preferable to ideological 
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discord and antagonism in pursuing alliance formation and coordinated behavior. This is 
especially true during times of peace and relative stability. In general, states that share 
similar beliefs, especially domestic principles and values, appear less threatening.141  Thus 
they are more likely to trust and align with one another.142  Moreover, states with similar 
ideologies may affect alliance behavior by helping to enhance the legitimacy of weak or 
unstable regimes by demonstrating that they are part of a larger, legitimate movement to 
gain popularity with their constituents.143  As Walt writes, “Accordingly, we can expect 
regimes whose legitimacy is precarious to enter ideologically based alliances.”144  
Paradoxically, certain types of ideology can create divisiveness among states. 
Indeed, divisive ideologies, such as pan-Arabism, can erode trust in relations between Arab 
and non-Arab states and increase the likelihood of conflict between states.145   This finding 
is particularly relevant to this thesis because of Turkey’s neo-Ottoman foreign policy under 
the AKP as well as the shared irredentist aspirations of reclaiming the glory of the former 
Ottoman Empire among the Turkish ruling elites.146  Nevertheless, Walt claims that 
ideology is not a decisive factor because the importance of shared ideology among states 
declines as the level of threat increases.147  Ideological solidarity is more important when 
threat levels are low or when the shared ideology acts to reinforce the state’s security.148  
In other words, a state’s national security requirements will likely take precedence over 
shared ideology, especially when the state faces an imposing threat. 
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(2) Foreign Aid and Political Penetration  
Foreign aid and political penetration are commonly considered to be policy tools 
that deepen inter-state relations between the provider and the recipient. The logic behind 
both policy tools is to gain some form of concessions or leverage in exchange for 
assistance. Despite the popular usage of both political instruments in attracting potential 
allies or maintaining an alliance, Walt’s findings demonstrate “that focusing on foreign aid 
or penetration alone usually does not explain much about how states choose their allies”149 
and “rarely gives patrons significant political leverage over their clients.”150   In the 
absence of a common threat or shared political interests, neither policy tool will be effective 
for attracting potential allies or maintaining alliance solidarity.151   Thus, foreign aid and 
foreign penetration cannot explain alliance formation and behavior. Consequently, Walt 
holds that foreign aid should be considered as “just another form of balancing 
behavior.”152   
Nevertheless, foreign aid is still a useful policy tool. In preexisting alliances, 
foreign aid between allied members is commonly considered a means to strengthen fellow 
allies and foster alliance cohesion.153  However, if alliance members’ political interests 
greatly diverge or if the allies disagree over the level of danger a threat poses to them, the 
lack of adequate foreign aid and assistance will likely cause the ally in need to seek 
assistance elsewhere or realign. Consequently, this may weaken the alliance and erode the 
alliance’s cohesion. 
Political penetration “is defined as the manipulation of the target state’s domestic 
political system to promote alignment.”154  In other words, it is the application of foreign 
influence directed at a state’s population to influence a desired state behavior. The 
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likelihood of penetration influencing a target country is heavily reliant on the state having 
an open society. Walt argues that penetration is rarely successful if other alignment 
motivations are absent.155  In fact, “when penetration threatens a prospective ally’s internal 
stability [or regime], it is more likely to create hostility than to encourage an effective 
alliance.”156  Hence, attempts to penetrate a state’s internal political dynamics are most 
likely to be counterproductive.  
Despite the popularity of using foreign aid and political penetration as policy 
instruments to influence alliance behavior, Walt’s study demonstrates that both are 
unreliable tools that may have little effect. In his words, “Aid and penetration can enhance 
alliances between states with similar interests, but neither is an especially effective 
instrument by itself.”157  If the political interests and shared threat perceptions among 
states are not aligned, neither policy tool will serve to create or maintain effective 
alliances.158  Thus, they are secondary factors in determining alliance formation and 
behavior.159   
(3) Nationalism 
What is the most powerful political force in the world?  Walt argues it is 
nationalism.160  In his words, nationalism is “The belief that humanity is comprised of 
many different cultures—i.e., groups that share a common language, symbols, and a 
narrative about their past (invariably self-serving and full of myths)—and that those groups 
ought to have their own state has been an overwhelmingly powerful force in the world over 
the past two centuries.”161  Walt’s position on the power nationalism is not unique. Indeed, 
Benedict Anderson, a renowned scholar of nationalism, wrote in his book, Imagined 
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Communities, that nationalism “is the most universally legitimate value in the political life 
of our time” with no end in sight.162  Moreover, John J. Mearsheimer, a respected IR 
scholar, contends that “there is little question that nationalism is a real-world phenomenon. 
It is commonplace to talk about nationalism as a powerful force in everyday life that shapes 
politics within and among states.”163   
The power of nationalism cannot be overstated and is important to comprehend in 
the case of Turkish politics and state foreign policy decision making writ large. The 
phenomenon of nationalism can evoke many responses and outcomes. Among the many 
outcomes, nationalism can be used to unify a common people or a state; conversely it can 
also create deep fault lines within a state. Nationalism can be engineered to mobilize a state 
for war and promote a collective irredentism in a society. Further still, it must be 
understood that the power of nationalism is able to trump alliance commitments and even 
limit the power and influence that strong states may attempt to impose on weaker states.164 
C. WEITSMAN’S THEORY OF ALLIANCE FORMATION AND COHESION  
Building upon the seminal work of Stephen M. Walt, Patricia Weitsman’s theory 
of alliance formation and cohesion, presented in her book, Dangerous Alliances: 
Proponents of Peace, Weapons of War, is considered a contribution complementary to 
Walt’s theoretical framework.165  Weitsman’s central thesis posits that differing levels of 
threat can produce varying forms of alliance behavior and that the specific threat level will 
determine a state’s alliance behavior.166  She notes that a “state behaves differently 
according to the specific level of threat they experience.”167  Therefore, she believes it is 
essential to examine levels of threat and alliance cohesion in order to truly understand 
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alliance behavior.168   Because Weitsman agrees with Walt’s theoretical findings, this 
thesis does not discuss in detail her entire corpus of theoretical work. Indeed, her external 
threat factors are strikingly similar to Walt’s four key variables, although she labels them 
differently.169  Nevertheless, Weitsman’s theoretical concept regarding the relationship 
between an alliance’s internal threat levels and the subsequent effects it may have on 
alliance cohesion enriches Walt’s theory. The inherent relationship between internal threats 
and alliance cohesion are invaluable to this thesis. Both variables are useful for analyzing 
an established alliance because of the implications the relationship may have in shaping an 
alliance member’s behavior and determining the fate of the alliance. Consequently, 
Weitsman’s concept of internal threat levels and its relationship to alliance cohesion is 
considered in the examination of Turkey’s recent alliance behavior. 
1. Internal Levels of Threat and Alliance Cohesion  
Weitsman’s theory places a much-needed emphasis on examining the relationship 
between internal threats and alliance cohesion to understand established alliances and their 
members’ behavior. Whereas Walt focused primarily on external threats, Weitsman places 
internal and external threats into two distinct categories.170  This offers the possibility of 
gaining a more comprehensive understanding of Turkey’s recent alliance behavior. 
Weitsman’s concept of internal threats refers to threats that take place within an alliance. 
Internal threat levels are influenced by factors such as the impetus for creating the alliance, 
the level of external threat, and trust, as well as shared values, goals, and interests.171  
Although not all of these factors must be present or in good order for an alliance to function, 
they are all intrinsically linked to an alliance’s level of cohesion.  
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Weitsman defines alliance cohesion as the ability of the member allies “to agree on 
goals, strategy, and tactics, and coordinate activity directed toward those ends.”172  
Alliance cohesion, at its core, is shaped by how alliances perform. What drives alliance 
performance?  Weitsman contends that the original impetus “behind a state’s decision to 
ally is essential” to an alliance’s efficacy in achieving its intended goals.173  Moreover, it 
is important to examine if the alliance’s goals were established during peacetime or war 
because ultimately security is the top priority of states. In other words, during wartime, 
alliances generally put aside lesser disagreements because survival is at stake. Thus, 
alliance cohesion is usually high and internal threat levels are low. Paradoxically, in 
peacetime, it is common for internal threats to increase and alliance cohesion to erode 
because no existential threat exists. Treaties and agreements are important, but what 
ultimately matters are the actions exhibited by fellow alliance members when an ally 
perceives a threat. 
2. External and Internal Threat Levels: How they Impact Alliance 
Cohesion 
Weitsman’s ‘Threats and Cohesion’ table (see Table 1), clarifies her theoretical 
concept between threats (internal and external) and alliance cohesion and how it influences 
alliance behavior. Understanding Weitsman’s theoretical concept regarding the 
relationship between internal threats and alliance cohesion, coupled with an agreed-upon 
level of external threat an alliance faces, is essential to this thesis. It explains why the end 
of the Cold War was such a pivotal event in the history of NATO and Turkey’s foreign 
policy activism during the first decade of the twenty-first century. As Weitsman illustrates 
in the table, when internal and external threats are low, cohesion is low. In this scenario, 
member states are more likely to hedge and develop policies at variance with those of 
fellow allies.  
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Weitsman’s table also helps to explain Turkey’s increased divergence from the rest 
of the Alliance since 2013. Differing external threat perceptions among members of an 
alliance can alter the internal threat level within that alliance. This can influence the 
alliance’s cohesion and drive a member state’s alliance behavior. In the case of Turkey’s 
recent alliance behavior, the external threat for most of the NATO allies remained 
relatively low in comparison to the threats perceived by Turkey. Once the Syrian War 
began, the differing external threat perspectives between Turkey and most of the allies 
caused the internal threat level within NATO to increase and lower (or weaken) the 
Alliance’s cohesion. Thus, Turkey exhibited the alliance behavior of tethering (see 
Appendix A, Thesis Definitions and Terminology, for additional information on tethering), 
in which a member state seeks support from the threatening state to mitigate conflict and 
manage relations. 
Table 1. Threats and Cohesion.174 
 Low Internal Threat High Internal Threat 
Low External Threat Moderate or low cohesion; 
depends on which (internal 
or external) threat is higher; 
usually hedging alliances. In 
these cases, insights 
generated from liberalist 
[liberalism] theory will hold. 
Low or no cohesion; 
tethering alliances. 
High External Threat Moderate to high cohesion; 
balancing alliances. In these 
cases, insights from realist 
theory will hold. 
Cohesion difficult though 
not impossible to attain; 
depends on which 
(internal or external) 
threat is higher. These 
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D. COMBINING WALT AND WEITSMAN  
Walt’s BoT provides a comprehensive theoretical framework for understanding 
alliance behavior, and it is the main theory applied through this thesis. Yet, including 
Weitsman’s theoretical concept regarding the essential correlation between internal threat 
levels and alliance cohesion serves to bolster Walt’s seminal work. These theoreticians’ 
findings are strikingly similar. Walt and Weitsman agree that the level of threat facing a 
state is the main factor in determining alliance formation and behavior.176  Weitsman 
concurs with Walt’s four external threat components: power, geographic proximity, 
offensive capabilities, and, perceived intentions.177  However, her work enriches his by 
adding the importance of internal threats to alliance cohesion and behavior. Both 
theoreticians rightly emphasize the importance of perceptions in shaping what a state 
determines is a threat.178  Walt writes, “the importance of intentions has been apparent 
throughout this analysis. Because power can be used either to threaten or to support other 
states, how states perceive the ways that others will use their power becomes 
paramount.”179  Yet, neither Walt nor Weitsman describes ways in which to determine or 
comprehend how states perceive threats and intentions—other than analyzing direct 
communiqués and actions and aligning with domestically like-minded states.180   Walt 
admits that determining intentions is a difficult endeavor.181  Nevertheless, it is necessary 
to gain a better understanding of the domestic factors influencing Turkey’s alliance 
behavior, including the ideas, principles, and beliefs of the current Turkish ruling elite.  
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E. LISEL HINTZ: TURKISH IDENTITY PROPOSALS 
Alliances are instruments used by states to maximize their security against 
perceived threats.182  Although a state’s aggregate capabilities are essential in determining 
a threat, understanding a state’s perceptual frameworks are equally important in studying 
alliance behavior because perceptions influence who and what is deemed a threat to the 
state. Indeed, Weitsman contends that threats are fundamentally a perceptual factor and 
that perceived intentions are an essential ingredient to determining a threat.183  Walt adds 
strong emphasis on the criticality of perceived intentions in influencing a state’s alliance 
behavior.184  Both theoreticians identify the importance of perceptions and ideas; yet, 
many IR scholars struggle to identify ways to analyze perceptions and intentions. The 
thesis seeks to address this challenge by taking into account the identity proposals 
developed by Lisel Hintz in her book, Identity Politics Inside Out: National Identity 
Contestation and Foreign Policy in Turkey.185  Hintz identifies four distinct and coherent 
Turkish identity proposals in present-day Turkey—Republican Nationalism, Ottoman 
Islamism, Pan-Turkic Nationalism, and Western Liberalism.186  By incorporating her 
analysis of the identity proposals of the Turkish regime, this thesis aims to gain a deeper 
understanding of the Turkish ruling elites’ beliefs, worldviews, and self-perceptions. This 
might enhance one of Walt’s four threat components—perceived intentions.  
1. Importance of Identity Politics in Deciphering Threat Perceptions 
The concept of a distinct political identity proposal (or group) is vital to 
understanding how threats are perceived. Examining a state’s domestic identity politics is 
essential in understanding its foreign policy decisions.187  Hintz explains that identity 
proposals are groups that “compete against each other to delineate, among other standards, 
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the boundaries of inclusion and exclusion, desired goals of the group, and friends and 
enemies—essentially who ‘we’ are and how we should behave.”188  The Justice and 
Development Party (AKP) has been the ruling party in Turkey since 2002 and is 
categorized under the Ottoman Islamism identity proposal. In 2018, AKP leaders forged a 
political alliance with the Nationalist Action Party (MHP) that falls under the Pan-Turkic 
Nationalism identity proposal.189  Since this political alliance is responsible for Turkey’s 
domestic and foreign policymaking, it is essential to understand the beliefs, values, 
principles, aims, and redlines of these two proposals in order to address Walt’s fourth threat 
component. Indeed, Hintz argues that Turkey’s recent changes in its foreign policy can best 
be explained by the rise of the AKP in 2002, a political party that falls under the Ottoman 
Islamism identity proposal, and the ideology its leaders espouse.190  Along with Walt’s 
three other main threat components—power, geographic proximity, and offensive 
capabilities—the Turkish ruling elites’ (AKP/MHP political alliance) perceptions of 
themselves and the world are influential in the shaping Turkey’s recent alliance behavior.  
The purpose of this thesis is not to go into detail regarding Hintz’s “inside out” 
contestation theory,191 but rather to use her analysis and description of the Turkish ruling 
elites’ beliefs and perceptions to determine what role they have in shaping Turkey’s recent 
alliance behavior. The thesis will primarily focus on the identity proposals of the current 
ruling elite—Ottoman Islamism (AKP) and Pan-Turkic Nationalism (MHP). Hintz 
develops a useful framework for providing a comparative analysis of each identity proposal 
by categorizing them into four main elements of content—constitutive norms, social 
purpose, relational meaning, and cognitive worldview (see Table 2).192   
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2. Ottoman Islamism and Pan-Turkic Nationalism 
Of the four prominent Turkish identity proposals, Pan-Turkic Nationalism and 
Ottoman Islamism share the most commonalities. Their similarities far outweigh any minor 
differences they have between each other. Perhaps one of the more important shared beliefs 
between these two identity proposals is their negative perception of Atatürk and his 
legacy.194  As Hintz writes, both “view him as the figure responsible for the repression of 
their religious rights and their persecution as a collectivity under an absolutist secular 
regime.”195  Another important shared commonality is their enmity toward the United 
States as an “imperialist enemy” and their view of the West as a hostile out-group that 
cannot be trusted.196  Other commonalities between Pan-Turkic Nationalism and Ottoman 
Islamism include their strong adherence to Sunni Islam,197 their anti-Semitism, their 
glorification of the Ottoman Empire’s past,198 and subsequently, their shared irredentist 
goal for Turkey to gain greater global power and influence.199  Consequently, both identity 
proposals’ relational meaning drive a Turkish foreign policy that distances itself from the 
West.200   
Hintz’s analysis of the current Turkish ruling elites’ identity proposals greatly 
contributes to a more comprehensive understanding of Turkey’s recent divergent alliance 
behavior, its increasingly illiberal backsliding, and the decision to purchase the Russian S-
400. The Ottoman Islamist belief in the resurrection of the Sunni caliphate in Turkey helps 
to explain Ankara’s foreign policy activism in the region under the AKP.201  Hintz writes, 
“In order to re-establish Turkey’s roles as inheritor of the Ottoman legacy of regional rule 
and the legitimate center of the Muslim world, as it had been while hosting the caliphate, 
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the AKP sought to spread its influence and leadership authority across former Ottoman 
lands.”202  Her assessment that the Ottoman Islamists hold that the government should 
have absolute authority within the state provides increased clarity behind the government’s 
brutal reaction to the Gezi Park protests,203 the repression of human rights, and the recent 
purges.204  Meanwhile, the Pan-Turkic Nationalists’ disdain and exclusion of all Kurds 
from what they consider genuine Turkishness helps explain why Kurdish-Turkish 
rapprochement has failed in Turkey. As a result, Kurds have endured injustices both in and 
outside of Turkey from Ankara.205  Thus, the political alliance between the AKP and MHP 
appears to be beneficial for both groups in the pursuit of their Turkish identity hegemony.  
F. THESIS APPLICATION AND LOGIC  
Since 2013, Turkey, a member of the NATO Alliance, has increasingly engaged in 
both domestic and foreign policy actions that contradict the purposes, principles, and ideals 
on which the Alliance was formed. Consequently, Turkey’s recent alliance behavior has 
increasingly called into question the future of the Alliance and Turkey’s role within it.206  
This thesis seeks to understand the factors that influenced Turkey’s recent alliance behavior 
in the purchase of Russia’s S-400. Why would an alliance member state make a decision 
that would weaken its own alliance’s security and erode its cohesion?   
This thesis will apply the theoretical framework of Stephen M. Walt’s BoT as the 
primary theory to examine the case study. To reinforce his seminal work, theoretical 
concepts by Patricia Weitsman on internal threat levels and alliance cohesion will be 
included as well as the identity proposals developed by Lisel Hintz. Weitsman’s and 
Hintz’s works enrich the foundational theory put forth by Walt. Weitsman’s concepts of 
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internal threats and the effects they have on alliance cohesion add an important variable to 
examine, especially in established alliances. Meanwhile, Hintz’s work on identity 
proposals within Turkey greatly contributes to providing a more comprehensive 
understanding of what the Turkish ruling elite perceives as a threat.  
The two independent variables are external threat levels and internal threat levels 
(see Figure 1). Walt’s four key components of a threat (power, geographic proximity, 
offensive capabilities, and perceived intentions) will be applied to examine the external 
threat level.207  While, the internal threat level draws from Weitsman’s work.208  The 
dependent variable is alliance cohesion, which is in a constant state of fluctuation as a result 
of the varying levels of the two independent variables. Hintz’s work on identity politics 
within Turkey’s current domestic society is incorporated in both independent variables to 
enrich the comprehension of the current Turkish elites’ beliefs and perceptions. By 
combining the three scholars’ work, the thesis aims to deepen the understanding of 
Turkey’s recent alliance behavior. 
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Figure 1. Thesis’s Theoretical Framework.  
Although the focus of the thesis is to examine Turkey’s recent security decision 
regarding Ankara’s informal alliance with Moscow and its purchase of the Russian S-400 
through the application of alliance theory, the modified theoretical framework presented 
throughout this chapter aims to potentially fill a gap in academia gap that may enrich the 
understanding of Turkey’s overall foreign policy divergence from the West. To achieve 
this aim, the thesis employs a combination of historical analysis and process tracing to 
establish a baseline of the theoretical variables and then identify possible variations in the 
established baseline variables to answer the question: what factors led Ankara to decide to 
acquire the S-400 despite the assessment of the United States and its other fellow NATO 
allies that the acquisition of the Russian surface to air missile defense system would 
jeopardize the integrity and security of the Alliance? 
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III. THE GENESIS FOR THE TURKISH REPUBLIC, NATO, AND 
TURKEY’S ACCESSION 
To understand why Turkey’s alliance behavior appears to be increasingly divergent 
from the rest of its NATO allies it is prudent to first examine the key events of the first half 
of the twentieth century. This period played a significant role in the shaping of state 
perceptions, the founding of the Turkish Republic (1923), and the creation of the NATO 
Alliance. The dynamism and uncertainty exhibited during the first half of the twentieth 
century created an extremely volatile international system that witnessed two world wars, 
the introduction of nuclear weapons, and the collapse of six empires (the Austro-
Hungarian, German, Ottoman, and Russian Empires after the First World War; and the 
German Third Reich and the Japanese Empire after the Second World War). Two world 
wars were among the primary factors in the collapse of these great powers and the 
emergence of new ones, which greatly shifted the balance of power within the international 
system. As Martin Wight wrote, “Great-power status is lost, as it is won, by violence.”209  
Indeed, the first half of the twentieth century witnessed an unprecedented amount of 
violence and carnage on a scale the world had never before experienced nor has witnessed 
since. Hence, the effects of state militarism, international instability, and the consequences 
of the world wars increased the value states saw in alliances for enhancing the members’ 
security and advancing their interests.  
The NATO Alliance was formed from because of this international volatility, 
dynamism, and insecurity. The outcome of the rise of nationalism and the First World War 
sowed the seeds of state perceptions. Specifically, Turkey’s dialectical perception of the 
West, which consisted partly of suspicion and partly of admiration.210  Still, it was the 
events during and subsequently after the Second World War that became the impetus for 
the Alliance’s formation and the primary driver for Turkey’s accession to NATO. As Walt 
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and Weitsman hold, states will likely form alliances when faced with a threat.211  That 
shared threat was the Soviet Union and its expansionist policy. The chapter seeks to deepen 
the understanding of shared threat perceptions, the roles and benefits the original 
signatories saw in Turkey’s accession to NATO, and conversely, the roles and benefits 
Turkey considered in deciding to join the Alliance. By examining these topics, the chapter 
seeks to provide a clearer comprehension of Turkey’s recent alliance behavior.  
The chapter proceeds as follows. First, it discusses the implications of the Ottoman 
Empire’s defeat after the First World War and the subsequent construction of the Turkish 
Republic under Mustafa Kemal Atatürk. As Walt holds, perceived intentions are a critical 
component in informing what a state sees as a threat.212  Many scholars contend that 
Turkish perceptions of the West were deeply influenced by the events following the end of 
the First World War.213  Next, the chapter examines the origins of the NATO Alliance. It 
is crucial to examine the Alliance’s purposes, goals, and desired end state to understand 
how they affected NATO’s external and internal threat levels and its alliance cohesion. 
Then, the chapter analyzes the reasoning for Turkey’s accession to the Alliance. Identifying 
the benefits that Turkey and the original signatories conceived may explain Turkey’s recent 
alliance behavior. Finally, a synthesis of the findings is discussed and contextualized 
through Walt’s theoretical variables of alliance behavior and theory.  
A. THE END OF AN EMPIRE AND THE MAKING OF THE TURKISH 
REPUBLIC 
The history between Europe and the Ottoman Empire is highly complex. The 
relationship spans roughly six centuries. During this period, Europeans and the Ottomans 
learned to coexistence, experienced several wars and uprisings, but also exchanged many 
cultural and ideological concepts. The immense history between Europe and the Ottoman 
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Empire is not possible to encapsulate within this thesis and therefore, is beyond the scope 
of this thesis. Still, providing a historical context is necessary in the understanding of 
Turkey’s current collective perceptions and the country’s recent alliance behavior. Thus, 
this chapter begins by examining the historically relevant events that have influenced 
recent Turkish alliance behavior and its trend away from the country’s traditional Western 
allies.  
During the period between 1912 to1922, the Ottoman Empire experienced an 
extremely violent and volatile time of tremendous insecurity that fundamentally 
transformed the Ottoman legacy and created the collective Turkish narrative, psyche, 
perspective, and mythos surrounding Atatürk as the great hero and nation builder.214  
Indeed, Uur Ümit Üngör describes this period as “the ‘dark side’ of the Turkish process of 
nation-building, of which violence was a defining feature.”215  These violent events 
include: the Balkan War (1912) and the subsequent forced expulsion of European Muslims, 
the Ottoman defeat during the First World War (1914–1918), the genocide of Armenians 
and Syriacs (1915), the Turkish War of Independence (1919–1922), the Kocgiri and Pontus 
massacres in 1921, and the violent treatment of the Kurdish people throughout the 1920s 
and 1930sculminating in the Dersim massacre of 1938.216  Undeniably, the ideas of 
national sovereignty and militarism which dominated this period of history is seminal to 
the making of Turkish politics, its foreign policy, and the Turkish collective perception of 
the West.  
1. Consequences of Defeat: the Treaty of Sèvres and the Turkish War of 
Independence 
During the First World War, the Ottoman Empire allied with Germany and the 
Central Powers to wage war against the Entente Powers.217  The Central Powers were 
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ultimately defeated and signed an armistice that ended the war on November 11, 1918.218  
The Ottoman regime’s costly defeat prompted the eventual demise of the 600 year old 
empire. Due to the strategic location, historical affinity, and resource-rich territories of the 
Ottoman Empire, Britain, France, and Russia were conducting confidential negotiations 
for the division of the empire as early as 1915. The British-French accords were later 
known as the Sykes-Picot Agreement.219  At the Conference of San Remo in April 1920, 
the Allied Powers convened to determine the fate of the Ottoman Empire.220  This 
conference produced the language codified in the Treaty of Sèvres (see Figure 2). The 
Treaty was agreed upon by representatives from the Ottoman government and the 
victorious allies on August 10, 1920.221   
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Figure 2. Treaty of Sèvres: Borders, Foreign Occupiers, and Proposed 
Mandates.222 
The Treaty of Sèvres was a humiliation for the Ottoman Empire and the Turkish 
nationalists. The significance of the treaty cannot be overstated. According to the terms of 
the treaty, the Ottomans renounced all rights and ownership of the Middle East, North 
Africa, Thrace, the Aegean islands, and large tracts of western and southern Anatolia.223  
In addition, the treaty called for an independent Armenian state and an autonomous region 
of Kurdistan (see Figure 2).224  Moreover, the Ottomans were stripped of control over the 
Bosporus and Dardanelles. The treaty placed them under international control. The Treaty 
of Sèvres severely damaged the prestige and status of the Ottomans. Ultimately, it signaled 
the end of the Ottoman Empire and the creation of the Republic of Turkey. 
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Although the Treaty of Sèvres was never legally ratified, the humiliation it created 
for the Turks had immediate and enduring consequences that still resonate within the 
Turkish psyche. Indeed, Hasan Kosebalaban opines that “The Ottoman decline in the First 
World War and the Treaty of Sèvres created irreparable damage to in [sic] the Turkish 
nationalist psyche continuing its effects to this day.”225  Not only did the treaty contribute 
to Turkish feelings of insecurity, it deepened the collective mistrust of the West at large. 
In the near term, the treaty was denounced by the Turkish nationalist movement as an 
unacceptable agreement. Although Turkish nationalism was already present, the treaty 
became a powerful catalyst to the movement. Led by Mustafa Kemal, the Turkish 
nationalist movement was founded on militarism. Turkish nationalists waged a war of 
independence (1919–1922) to remove both the foreign occupiers and the ailing Ottoman 
government.226   
Eventually, the nationalist forces under Mustafa Kemal forced the war-weary 
Western Allies to renegotiate the terms of the original Treaty of Sèvres at Lausanne, 
Switzerland, in 1922. The outcome was the creation of a new agreement called the Treaty 
of Lausanne that was signed on July 24, 1923.227  The new treaty was an enormous victory 
for Mustafa Kemal and the participants of the war of independence. First, it returned much 
of the territory that now makes up modern-day Turkey. Second, the treaty called for the 
removal of the foreign occupiers. Lastly, the treaty no longer contained language requiring 
the establishment of an independent Armenian state nor a Kurdish autonomous region.228  
In the long term, the Treaty of Sèvres created an enduring legacy of mistrust and 
suspicion toward the West. The treaty became a political trope, commonly referred to as 
the Sèvres Syndrome, a narrative that created a near constant skepticism about the West’s 
true intentions that range from dividing and annexing Turkey’s territorial integrity to 
secretly supporting an autonomous Kurdish regional government. Indeed, Graham E. 
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Fuller holds that the Sèvres Syndrome “today is still an emotive call for remembrance and 
a reminder to never again permit foreigners to act in ways that might dismember or cripple 
Turkey.”229  Characterized as a strategic paranoia, the trope applies to the Kurdish question 
that Ankara currently struggles to peacefully solve.230  Consequently, the Sèvres 
Syndrome continues to play an important narrative in shaping Turkish suspicions of 
Kurdish connections to the PKK, as well as informs Turkey’s perceptions of the West as 
dishonest imperialists.231  These events remain significant. For the Turks, the Ottoman 
Empire’s defeat during the First World War at the hands of a more capable Western 
military force and the consequences of that defeat—the Treaty of Sèvres—created a 
complex dual perception of the West that still exists in Turkish politics and society.232  
On one hand, Turkey views the West with suspicion, resentment, and skepticism. 
Indeed, Graham E. Fuller writes that the West is “recognized as a long-standing, source of 
imperialist aggression that was a key force in the dismantling and destruction of the 
Ottoman Empire.”233  The Sèvres Syndrome persists as a powerful political trope that 
influences Turkey’s collective perceptions characterized by deep distrust of the West.234  
While, the redrawing of Turkey’s southern border with Syria by the Western victors 
remains a collective source of Turkish irredentism in Turkish politics. On the other hand, 
Turkey views the West with admiration because of its power and success. Fuller notes, 
“The West is admired as a powerful, advanced, and accomplished civilization..”235  Thus, 
after establishing the Republic of Turkey in 1923, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk and his 
successors implemented national reforms aimed at transforming the country along Western 
lines.236  Turkey’s dual view of the West has remained an important factor in shaping 
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Turkish foreign policy. The importance that Walt and Weitsman place on the perceptual 
concept of who is a friend and an enemy in determining a state’s alliance behavior cannot 
be overstated. State perceptions help to inform its leadership as to who is a friend and an 
enemy. The Treaty of Sèvres and Atatürk’s making of the new Turkish Republic are 
significant events that arguably continue to shape Turkey’s alliance behavior and 
perceptions of the West. 
2. The Making of the Modern Turkish State: Kemalism and Social 
Engineering  
The making of the modern Turkish state was led by Turkey’s founding father and 
first elected president, Mustafa Kemal—later known as Atatürk.237  The goal of his nation-
state making was to create a homogeneous, secular, and Westernized modern state. 
However, due to Turkey’s multiethnic diversity and Ottoman past, achieving these goals 
proved to be extremely challenging. As Lord Acton wrote, “The greatest adversary of the 
rights of nationality is the modern theory of nationality. By making the State and the nation 
commensurate with each other in theory, it reduces practically to a subject condition all 
other nationalities that may be within the boundary. It cannot admit them to an equality 
with the ruling nation which constitutes the State, because the State would then cease to be 
national, which would be a contradiction of the principle of its existence.”238  In essence, 
from the beginning, Atatürk’s vision of a homogenous and secular state was either doomed 
to fail or would involve implementing procedures that contradicted Western values. 
Atatürk chose to establish an authoritarian hegemony over the state to impose his reforms 
on Turkish society via a top-down process of social engineering.239  Ultimately, Atatürk 
and his Kemalist legacy made great progress in transforming Turkey from a conservative, 
religious society to one which arguably resembled a semi-Western democratic state.  
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On October 29, 1923, the Republic of Turkey was established with Atatürk 
becoming the new Turkish Republic’s first duly elected president.240  Throughout the 
1920s and 1930s, Atatürk implemented policies intended to remove the legacy of the 
Ottoman Empire and its Muslim past from Turkish society. His aim was to replace this 
backward legacy with a secular, unified, and modern nation-state modeled after the West. 
Atatürk’s Kemalist ideology was founded on six key principles: populism, republicanism, 
nationalism, secularism, statism, and reformism.241  Adopting many of Mussolini’s 
techniques at the time, Atatürk set about manufacturing a nationalist society. According to 
Zürcher, “An extreme form of nationalism, with the attendant creation of historical myths, 
was used as the prime instrument in the building of a new national identity, and as such 
was intended to take the place of religion in many aspects.”242   
Kemalist reforms focused primarily on three key areas—the state, the Islamic 
religion and its symbols, and the Turkish society.243  Some of Atatürk’s key secular 
reforms included abolishing the caliphate (1924) and the dervish orders (1925), outlawing 
the fez—a symbol of religious traditionalism (1925), implementing a civil and criminal 
code modeled after the Swiss (1926), adopting the Western clock and Gregorian calendar 
(1926), renouncing Islam as the state’s official religion (1928), replacing the Arabic script 
with the Latin alphabet and the Arabic numerals with the Western numerals (1928), and 
implementing a secular system of public education.244  Samuel P. Huntington argued that 
Atatürk’s decision to adopt the Latin alphabet was particularly important because “It made 
it virtually impossible for the new generations educated in the Roman script to acquire 
access to the vast bulk of traditional literature; it encouraged the learning of European 
languages; and it greatly eased the problem of increasing literacy.”245   
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Undoubtedly, Atatürk’s series of calculated reforms throughout the early years of 
the new Turkish Republic were effective in the pursuit of achieving his vision of a secular, 
nationalistic, and Western-oriented Turkish state. Most of the modernizing reforms 
occurred within urban areas; however, they had less impact in rural Turkey. Although many 
Turks accepted the reforms with indifference, resistance to secularism remained.246   
Atatürk’s vision of a homogeneous, secular, Westernized, modern state never fully 
came to fruition. Hintz contends that Atatürk and his identity proposal legacy—Republican 
Nationalism—arguably came the closest of Turkey’s four identity proposals to achieving 
a unified Turkish national identity.247  Yet, Atatürk’s image of Turkey has been 
increasingly weakened by the identity contestation within Turkey, especially after the AKP 
came to power in 2002.  
3. Turkish Foreign Policy (1923–1945) 
From the Turkish Republic’s founding until the end of World War II, Turkish 
foreign policy was primarily based on maintaining neutrality. Throughout this period, 
Atatürk’s ‘peace at home, peace in the world’ remained the guiding principle of Ankara’s 
foreign policy.248  Atatürk and his Kemalist successor, İsmet İnönü, were primarily 
concerned with implementing domestic reforms that were aimed at modernizing the 
country and reinforcing the authority of the state.249  Nonetheless, Turkey had concerns in 
the surrounding region, particularly in territories that the Ottoman Empire once ruled. 
These foreign policy concerns included Mosul, the Balkans, the Sadabad Pact, and Hatay.  
a. Mosul  
From 1923 to 1926, Turkey’s primary foreign policy agenda centered on the dispute 
over Mosul and its surrounding area.250  Britain, the dominant foreign power in the Middle 
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East, claimed tutelage of Mosul and other areas within the Middle East. British interests 
were mostly focused on the economic aspects of gaining access and revenue from the oil 
in the region. However, Turkey felt that it had a legitimate claim to Mosul and was 
concerned that its inability to acquire it would be perceived as a failure to uphold the 
objectives of the National Pact.251  After negotiations between the two parties failed in 
1924, the issue was taken to the League of Nations, which determined that Mosul would 
become part of the new province of Iraq. The decision pleased the British but angered the 
Turks. Yet, neither party was prepared to go to war over the decision. Ultimately, in June 
1926, a bilateral treaty was signed providing Turkey with 10% of the oil revenue from the 
Mosul province for the next 25 years.252  However, to this day, Turkey has exhibited an 
irredentist interest in reclaiming the northern Iraqi region.  
b. The Balkan Pact 
In the 1930s, the Balkans became the other foreign policy concern for Turkey 
during the period from 1923 to 1945. Like the province surrounding Mosul, the Balkans 
had been an Ottoman territory that still contained elements of Turkic speaking diasporas. 
Yet, unlike Mosul, the situation and actors involved in the Balkans made things much more 
complicated to diplomatically navigate. War in Europe was becoming increasingly 
imminent. Turkey’s main concern was with Italy, which was perceived as a potential 
adversary to one of Turkey’s traditional zones of danger—the Balkans.253  Turkey’s key 
objectives were its security, to be left out of the looming war, to prevent instability within 
the Balkan region, and to prevent the Europeans from seizing it.254  Hence, Turkey actively 
sought diplomatic means of achieving its objectives. In 1932, Turkey renewed its Treaty 
of Neutrality, Mediation and Judicial Settlement with Mussolini’s regime.255  Then, in 
1933, Turkey sought a rapprochement with Greece intended to create an anti-Italian 
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alliance. The move was successful in creating an Entente Cordiale—a bilateral pact for the 
defense of Thrace.256  Lastly, Turkey signed formal non-aggression pacts with both 
Yugoslavia and Romania. The separate agreements between the various states eventually 
evolved into the Balkan Pact (Greece, Romania, Turkey, and Yugoslavia) in 1934, which 
guaranteed that if one of the states was attacked the others would come to its defense.257  
Despite Turkey’s diplomatic activism in Europe, Ankara perceived itself as vulnerable to 
Italian aggression. 
c. The Sadabad Pact 
Like the Balkan Pact, the impetus for Turkey’s decision to become a signatory to 
the Sadabad Pact of 1937 was its fear of Italian activity and perceived aggression in the 
Horn of Africa, combined with Italy’s apparent interests in the eastern Mediterranean.258 
The Middle East regional security pact included Afghanistan, Iran, and Iraq.259  Yet, the 
pact was unique in that it did not call for guarantees of military aid and support to one 
another against an outside aggressor. Instead, the primary purpose of the accord was to 
ensure the territorial integrity of signatories against one another.260  Indeed, as Hale writes 
the main objectives of the Sadabad Pact was for the signatories to “preserve their common 
frontiers, not to interfere in one another’s territory and to consult together on all matters of 
common interest…The Sadabad agreement was primarily a means of preventing frontier 
disputes between the four states” and confirmed that the parties would not aid the Kurdish 
rebels to undermine one another.261 
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d. The Annexation of Hatay 
Perhaps the riskiest Turkish foreign policy confrontation that occurred during the 
inner-war period was the dispute over the territory of Hatay262 with France. As part of the 
former Ottoman Empire’s defeat in the First World War, France and the Ottoman 
government signed the Treaty of Ankara in 1921, which gave Hatay special status under 
the French mandate.263  Hatay was at the time located within Syrian territory. However, 
Ankara considered the inhabitants of Hatay as part of the Turkic people and had ambitions 
to have the territory annexed to Turkey.264  After failing to fully settle the matter 
diplomatically under the auspice of the Council of the League of Nations in 1937, along 
with the growing tensions between Turkey and Syria over the territory, Turkey deployed 
approximately 30,000 troops to the border of Hatay in 1938.265  The events taking place 
in Europe regarding Germany revanchism during this time obliged France to acquiesce to 
Turkey’s demands for the annexation of Hatay in 1939.266  According to Zürcher, the 
annexation of Hatay to this day is a source of “great anger” with Syrians, who still “depict 
the area as Syrian on their maps.”267  Although, Turkey was successful in gaining the 
territory of Hatay, the redrawing of the Turkish-Syrian border after the First World War 
remains a source or irredentism in southern Turkey, exhibiting its desire to reclaim the 
territories north of Aleppo.  
Overall, Turkey was successful in maintaining Atatürk’s guiding principle of 
‘peace at home, peace in the world’ with regards to its foreign policy, maintaining a neutral 
position—even as the Second World War was waged. Still, Turkey made formal 
agreements with various states to ensure its security and to protect its interests during the 
period from 1923 to 1945. The focus for Turkey was on its domestic reforms, which were 
shaped by Atatürk and his six principles of Kemalism. Yet, as will be discussed, Turkey’s 
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foreign policy after the Second World War increasingly emphasized inclusion and 
cooperation with the West. To understand why Turkish foreign policy progressively shifted 
westward, it is necessary to examine the origins of the NATO Alliance.  
B. THE ORIGINS OF THE NATO ALLIANCE 
“It..[is] the common practice of mankind, …[to] accept an empire [of 
alliances]…, and refused to give it up [without going to war] under the pressure of three 
of the strongest motives, fear, honor, and interest.” 
—Thucydides268  
Alliances are a tool of statecraft and a crucial component of international relations. 
Indeed, Weitsman contends that “Military alliances shape worlds.”269  Examining 
alliances deepens the understanding of conflict and cooperation between states and 
ultimately reveals the causes of changes in the international system. Therefore, it is vital to 
identify and examine the origins of an alliance because this will clarify the forces 
compelling the alliance’s formation and its goals. Analysis may increase the likelihood of 
determining the reasons an alliance may dissolve or continue to exist, as well as explain a 
member’s alliance behavior. Walt writes, “The forces that bring states together and drive 
them apart will affect the security of individual states by determining both how large a 
threat they face and how much help they can expect.”270  Additionally, Weitsman holds 
that alliance “Cohesion will flow from the raison d’être of the alliance.”271  Hence, to 
increase the understanding of Turkey’s current alliance behavior concerning its fellow 
NATO allies and with Russia, it is imperative to analyze the origins of the Alliance, its 
raison d’être, and the reasoning behind Turkey’s accession into NATO. 
The creation of the NATO Alliance was by no means an inevitable outcome. The 
creation of the Alliance was highly contested by various parts of society within some of 
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the original state signatories.272  Jamie Shea, formerly NATO’s Deputy Assistant 
Secretary General for Emerging Security Challenges, stated during a lecture in 2008 that 
“NATO…was controversial at the time [1949]. There was even a riot in Iceland in 1949 
when that rather sober country agreed to adhere to the Washington Treaty…one of the 
reasons why the negotiations took so long was precisely because there were always on both 
sides of the Atlantic hesitations and doubts.”273  Yet, the Athenian ambassadors at Sparta 
stated, as reported by Thucydides, the formation of military alliances is a derivative of fear, 
interest, and honor.274  Arguably all three factors influenced the decision to create the 
NATO Alliance. However, above all, it was fear of Soviet expansionism into Western 
Europe following the end of World War II that compelled the twelve original signatories 
(Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, 
Norway, Portugal, the United Kingdom, and the United States) to overcome their 
differences and consequently sign the North Atlantic Treaty in Washington, D.C., on April 
4, 1949.275  The formation of the NATO Alliance was revolutionary in that it was the first 
time in history an alliance forged in peacetime committed an organized military force under 
a unified command structure.276 
1. Soviet Expansionism 
Although the fear of Soviet expansionism was the main reason for the creation of 
the NATO Alliance, the origins of the Alliance were discernable before the Second World 
War began. Martin Malia, an expert on Russian history, contended that Josef Stalin’s 
decision to sign the August 1939 Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact between Germany and the 
Soviet Union was primarily based on his irredentist aims to recapture the territories of the 
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old Russian empire of Finland, the Baltic States, Poland, and Bessarabia.277  The second 
article of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact reinforces Malia’s Soviet irredentist claims, stating 
that neither signatory would intervene on behalf of a third party if either Germany or the 
Soviet Union made a warlike action on a third party.278  Subsequently, the Molotov-
Ribbentrop Pact facilitated Stalin’s move to make the Baltic states of Estonia, Latvia, and 
Lithuania his frontier provinces—invading them in the summer of 1940.279  Despite 
eventually joining the Grand Alliance against Nazi Germany in June 1941, after Hitler 
invaded the USSR, Stalin had already begun his Soviet expansionist campaign, which 
sparked concerns in Western European states. Thus, increasing the internal threat level of 
the wartime Grand Alliance. Yet, because the Grand Alliance members equally viewed the 
Axis Powers as an existential threat, the external threat level maintained a higher position 
over the alliance’s internal threat level.280  Consequently, the Grand Alliance’s cohesion 
was strong enough to overcome the internal tensions and mistrust.  
Stalin’s intentions for the expansion of the Soviet Union into Europe became 
increasingly apparent to the Western leaders during the Tehran Conference (November 
28—December 1, 1943).281  Declassified information released by the United States 
Department of State, Office of the Historian reveals that at the conference, “Stalin pressed 
for a revision of Poland’s eastern border with the Soviet Union to match the line set by 
British Foreign Secretary Lord Curzon in 1920. In order to compensate Poland for the 
resulting loss of territory, the three leaders agreed to move the German-Polish border to 
the Oder and Neisse rivers.”282  In return, Stalin, whose Red Army had already annexed 
Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, agreed to allow these countries to hold democratic elections 
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once the war was over—although he insisted that the future elections abide by the Soviet 
Constitution.283  Consequently, as Zbigniew Brzezinski writes, Eastern Europe was 
“conceded de facto to Josef Stalin by Franklin D. Roosevelt and Winston Churchill” at the 
conference in Tehran.284 
The next meeting which the three Allied leaders (Churchill, Roosevelt, Stalin) 
attended was the Yalta Conference, which took place at a Russian resort town in Crimea 
from February 4–11, 1945.285  With an Allied victory seemingly inevitable in the European 
theater, the three leaders made decisions regarding postwar Europe, among other topics. 
At this point in the war, the Soviet Red Army occupied territories in Czechoslovakia, 
Finland, Germany, Poland, and Romania (in addition to the annexation of Estonia, Latvia, 
and Lithuania).286  As Malia wrote, “For the West, the Yalta Conference became the 
symbol of the West’s naïve surrender of Eastern Europe to Stalin.”287  Indeed, Stalin’s 
irredentist designs through Soviet expansionism were visible well before the beginning of 
the Cold War. In short, Roosevelt and Churchill had been politically and militarily 
outmaneuvered by Stalin in Europe. Former U.S. Secretary of State James F. Byrnes, then 
a delegation member at the Yalta Conference, later reflected, “It was not a question of what 
we would let the Russians do, but what we could get the Russians to do.”288  In other 
words, Stalin had presented the move as a fait accompli to the Western leaders. 
The slowly growing dealignment between Russia and the rest of the Grand Alliance 
or United Nations (as the alliance against the Axis Powers was called from January 1942 
on) is not uncommon throughout the history of military alliances. Indeed, as the force that 
compelled the allied states to align is perceived to no longer be a threat, individual state 
interests take precedence once more. In other words, the raison d’être for the creation of 
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the alliance no longer applies. According to Erik P. Hoffmann, each of the three Grand 
Alliance states’ priorities greatly differed as the Second World War neared its end:  
In probable order of importance, the United States was concerned with (1) 
removal of procedural obstacles to the creation of the United Nations; (2) 
war strategy in the Far East and Allied assistance in subduing Japan; and 
(3) the political and territorial status of postwar Europe, especially Germany 
and Poland. Great Britain was concerned with (1) its colonial empire; (2) 
the political ramifications of the fighting in Europe, especially the final 
location of Allied troops and the future of Germany, France, Poland, and 
the Balkans; (3) the Far East military situation; and (4) the United Nations. 
The USSR was concerned with (1) ensuring national security against 
Germany, other European powers, and the United States; (2) strengthening 
Stalin’s control over the Soviet polity and the international Communist 
movement, which now included potentially powerful parties in Eastern 
Europe; (3) reconstructing the devastated Soviet economy, preferably with 
reparations from a united but permanently weakened Germany; (4) 
preserving the territories gained under the Nazi-Soviet pact; and (5) 
reacquiring territories lost to Japan in 1905 and acquiring new territories in 
Norway, Germany (East Prussia), Poland, Czechoslovakia, Turkey, Iran, 
and Japan.289  
Consequently, as the end of the Second World War drew near, each of the victorious 
belligerents began to increasingly pursue its individual national interests.  
Yet, the significant reduction in the Grand Alliance’s shared view of the external 
threat only explains part of the reason why it began to fray and ultimately dissolve. The 
second factor to consider is the internal threat level. There was much distrust between the 
Soviet Union and its Western allies, including centuries of war between varying Western 
European states and Tsarist Russia,290 their differing political ideologies, and suspicions 
by Stalin that the Western Allies would secretly make peace with Nazi Germany during 
the Second World War.291  Regardless of this deep-seeded mistrust, the Grand Alliance’s 
cohesion remained because the external threat level was much more significant than the 
internal threat level. However, once the threat of Nazi Germany was extinguished, the 
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Grand Alliance’s external threat level diminished and was usurped by its internal threat 
level.292  Consequently, this change in threat levels undermined the alliance’s cohesion 
and led to its dissolution.  
2. The Perception of the Soviet Union as an Existential Threat to the 
West 
The West’s fear of the Soviet Union was caused by the combination of its 
expansionist policy, the perception of a formidable Red Army and its provocative behavior, 
and the increasing momentum of communist popular front movements during and after the 
Second World War in Europe.293  Indeed, by 1945, the Soviet Union “had annexed nearly 
180,000 square miles of territory with a population of more than 23 million people.”294  
Walt and Weitsman hold that perceptions are critical to informing how states determine 
what they deem as a threat.295  Though scholars may disagree over the Soviet Union’s 
foreign policy objectives following the end of the Second World War, what ultimately 
matters concerning the formation of NATO is that the Soviet Union’s behavior was 
perceived to be threatening to Western security, principles, and values.296   
Overall, each of Walt’s four variables of a threat (power, geographic proximity, 
offensive capabilities, and perceived intention) contributed to the West’s view of the 
Soviets as a threat. Following the Second World War, the United States and the Soviet 
Union emerged as the two great superpowers. Soviet expansionism into Europe decreased 
the geographic proximity between the Soviets and Western Europe, as they now shared a 
border. The Soviet Union maintained a large military presence in Eastern Europe well after 
the Second World War ended. Meanwhile, the Soviets were near to acquiring a nuclear 
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weapons capability. The combination of these four variables caused many in Western 
Europe to perceive the Soviet Union as an existential threat to liberal democracy, peace, 
and national security. Hence, these states displayed a balancing behavior, by seeking 
security arrangements with Canada and the United States and allying together against the 
prevailing threat—the Soviet Union.297  Yet, before the Alliance came into existence, the 
United States first tried to contain Soviet expansionism by implementing the Truman 
Doctrine.  
3. The United States: The Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan 
The Truman Doctrine and the Economic Cooperation Act, better known as the 
Marshall Plan, were both parts of a comprehensive American grand strategy to provide 
security and economic means for Europe to recover from the ravages of the Second World 
War and deter Soviet expansionism. The grand strategy is still regarded as being successful 
because it strengthened the trans-Atlantic link between the United States and Europe, 
facilitated greater integration among the European states, and prevented further Soviet 
incursions into Western Europe. The Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan were 
arguably the seeds that eventually grew to become the NATO Alliance and the European 
Union. This grand strategy also benefited the United States by strengthening its national 
security and foreign policy aims by containing the Soviet Union and preventing its 
communist ideology from spreading across the whole of Europe.298   
The United States had learned that it could no longer conduct an isolationist foreign 
policy as it did after the First World War. Having just suffered the carnage of the Second 
World War, the United States and its Western European partners had no desire to see the 
countries they had just fought to liberate become subjugated to another form of 
totalitarianism. Still, the catalyst for expediting the approval of both U.S. programs through 
Congress resulted from the urgent requests for assistance in preventing further Soviet 
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expansion into Western Europe by the free European nations.299  Lawrence S. Kaplan 
writes, “Despite the frequent charges that NATO was a product of America’s imperial 
reach after World War II, it was Europe’s initiative—not that of the United States—which 
opened the way to NATO.”300  Thus, in response to Europe’s concerns, President Truman 
declared in a speech to Congress that “It must be the policy of the United States of America 
to support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities, or by 
outside pressure” on March 12, 1947.301   
In support of the Truman Doctrine, the United States Congress authorized 
comprehensive security and economic aid that appropriated $400 million and the 
authorization of both American military and civilian missions aimed at deterring Soviet 
and communist influences that were specifically directed towards Greece and Turkey.302  
NATO archives reveal that the Truman Doctrine was specifically designed to aid these two 
countries because they faced the gravest threats of succumbing to communist ideology 
within Greece and of and caving in to Soviet intimidation tactics in the case of Turkey.303  
According to William Hale, Greece’s situation was deemed to be more precarious than that 
of Turkey because Greece was struggling with internal political and economic challenges 
which gave rise to support in some quarters for communist ideology.304  Thus, the majority 
of U.S. aid was directed at stabilizing the internal turmoil in Greece.  
Unlike Greece, Turkey was facing external pressure from the Soviet Union and 
Stalin’s Red Army. The Montreux Convention of 1936 granted Turkey legitimate control 
of the Turkish Straits.305  Understanding Turkey’s strategic value, Stalin demanded a 
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revision of the Montreux Convention in 1945–46.306  The early success of the Soviet 
expansionist policy combined with Stalin’s desire for control of the Straits resulted in the 
Red Army surrounding Turkey’s east and west flanks. This form of coercion increased the 
pressure on Turkey, but Ankara continued to resist intimidation. Stalin’s likely aim, 
according to Hale, was “to isolate Turkey diplomatically and then force the rulers to accept 
a treaty that would give the USSR control of the straits and then of the government as a 
whole.”307   
Shortly after President Truman’s famous speech, Secretary of State George 
Marshall gave a speech on June 5, 1947, at Harvard University, in which he proposed that 
the United States provide economic assistance to Europe to aid in its reconstruction and 
economic recovery.308  The speech resulted in the Economic Cooperation Act of 1948, 
which was approved by Congress and subsequently signed by President Truman on April 
3, 1948.309  The Act included the appropriation of approximately $15 billion over the next 
four years to sixteen states for the reconstruction of their infrastructure, cities, and 
industrial capacity.310  Though the Marshall Plan was primarily directed toward the 
economic recovery of Europe, Turkey was a recipient of the aid as well. In 1948 to 1950, 
the United States provided Turkey with $183 million for economic development and $200 
million in military aid.311  The Marshall Plan not only served to foster greater cooperation 
among the recipients of this financial aid, but it also strengthened the trans-Atlantic 
relationship between the United States, Western Europe, and Turkey.  
Although the Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan successfully deterred Soviet 
expansionism in the West and reinvigorated the Western European economy, some 
scholars believe that the implementation of the Truman Doctrine was the catalyst for the 
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beginning of the Cold War,312 rather than a prudent response to Soviet threats. Moreover, 
the strategy did not stop the Soviets from exhibiting provocative, aggressive behavior in 
Europe. In February 1948, the Soviets covertly supported a communist putsch in 
Czechoslovakia that removed the democratically elected government.313  Then, in 
response to the West’s efforts to consolidate Western Germany, the Soviet Union 
implemented a ground blockade to prevent communications between West Berlin and the 
West from June 24, 1948 to May 12, 1949.314  This spurred Britain, France, and the United 
States to respond by supplying the people of Berlin by air. Indeed, the Soviet Union’s 
behavior continued to be of concern to the West. Thus, European calls for a collective 
defense and security pact increased.315   
Nonetheless, the Truman Doctrine’s grand strategy successfully achieved its 
objectives of providing security reassurances, facilitating economic reconstruction, and 
blocking further Soviet expansionism into Western Europe and Turkey. For Turkey, the 
military and economic aid not only helped Ankara to ward off the Soviet Union’s 
intimidation tactics, but also laid the foundation for a strong strategic partnership with the 
United States. Discussing the profound effect that the Truman Doctrine had on Turkey, the 
country’s Minister of Foreign Affairs, Necmeddin Sadak, said, “The Truman Doctrine was 
a great comfort to the Turkish people, for it made them feel that they were no longer 
isolated.”316  However, both programs were designed to be short term solutions. The 
looming shadow cast by the Soviet Union’s expansion into Europe required a more 
permanent and robust solution for the deterrence of further Soviet expansion and the 
protection of the West from communism.317  The West’s solution to this issue became the 
creation of the NATO Alliance.  
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4. North Atlantic Treaty: Purpose and Principles 
[NATO] “was created to keep the Soviet Union out, the Americans in, and the 
Germans down” 
—Lord Hastings Lionel Ismay, first Secretary General of NATO318 
As previously mentioned, the main impetus for the creation of the NATO Alliance 
was the fear that the perceived threat of Soviet expansionism created within the West. 
However, honor and interest were also influential factors in its formation. As Lord Ismay’s 
famous statement implies, the Alliance was not founded purely to provide security against 
the Soviet Union. NATO was also formed to ensure that the United States maintained a 
presence in Europe to convey security reassurances to its European Allies, to foster positive 
trans-Atlantic relations and integration, and to prevent the re-emergence of European 
militarism.319   
The creation of NATO was a monumental achievement in the history of the world. 
The North Atlantic Treaty (see APPENDIX B) was purposefully written in “conformity 
with the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations, to preserve peace and international 
security and to promote stability and well-being in the North Atlantic area.”320  
Additionally, its framework signified the commitment of the allies to a set of shared liberal 
values, principles, and beliefs. Thus, the Alliance was more than purely a defensive security 
pact, as it incorporated political, economic, and social dimensions as well.321  The North 
Atlantic Treaty emphasized the importance of economic and social progress, while 
reaffirming the signatories’ inherent right to collective self-defense. The Preamble of the 
Treaty states, “The Parties…are determined to safeguard the freedom, common heritage 
and civilization of their peoples, founded on the principles of democracy, individual liberty 
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and the rule of law…[and] resolved to unite their efforts for collective defense and for the 
preservation of peace and security.”322  The Treaty aimed not only to ensure the members’ 
security through collective self-defense but also to secure and promulgate Western ideals 
of liberalism. Although the Alliance has been successful in providing security, the liberal 
ideals within some of the member allies have not been enforced or fully achieved.323  
Undoubtedly, the allies are committed to upholding the principles and values in the 
Preamble, but the history of NATO reveals that the priority of security, especially during 
certain times during the Cold War, has trumped the Treaty’s stated values. 
C. TURKEY’S ACCESSION  
Like the impetus for NATO’s formation in 1949, the perceived threat of Soviet 
expansionism caused fear within Turkey, which compelled it to seek accession to the 
Alliance. Hale writes, “there was a real fear on the Turkish side that the USSR wanted not 
only to gain control of the straits but also to convert Turkey into a satellite.”324  Although 
security concerns were Turkey’s top priority after the Second World War, the country was 
also seeking to bolster its economic development and modernization.325  Thus, Turkey saw 
membership in NATO as a means to guarantee the flow of Western aid that would enable 
the country to address both its security and economic concerns.326  Meanwhile, the 
Alliance considered Turkey’s accession to the Alliance as a way to bolster its security by 
safeguarding the Turkish Straits from Soviet control, thereby protecting Europe’s southern 
flank, as well as acting as a buffer state327 against Soviet expansion into the Near and 
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Middle East.328  Still, Turkey faced many challenges before its application to the Alliance 
was finally approved.  
1. Turkey’s Early Attempts at Joining a Western Security Pact 
The threat imposed by Soviet diplomatic isolation and the Red Army’s apparent 
aggressive behavior caused Turkey to eagerly pursue membership in a greater Western 
security pact. Thus, in 1948, Turkey officially requested participation in any future alliance 
with the West.329  However, Turkey’s request was denied. According to the United States 
Department of State, Office of the Historian records, “The Turkish Government was 
informed…[that] the conception [of a Western security pact] was clearly a geographical 
one, restricted geographically in scope to countries of the North Atlantic region.”330  In 
the eyes of the West, Turkey was a Middle Eastern country. After NATO was created, 
Turkey, was still determined to gain formal security assurances with the West, submitted 
its first formal application for membership to the Alliance in May 1950.331  It seemed that 
for Turkey to gain accession to the Alliance, it would first need to demonstrate its worth. 
Serendipitously, the outbreak of the Korean War in 1950 provided Turkey with this 
opportunity.   
2. Turkey and the Korean War 
Although the defense of South Korea during the Korean War (1950–1953) was 
under the auspices of the United Nations (UN), it nonetheless tested the resolve of the 
newly formed Alliance and compelled NATO to make its first transformation as a result. 
North Korea’s invasion of South Korea was perceived as an extension of the Soviet 
Union’s influence and its desire to spread communism. The war increased the West’s fears 
of Soviet expansionism and revealed that it was a global threat to the Western way of 
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life.332  When the UN requested membership participation in the war effort, Turkey saw 
an opportunity to gain the respect and approval of the Alliance. In other words, Ankara’s 
contributions to the UN-led effort were tied to its entry into NATO.333  Less than a month 
after the Korean War began, Ankara offered to send a brigade of 4,500 troops to the war 
front. By the war’s end, approximately 25,000 Turkish troops had served in the war—
suffering over 6,000 casualties.334  According to John M. Vander Lippe, Turkey’s decision 
to break from its nearly 30-year-old foreign policy based on neutrality was driven by both 
domestic and foreign factors. He writes, “Turkish leaders believed that participation in 
military operations in Korea would mean closer ties to the West, which in turn would lead 
to economic growth and greater diplomatic and military power.”335  Ultimately, Ankara’s 
gamble was successful in achieving these ends. In September 1951, the North Atlantic 
Council convened in Ottawa and recommended the approval of Turkey’s accession to the 
Alliance.336  Consequently, Turkey officially became a NATO member on February 18, 
1952 (see APPENDIX C).337   
3. Turkey’s Contribution to the Alliance from the Western Perspective 
Undoubtedly, the main factor for Turkey’s invitation to join the Alliance stemmed 
from the threat of Soviet expansion.338  However, the West understood that having Turkey 
in NATO provided other important benefits for enhancing the Alliance. The first was 
Turkey’s strategic location. According to Andrew M. Johnson, by 1950, “NATO was 
looking to expand its global reach through acquiring strategic basing rights. Because of 
Turkey’s strategic location, accepting Turkey into the Alliance helped to achieve this 
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aim.”339  Indeed, with Turkey located at the crossroads between three distinct regions of 
the world—Europe, Asia, and the Middle East—offering Turkey inclusion in NATO 
considerably enhanced the Alliance’s ability to project power and influence and extend its 
strategic reach.340  
Second, accepting Turkey in NATO prevented Moscow from achieving its 
centuries-long objective of taking control of the Turkish Straits.341  In other words, by 
accepting Turkey’s accession to the Alliance, NATO had deterred further Soviet attempts 
at pursuing control over the straits, representing the accession as a fait accompli. This 
restricted the Soviet Navy’s access in and out of its only warm water port.  
Third, Turkey’s membership greatly increased the size of NATO’s ground forces. 
An assessment done by the CIA in 1947 estimated that Turkey had a standing army of 
555,000 men.342   
Fourth, NATO saw that Turkey’s accession to the Alliance would increase the 
protection of—and access to—the West’s growing requirements for Middle Eastern oil.343 
Finally, and perhaps most important, Turkey’s accession provided Europe a 
defender to protect its eastern and southern flank. Turkey’s role would be as a buffer 
state344 and an alternative avenue of approach to defend and launch a possible counter-
attack against the Soviet Union if required.345  No longer could the Soviet Union focus 
solely on a possible European ground axis of approach if war broke out between NATO 
and the Soviet Union. Thus, by approving Turkey’s accession, the Alliance forced the 
Soviet Union to divide its forces and give credence to protecting its southern flank.  
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D. CONCLUSION 
Although the threat of Soviet expansionism following the end of the Second World 
War was key factor for the formation of NATO in 1949 and Turkey’s accession to the 
Alliance in 1952, the need for creating a powerful Alliance stemmed from the dynamism 
and unprecedented amount of death and destruction during the first half of the twentieth 
century. Stalin’s Soviet expansionist policy post-1945 was undoubtedly perceived as a 
threat to the security of Turkey and the West.  
After the Second World War, the relationship between the United States and Turkey 
greatly deepened. The Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan were key strategic plans 
that served to reassure Turkey and strengthen the strategic partnership that would develop 
over the next seven decades between the Washington and Ankara. Regardless of how real 
the threat from Soviet expansionism was to the West’s and to Turkey’s way of life, what 
matters is that the Soviet Union behaved in a manner that caused the West and Turkey to 
determine it was a threat, and this ultimately compelled Turkey to join the Alliance to 
balance against the Soviet Union. Indeed, all four of Walt’s variables of power, geographic 
proximity, offensive capabilities, and perceived intentions were present during this period. 
Thus, the Soviet Union in the view of the West and Turkey was that it was a real threat. 
Walt contends that “States form alliances primarily to balance against threats.”346  
Undoubtedly, his Balance of Threat theory (BoT) holds in the case of the NATO Alliance’s 
formation and Turkey’s accession.  
Stalin gravely miscalculated in his foreign policy decisions after the Second World 
War. His policy was founded on bandwagoning beliefs, thinking he could intimidate and 
threaten weaker states into allying with the Soviet Union or exact concession from them.347  
However, his tactics and bandwagoning belief ultimately backfired, as states such as 
Turkey and Iran instead exhibited balancing behavior by seeking other states to balance 
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against the Soviet Union.348  By forming the Alliance, the allies exhibited balancing 
behavior. This behavior not only increased each member’s individual security against the 
threat, but the NATO Alliance arguably helped to create a sense of order and stability 
within an anarchical international system.  
NATO’s primary purpose was to deter Soviet aggression against the member states 
by maintaining a formidable Alliance founded on the idea of mutual collective defense 
against any would-be attacker. The Alliance’s defense pledge is cemented in Article 5 of 
the North Atlantic Treaty, which states that “an armed attack against one…shall be 
considered an attack against them all…”349  The creation of the Alliance provided 
reassurances to Western Europe and Turkey. NATO reinforced the West’s solidarity by 
codifying the Alliance member’s guarantees to defend one another and ensure the 
principles of liberty and other values the members shared. However, the Cold War was just 
beginning.  
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IV. TURKEY’S ALLIANCE BEHAVIOR IN NATO 
Having laid the historical foundation on which the NATO Alliance was created and 
having identified the key factors that influenced Turkey’s accession to the Alliance in the 
previous chapter, the following chapter applied the theoretical framework discussed in 
Chapter II to examine Turkey’s alliance behavior (see Figure 1). This chapter examines the 
security dimension of Turkish foreign policy and Ankara’s alliance behavior from the 
period between Turkey’s accession to NATO (1952) to its security decision making in 
2019 to deepen the understanding of Turkey’s tethering behavior towards Russia in Syria 
and to comprehend the factors that influenced Ankara’s decision to acquire the S-400.  
Although the period examined in the chapter includes Turkey’s alliance behavior 
both during and after the Cold War, the primary focus and main body of the chapter are on 
Turkey’s alliance behavior since 2013. After 2013, Turkey’s alliance behavior and foreign 
policy decision making noticeably deviated from its normative alliance behavior—most 
notably Turkey’s tethering behavior towards Russia that manifested in both countries, 
creating an informal alliance regarding security matters in Syria starting in 2016 and 
featuring Ankara’s decision to purchase the Russian S-400 in 2017. The examination over 
this span of time reveals that the origins of Turkey’s recent divergence from the rest of 
NATO began with the structural alterations to the international system as a result of the 
end of the Cold War. The subsequent Middle East instability demonstrated by the Gulf War 
(1990–1991), the Iraq War (2003–2012), and the Syrian War (2011–present) intensified 
the Alliance’s threat level, while the wars increased Turkey’s external threat level 
disproportionate to the rest of the allies’ perceived external threat level in the Middle East. 
The combination left the cohesion of the Alliance in tatters and compelled Ankara to search 
for alternative ways to ensure the country’s national security. Finally, the advent of the 
current Turkish regime (AKP) and its adherence to Ottoman Islamist ideology influenced 
the orientation of Turkey’s interest away from that of the West and its traditional allies. 
These three critical factors not only influenced Turkey’s perceptions of its place in the 
world, but also significantly altered the perceptions and opinions held by both Turkey and 
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the West toward one another. Yet, it was the events after the outbreak of the Syrian War 
that have called into question Turkey’s alliance behavior and decision making.  
This chapter proceeds as follows. First, Turkey’s alliance behavior during the Cold 
War is discussed with reference to the thesis’ theoretical variables and concept of cause 
and effect to explain its ‘traditional’ alliance behavior. Additionally, this section will 
examine three internal Alliance disputes between Turkey and the Alliance that became the 
genesis of Ankara’s doubts about NATO’s security assurances. Although this section is 
succinct, the analysis regarding this period is necessary to establish a baseline for Turkey’s 
normative alliance behavior. Next, the chapter discusses the significance of the end of the 
Cold War had on Turkish foreign policy, NATO, and the international system writ large. 
This seminal event deeply influenced Turkey’s perception of its place in the world. Then, 
the chapter examines the Post–Cold War Middle East conflicts that increasingly shaped the 
collective Turkish perception of the United States and NATO at large. This section 
concludes by discussing the decisive events that arguably explain Turkey’s marked change 
in its traditional alliance behavior exhibited by its tethering behavior towards Russia in 
Syria since 2016 and Ankara’s S-400 decision in 2017. Finally, a synthesis of the findings 
is presented.  
A. TURKEY’S ALLIANCE BEHAVIOR DURING THE COLD WAR 
Turkey’s accession to the Alliance in 1952 was founded on Ankara’s fear of Soviet 
expansionism that threatened Turkey’s security and sovereignty. The Soviets’ aggressive 
behavior and intimidation along Turkey’s northern border, the Red Army’s seemly 
insurmountable military armament and enhanced offensive capabilities, and Stalin’s well-
known desire to acquire control of the Turkish Straits deeply influenced Ankara’s 
perception that the Soviet Union was a real threat to Turkey. Indeed, Hale contends that 
“the fear that the USSR might try to take over Turkey as a means of controlling the straits 
was still the most important single reason for Turkey’s attachment [and balancing 
behavior] to NATO.”350  Applying the theoretical framework in examining Turkey’s 
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alliance behavior during the 1950s, it is not surprising that Turkey (the weaker state) sought 
to join an alliance to balance against the Soviet Union (the strong state).351  Ankara deemed 
the USSR an existential threat because it met all four of Walt’s components of a threat.352   
As previously discussed, the Soviet Union was the fundamental driver for the 
formation of NATO. In other words, the Alliance’s raison d’être was to deter and defend 
each of the members against the high external threat level the Soviet Union presented. 
According to Weitsman, the cohesion of an alliance is greatly influenced by the level of 
the threat and where its source is derived from (externally or internally).353  Because the 
internal threat level within the Alliance never surpassed the allies’ shared external threat 
level during the Cold War, the strength of the Alliance’s cohesion stayed reasonably strong 
during this period. Hence, the strength of the Alliance’s cohesion is intrinsically linked to 
its raison d’être.354  Consequently, the impetus and original purpose upon which an 
alliance is formed will help to determine its efficacy and longevity. Weitsman’s theory 
explains why NATO was able to successfully accomplish its objective of collective defense 
against the Soviet Union. 
Despite the success the Alliance had in deterring the Soviet Union during the Cold 
War, Turkey’s relations with its fellow NATO allies was by no means harmonious. There 
were a handful of historical disputes between Ankara and the Alliance since Turkey’s 
accession to NATO that increased the internal threat level—most notably the Cuban 
Missile Crisis (1962–1963), the Cyprus Crisis involving President Johnson’s letter (1963–
1964), and the Turkish invasion of Cyprus (1974).355  The last event led to an arms 
embargo by the United States (1975–1978).356  These events planted the seeds of Ankara’s 
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distrust of the Alliance’s commitment to defending Turkey’s security and interests.357  
Explaining the impact of these internal disputes, Fuller writes that they “created doubt in 
Ankara about the reliability of U.S. security guarantees and the degree of U.S. sensitivity 
to Turkish interests.”358  Subsequently, this doubt created a temporary change in Turkey’s 
alliance behavior from balancing to tethering that was expressed through the short-lived 
rapprochement between Ankara and Moscow.359  Nevertheless, the increase in the internal 
threat level that these events caused never surpassed the external threat level produced by 
the Soviet Union. Despite the internal friction, NATO was able to maintain a moderately 
high level of Alliance cohesion. Thus, it was able to overcome these internal Alliance 
quarrels.  
1. The Cuban Missile Crisis 
The first of the three was the Cuban Missile Crisis (1962–19633). In October 1959, 
Washington and Ankara agreed to deploy fifteen nuclear-armed Jupiter intermediate range 
ballistic missiles to Turkey that were installed in 1961, and became operational in 1962.360  
The purpose of the missile agreement was not only to enhance Turkey’s military 
capabilities and bolster the country’s deterrence capabilities against the Soviet Union, but 
to demonstrate the Alliance’s commitment and solidarity.361  However, with the Soviet 
Union’s nuclear-armed ballistic missile emplacement in Cuba, the Jupiter missiles became 
a bargaining chip to deescalate the potential of starting a nuclear war. Although the nuclear 
warheads remained in U.S. possession, the missiles belonged to Turkey.362  Still, as part 
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of the crisis’s resolution with the Soviet Union, the United States agreed to remove the 
missiles from Turkey without first consulting about the decision with Ankara.363   
Although the decision to remove the missiles deescalated a near nuclear war, 
Ankara perceived the removal of the missiles as “a sense of betrayal” by its strategic 
partner—the United States.364  Indeed, the “Turkey-for-Cuba trade” increased Ankara 
mistrust that the United States and NATO writ large would truly come to the defense of 
Turkey if a war broke out between the Soviet Union and Turkey.365  Although the Turkish 
ruling elites’ suspicions of its allies may have grown, Hale remarks, “The incident failed 
to provoke [Turkish] public criticism” because Ankara decided to keep the incident from 
the public.366  Consequently, the removal of the nuclear-armed Jupiter missiles did little 
to increase the internal threat level.  
2. The Republic of Cyprus and the Johnson Letter
The second internal Alliance clash involved Greece and Turkey over the island of 
Cyprus (1963–1964). Historically, the control of Cyprus has been exchanged between 
Greece, the Ottoman Empire, and Great Britain.367  The island has remained a deeply 
political and emotional contentious issue between Greece and Turkey because both states 
have cultural, societal, and political affinities to the island. In 1878, Cyprus fell under the 
tutelage of the British Empire. After the Second World War, Great Britain withdrew its 
colonial control of the island, which resulted in an armed struggle between the Greek 
Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots that lasted until 1960.368  As part of the Zurich and London 
Agreements of 1959 and 1960, Greece, Turkey, and Great Britain were to cooperate in 
transitioning the island into the independent state call the Republic of Cyprus, which was 
363 Mustafa Kibaroglu and Ayşegul Kibaroglu, Global Security Watch-Turkey (Westport, 
Connecticut; London: Praeger Security International, 2009), 51. 
364 Lawrence S. Kaplan, NATO Divided, NATO United: The Evolution of an Alliance (Westport, CT: 
Praeger Publishers, 2004), 73. 
365 Hale, Turkish Foreign Policy since 1774, 101. 
366 Hale, 100. 
367 Kibaroglu and Kibaroglu, Global Security Watch-Turkey, 137. 
368 Kibaroglu and Kibaroglu, 137. 
84 
to be a constitutional state.369  However, tensions between the Greek Cypriots and Turkish 
Cypriots intensified in 1963, when the Greek Cypriots altered the constitution in their 
favor. The move left the Turkish Cypriots with limited rights. Subsequently, violence and 
protest ensued that resulted in the killing of Turkish Cypriots in 1963.370  The perceived 
atrocities on the Turkish Cypriots pressured Turkey to intervene on their behave.  
As a proxy war between Greece and Turkey seemed increasingly eminent, 
President Lyndon B. Johnson wrote his infamous letter to Turkey’s Prime Minister İnönü 
(see APPENDIX D) that was aimed at preventing the two NATO allies from going to war. 
Not only would the conflict between NATO allies weaken the Alliance’s cohesion, there 
was the real risk that the Soviet Union, who was supporting the Greek Cypriots, would 
initiate a large-scale conventional war if Turkey became too heavily involved.371  Thus, 
possibly drawing the whole of NATO into a war against the Soviet Union under Article 5 
of the North Atlantic Treaty. In an excerpt from the letter to Prime Minister İnönü, 
President Johnson warned Ankara that the United States and NATO was unwilling to 
defend Turkey against a military conflict whether it be with Greece or against the Soviet 
Union if Ankara was seen to be the provocateur: 
I must call to your attention, also, Mr. Prime Minister, the obligations of 
NATO. There can be no question in your mind that a Turkish intervention 
in Cyprus would lead to a military engagement between Turkish and Greek 
forces. Secretary of State Rusk declared at the recent meeting of the 
Ministerial Council of NATO in The Hague that war between Turkey and 
Greece must be considered as ‘literally unthinkable.’ Adhesion to NATO, 
in its very essence, means that NATO countries will not wage war on each 
other. Germany and France have buried centuries of animosity and hostility 
in becoming NATO allies; nothing less can be expected from Greece and 
Turkey. Furthermore, a military intervention in Cyprus by Turkey could 
lead to a direct involvement by the Soviet Union. I hope you will understand 
that your NATO Allies have not had a chance to consider whether they have 
an obligation to protect Turkey against the Soviet Union if Turkey takes a 
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step which results in Soviet intervention without the full consent and 
understanding of its NATO Allies.372 
The “Johnson Letter” further deteriorated Turkey’s confidence that the United 
States and its fellow NATO allies would come to its defense. Indeed, according to Fuller 
the letter “Opened a major discussion in Turkey over the very cost and value of its alliance 
with the United States and NATO, sparking serious internal debate about whether Turkey 
should even withdraw from NATO…the crisis inaugurated a dramatic new era of 
rapprochement between Ankara and Moscow.”373   
3. The Turkish Invasion of Cyprus and U.S. Punitive Actions 
The last internal Alliance dispute was Turkey’s invasion of Cyprus in July 1974. 
The invasion of Cyprus was a continuation of the hostilities between Greece and Turkey 
that started nearly a decade earlier. On July 15, 1974, a pro-Greek military junta executed 
a successful putsch on the island. In response, Turkey evoked the Treaty of Guarantee 
(1960) and invaded the island to protect the Turkish Cypriots.374  After failing to achieve 
an agreeable settlement, the TSK conducted a series of military operations that captured 
roughly 40% of the island.375  In February 1975, Turkey proclaimed the newly conquered 
territory as the Turkish Federated State of Cyprus—a “move that was unrecognized by any 
state except Turkey.”376  In response to Turkey’s unacceptable actions, the United States 
government froze U.S. aid and imposed an arms embargo on Turkey that lasted from 1975 
to 1978.377  Ankara retaliated by rescinding the United States status of forces agreement 
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and took control of all U.S. installations—although the United States and NATO were 
allowed to continue to perform NATO operations.378   
4. Summary of Turkey’s Alliance Behavior during the Cold War 
The Cuban Missile Crisis (1962–3), the Johnson Letter (1964), and the Turkish 
invasion of Cyprus (1974) and the resulting arms embargo by the United States (1975–
1978) represent the low points between Turkey and the rest of the Alliance during the Cold 
War. The internal Alliance clashes between Turkey and the rest of NATO during the 1960s 
and 1970s did have an impact on Turkey’s image as a stalwart Ally against the Soviet 
Union and the Alliance’s perception of Ankara as a trustworthy Ally. For Turkey, these 
events reinforced its distrust of the Alliance’s commitment to Turkey’s security guarantees 
and its national interests.379  
Examining Ankara’s alliance behavior with Moscow during the 1960s and 1970s, 
it is possible to identify parallels with the alliance behavior Ankara has exhibited with 
Moscow since 2016. In both instances, Moscow saw an opportunity to exploit a rift 
between Turkey and the rest of the Alliance. Furthermore, Turkey has demonstrated a 
tethering behavior in each of the periods. Weitsman describes tethering as a form of 
alliance behavior that is “A strategy to manage relations with one’s adversary [the Soviet 
Union] by drawing closer to it via agreement.”380  The incidents discussed increased the 
internal threat level between Turkey and the rest of the Alliance, while there was a disparity 
between Turkey’s perception of the external threat and the other members of NATO. The 
increase in the internal threat level and the difference in the external threat level, combined 
with Ankara’s perceived betrayal and the rest of the Alliance’s mistrust of Turkey’s 
intentions drove Turkey to exhibit a tethering behavior. Arguably, the same variables that 
are observed in the case of Turkey’s shifting alliance behavior since 2016.    
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Ankara felt compelled to tether with the Moscow to address its own national 
intertest requirements that had been lost in the weakened relations with both the United 
States and NATO. Because tethering is generally temporary and less risky than 
bandwagoning, Ankara risked little retribution from NATO by tethering with the Soviet 
Union during the 1960s and 1970s.381  Furthermore, tethering enabled Ankara to redirect 
its interests and means toward the issue of Cyprus without having the heightened concern 
of Soviet aggression. .  
Still, tethering is usually a temporary arrangement between rivals.382  The ‘Johnson 
Letter’ may have shook the trust and confidence of Turkey in the Alliance and even brought 
about a short lived rapprochement with Moscow; however, the internal threat level never 
exceeded the external threat level of the Soviet Union. Moreover, Moscow could never 
match the benefits that came with being a member of the Alliance.383  Thus, the Alliance 
cohesion held. As Hale points out these events represent irregularities when one observes 
the entirety of Turkey’s membership within the Alliance.384  Indeed, Steven A. Cook 
remarked during his testimony to Congress in 2016, “The overarching threat that the Soviet 
Union posed to both countries [Turkey and the United States]…ensured that these crises, 
problems, and irritants never disrupted the strategic relationship.”385  Why?  Because the 
Soviet Union possessed of all four of Walt’s component of a threat throughout the Cold 
War, with perhaps the exception being the United States. Martin Wight opined, “the chief 
duty of each government is regarded as being to preserve the interests of the people it rules 
and represents against the competing interests of other peoples.”386  Maintaining the 
solidarity of the Alliance during the Cold War served this purpose for its members. Thus, 
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it was advantageous for the members of the Alliance to maintain overall friendly relations 
through the Cold War to ensure its security and sovereignty.  
Table 3. Summary of the Variables Influencing Turkey’s Alliance Behavior 
in the Cold War. 
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From the Alliance’s formation in 1949 to the end of the Cold War in 1989, NATO 
successfully achieved its raison d’être—collective defense to deter and if necessary, 
defend its members against the Soviet Union. As Yost opines, “Despite the rather motley 
and sometimes cumbersome character of the organization, it has been remarkably 
successful in aggregating power and achieving fundamental objectives.”388 NATO’s 
success can be contributed to its ability to maintain a strong Alliance cohesion. Turkey’s 
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NATO membership and contribution during the Cold War was a key factor to the 
Alliance’s  success. Noting the important role Turkey played, Retired U.S. ambassador 
James F. Jeffrey stated, “We could not have won the Cold War, had Turkey gone under or 
even better neutral—it’s that simple.”389  Yet, the collapse of the Soviet Union (1989–
1991) ushered in a new era of volatility that significantly altered the Alliance’s shared 
perception of the external threat level it faced. The dissolution of the Soviet Union removed 
the threat that was the impetus for NATO’s formation, greatly reducing the Alliance’s 
shared high external threat level.  
B. THE END OF THE COLD WAR: IMPLICATIONS FOR NATO AND 
TURKEY 
The collapse of the Soviet Union fundamentally altered the international order. 
Changing it from first a bipolar to unipolar and finally a multipolar system. The seminal 
event significantly altered U.S. foreign policy, the future of NATO, and Turkey’s foreign 
policy. Weitsman opines that the original reason “behind a state’s decision to ally is 
essential” to the overall alliance’s efficacy.390  In other words, now that the Alliance had 
achieved its raison d’être, what further purpose did it serve and was membership in the 
Alliance still beneficial for the individual member state’s own interests?  During the Cold 
War, Turkey and other NATO allies considered the Soviet Union as the existential threat 
because it maintained all four of the threat components. Thus, the Alliance’s shared 
external threat level remained high, while NATO’s internal threat level remained relatively 
low. This combination of variables  resulted in the Alliance maintaining strong cohesion.  
1. Walt and the End of the Cold War’s Impact  
Considering that Walt’s book was written before the Cold War ended, it is worth 
mentioning his remarkable accuracy in predicting the challenges that states would face in 
a multipolar international system. Walt warned that in a Post–Cold War world, “It will be 
far less clear which states pose the most serious threats; as a result, international alignments 
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[alliances] will be more ambiguous and less durable.”391  His prediction implies that 
alliance formation may become less formal and more flexible to more readily react to an 
uncertain international system. In Walt’s view, “Perceptions of intent will be increasingly 
important, because the distribution of capabilities will be more equal and geography may 
not offer clear guidance.”392  In other words, the rise of a multipolar world will create a 
diffusion of power that will make threats more difficult to recognize and effectively 
counter. Consequently, state decision making with regards to alliance behavior may 
become less predictable and more unreliable. Walt’s projections have been remarkably 
accurate with regards to Turkey’s recent alliance behavior. Walt’s forecast helps to deepen 
the understanding of the underlying causes that have facilitated Turkey’s tethering behavior 
to Russia in Syria and Ankara’s seemingly incoherent shift away from its traditional 
balancing behavior with the Alliance.393    
2. The End of The Cold War on the Future of NATO  
The end of the Cold War called into question NATO’s continued existence. The 
impetus for the formation of the Alliance was gone. Therefore, NATO’s raison d’etre had 
been fulfilled. Although at the core NATO was a military alliance, it also incorporated 
political, economic, and social dimensions.394  As Weitsman keenly observes, “In the 
absence of conflicts of interest, common values, institutions, and goals may flourish.”395  
Fortunately, NATO’s  preamble clearly codifies the members commitment to upholding a 
set of shared values.396  Still, for NATO to remain relevant and justify its continued 
existence, the Alliance would need to adapt to the new Post–Cold War system. 
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3. Walt and How the Collapse of the Soviet Union Would Impact NATO 
and the International System 
Regarding how the collapse of the Soviet Union would impact NATO, Walt 
predicted that “Without a clear and present threat [the NATO allies] are likely to find 
cooperation more difficult to sustain.”397  Ultimately, the end of the Cold War will create 
new challenges for the United States “because U.S. protection will be less important to its 
allies.”398  Thus, lacking a great unifying threat, states will become more independent, 
form new alliances, and increasingly pursue state national interests. Turkey’s foreign 
policy activism following the Cold War is in keeping with Walt’s keen prediction. Yet, the 
danger in states increasingly pursuing their own interests is that state on state disputes and 
potential conflicts are likely to increase. Ultimately, the absence of a shared external threat 
that can surpass the internal threat level of an alliance will results in the erosion of the 
alliance’s cohesion and possibly its dissolution. Rick Brix perhaps captures the conundrum 
the Alliance had to grapple with regarding its future after 1991: 
The end of the Cold War and the improbability of a military attack on 
Western Europe, has brought into question the existence of NATO itself. 
Some have argued that with the disappearance of the Soviet threat, NATO 
has lost its raison d’etre. After all, the sole reason that NATO was formed 
was to counter the Soviet threat and its purpose for existence throughout the 
Cold War remained solely to counter that threat. Others, however, have 
argued that NATO was about more than just countering the Soviet threat. 
They point to the fact that nowhere in the North Atlantic Treaty is the Soviet 
Union even mentioned by name. The treaty’s purpose, as stated in the 
preamble, is “to promote stability and well-being in the North Atlantic area” 
and “to safeguard the freedom, common heritage and civilization.”399 
Indeed, the end of the Cold War presented NATO with a significant challenge to 
its continued existence. Moreover, the seminal event in history was fraught with great 
uncertainty for the members of the Alliance who depended on the security it assured.  
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a. NATO Adapts  
NATO was able to overcome the challenges of no longer having the Soviet Union 
as its main external threat through adaptation of its purposes. Starting in the 1990 London 
Declaration, the Alliance began to reinvent itself by asserting that NATO could “Help build 
the structures of a more united continent supporting security and stability with the strength 
of shared faith in democracy, the rights of the individual, and the peaceful resolution of 
disputes.”400  Subsequently, the Alliance published its 1991 Strategic Concepts. Although 
NATO would remain primarily a collective defense alliance, the Strategic Concepts 
redefined NATO’s purposes and core tasks base off the Alliance’s outlined future threat 
environment:   
The security challenges and risks which NATO faces are different in nature 
from what they were in the past. The threat of a simultaneous, full-scale 
attack on all of NATO’s European fronts has effectively been removed and 
thus no longer provides the focus for Allied strategy. Particularly in Central 
Europe, the risk of a surprise attack has been substantially reduced, and 
minimum Allied warning time has increased accordingly.401 
In contrast with the predominant threat of the past, the risks to Allied 
security that remain are multi-faceted in nature and multi-directional, which 
makes them hard to predict and assess. NATO must be capable of 
responding to such risks if stability in Europe and the security of Alliance 
members are to be preserved. These risks can arise in various ways.402  
Risks to Allied security are less likely to result from calculated aggression 
against the territory of the Allies, but rather from the adverse consequences 
of instabilities that may arise from the serious economic, social and political 
difficulties, including ethnic rivalries and territorial disputes, which are 
faced by many countries in central and eastern Europe. The tensions which 
may result, as long as they remain limited, should not directly threaten the 
security and territorial integrity of members of the Alliance. They could, 
however, lead to crises inimical to European stability and even to armed 
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conflicts, which could involve outside powers or spill over into NATO 
countries, having a direct effect on the security of the Alliance.403 
To achieve its essential purpose, the Alliance performs the following 
fundamental security tasks:  
1. To provide one of the indispensable foundations for a stable 
security environment in Europe, based on the growth of 
democratic institutions and commitment to the peaceful 
resolution of disputes, in which no country would be able to 
intimidate or coerce any European nation or to impose 
hegemony through the threat or use of force.  
2. To serve, as provided for in Article 4 of the North Atlantic 
Treaty, as a transatlantic forum for Allied consultations on 
any issues that affect their vital interests, including possible 
developments posing risks for members’ security, and for 
appropriate co-ordination of their efforts in fields of 
common concern.  
3. To deter and defend against any threat of aggression against 
the territory of any NATO member state.  
4. To preserve the strategic balance within Europe.404 
The Alliance continued to evolve in the Post–Cold War Era. In 1994, NATO 
produced its Partnership for Peace (PfP) Framework Document.405  Then, NATO 
published its 1999 Strategic Concept that outlined five security task and, according to Yost, 
“reworded their [allies] definition of the Alliance’s essential purpose…to shape the broader 
international security environment, and not only to ensure the safety of Allied territory.”406  
Lastly, the Alliance published the 2010 Strategic Concept that modified NATO’s missions 
down to three essential tasks: 
The modern security environment contains a broad and evolving set of 
challenges to the security of NATO’s territory and populations. In order to 
assure their security, the Alliance must and will continue fulfilling 
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effectively three essential core tasks, all of which contribute to safeguarding 
Alliance members, and always in accordance with international law:407 
1. Collective defence. NATO members will always assist each 
other against attack, in accordance with Article 5 of the 
Washington Treaty. That commitment remains firm and 
binding. NATO will deter and defend against any threat of 
aggression, and against emerging security challenges where 
they threaten the fundamental security of individual Allies 
or the Alliance as a whole. 
2. Crisis management. NATO has a unique and robust set of 
political and military capabilities to address the full spectrum 
of crises – before, during and after conflicts. NATO will 
actively employ an appropriate mix of those political and 
military tools to help manage developing crises that have the 
potential to affect Alliance security, before they escalate into 
conflicts; to stop ongoing conflicts where they affect 
Alliance security; and to help consolidate stability in post-
conflict situations where that contributes to Euro-Atlantic 
security. 
3. Cooperative security. The Alliance is affected by, and can 
affect, political and security developments beyond its 
borders. The Alliance will engage actively to enhance 
international security, through partnership with relevant 
countries and other international organisations; by 
contributing actively to arms control, non-proliferation and 
disarmament; and by keeping the door of membership in the 
Alliance open to all European democracies that meet 
NATO’s standards.408 
Aside from redefining the Alliance’s purposes, NATO has also undergone a 
massive expansion of its member states. When the Cold War ended, the Alliance had 
sixteen members.409  As of 2020, that number has grown to thirty—with North Macedonia 
becoming the latest Ally in 2020.410  Yet, Weitsman keenly observe, “NATO’s 
decision…to alter the mission of the alliance and expand its membership after the end of 
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the Cold War has had an important effect on the relationships of amity and enmity in the 
system.”411  In other words, it has improved the security of the new members of the 
Alliance. Yet, its accumulation of greater aggregate power, Moscow’s perceived intentions 
of encirclement by NATO demonstrated by its continued expansionism, and the creation 
of out groups through exclusion not only fosters enmity, but could potentially create a 
security dilemma with between the Alliance and states like Russia or China.  
Ironically, it was the Soviet Union’s expansionism that compelled the formation of 
the Alliance—now, it is NATO expansionism that is the perceived threat to Moscow.412  
As Lilia Shevtsova argues, “NATO enlargement is a threat not to Russia but to the Russian 
regime and the elite, who want to create a cordon sanitaire of failed or weak states around 
themselves. For the elites…NATO is the optimal foe.”413  What Shevtsova means is the 
Russian regime needs to create a mythos of NATO as the enemy in order to remain in 
power and galvanize the Russian populous. Indeed, this is yet another parallel that the 
current regimes in Ankara and Moscow share, both create a narrative of the West as the 
enemy to invoke nationalistic fervor and maintain their position in power.414 
Overall, NATO has excelled at adapting to the changing international system and 
the evolving threat environment. Yet, the Alliance must walk a fine line between its desire 
to accumulate additional aggregate power through expansionism and risking NATO 
purposes becoming too ambiguous. Indeed, as Wight once remarked, “The more general 
the scope of the alliance, the less does it work as either party intended.”415  Two lessons 
for NATO can be gleaned from Wight’s observation. First, if the Alliance continues to 
expand its membership, it risks becoming too cumbersome and impotent because NATO 
requires a unanimous consensus with its members to take military action. Second, if NATO 
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assumes too many missions and core tasks, it risks maintaining its original purpose for 
which the Alliance was formed—collective defense. 
4. Impact on Turkey  
The origins of Turkey’s changing alliance behavior with the Alliance can be traced 
back to the end of the Cold War.416  This seminal event altered the structural integrity of 
the international system and heightened Turkey’s security concerns, and its threat 
perceptions. In addition, the belief of a new world order that offered Ankara great 
opportunity to become a regional hegemon and bridge connecting the East and West.  
Combined, these two very different outlooks profoundly influenced Turkey’s perception 
both of itself and of the West. Ankara’s perceived that in the Post–Cold War Era, Turkey 
would transform from a functional ally to the West, into a core state that wield influence 
over the Middle East.417  However, there was much uncertainty and concern in Ankara 
regarding the NATO’s continued relevancy. Without the Alliance, Turkey’s security 
assurances would be at jeopardy, exposing Turkey to greater instability and increased 
threats.418  In short, the dissolution of the Soviet Union had two important implications for 
Turkey’s foreign policy—increased autonomy and a greater need to ensure its national 
security.  
a. Increased Autonomy 
The first implication was it loosened the constraints on Turkey’s national interests, 
which enabled the country to pursue a more independent foreign policy because of the 
power vacuum that was created in the regions surrounding Turkey as a result of the collapse 
of the Soviet Union. Thus, the once seemingly powerful Soviet satellites in the Black Sea 
region, Central Asia, and Transcaucasia were now weak states in comparison to Turkey’s 
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relative position. Moreover, Turkey emerged from the end of the Cold War as a contender 
for the Middle East regional core state. This offered Ankara an opportunity to increase its 
regional influence and global prestige by implementing an assertive foreign policy over 
historically significant former Ottoman territories by emphasizing Turkey’s historical, 
religious, and cultural affinities aimed at growing its political and economic resources.419    
b. Security and Instability 
The second implication of the Soviet Union’s dissolution was  uncertainty within 
the international system. This seminal change in the system potentially threatened Turkey’s 
security guarantee, which it had enjoyed as part of the Alliance for the last forty years. The 
question of NATO’s continued existence was unsettling for Turkey. Moreover, even if 
NATO were to continue its existence in the Post–Cold War Era, there was  growing concern 
about Turkey among members of the Alliance.420  During the Cold War, the Alliance was 
willing to overlook Turkey’s historical authoritarian form of governance and list of human 
rights violations in exchange for security. Indeed, as David Yost, explains, “the NATO 
Allies were not during the Cold War so exigent in upholding requirements for membership, 
nor have they over the decades seen it as their responsibility to deal with nondemocratic 
conduct or “backsliding” by fellow allies.”421  Yet, the Alliance quickly reinvented its 
purposes and relevancy in the new world order by reprioritizing its interests that placed a 
greater emphasis on upholding the Treaty preamble’s values and principles. Thus, Turkey’s 
questionable pursuit towards liberal democratic ideals and the protection of individual 
liberties were increasingly criticized by the West. Consequently, the West’s criticism of 
Turkish domestic policies and Ankara’s misaligned value of the preamble’s stated values 
increased the internal threat level. Additionally, in the Post–Cold War Era, the Kurdish 
question significantly accelerated to the forefront of Turkish security concerns because the 
‘question’ had evolved from a state policy issue of assimilation into a high politized 
movement demanding Kurdish ethnic recognition and potential pursuit of self-
 
419 Zürcher, Turkey: A Modern History, 315. 
420 Hale, Turkish Foreign Policy since 1774, 136. 
421 Yost, NATO’s Balancing Act, 365. 
98 
determination that Ankara perceived as a threat to the country’s territorial integrity.422  
Further still, subsequent wars increasingly destabilized the Middle East and the Balkans—
two regions of great historical, cultural, and economic interest to Ankara resulting from the 
alteration of the stability that the former bipolar international system provided.423  Hale 
describes the concerns and the potential dangers that Turkey faced following the Soviet 
Union’s collapse, writing, “Turkey might be seen as a strategic and political liability rather 
than an asset to the west—strategically because it had a host of complex regional security 
concerns…and politically because of its non-membership of the European Community, its 
internal Kurdish problem, poor human rights record and conflicts with Greece.”424  
Discussing the intrinsic interaction between the internal and external threat levels and how 
they can effect an alliance, Weitsman writes, “The motivations that draw states together in 
the first place determine which of the following will be most pronounced: the level of threat 
within the alliance or the level of threat external to it.”425  In other words, the issues just 
discussed, created a disparity between the external threat level perceived by Turkey and 
the rest of the Alliance. For Turkey, the threat level remained high and for the rest of the 
allies the level decreased. Meanwhile, the internal threat level significantly increased 
because the key political, ideological, and cultural differences took on a relevancy that was 
not prioritized during the Cold War between Turkey and its fellow NATO allies.426  
Consequently, the Alliance’s cohesion, which enabled NATO to succeed in the Cold War, 
now began to eroded.  
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c. Turkey’s Continued Relevance 
Still, NATO recognized the potential significance Turkey’s role within the Alliance 
could play in the Post–Cold War international system. As the only Muslim majority NATO 
member, Turkey was often described as the West’s conduit to the Middle East. Indeed, 
while visiting Turkey in 2005, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice proclaimed that 
Washington and Ankara enjoyed a “very important strategic relationship,” founded on 
shared interests, values, and a vision for the future.427  Similarly, in 2009, President Barack 
Obama described Turkey as Westernized model partner.428  These political overtures were 
meant to praise Turkey and encourage other Middle Eastern states to follow Turkey’s 
‘democratic’ lead. However, Walt opines that in a Post–Cold War world “U.S. [and 
Western] influence over these states [like Turkey] is virtually certain to decline.”429  The 
United States and NATO wanted Turkey to continue to ponder to the West as it had during 
the majority of the Cold War.  
The end of the Cold War’s impact on the structure of the international system 
altered NATO and Turkey’s perception of itself in the new system. Because the Alliance’s 
shared external threat was removed, NATO had to reinvent to remain justifiably relevant. 
Meanwhile, Post–Cold War system enabled Turkey’s foreign policy to transform from a 
functional Ally to a foreign policy that was  more independent and assertive.430  
Huntington keenly observed, “At some point, Turkey could be ready to give up its 
frustrating and humiliating role as a beggar pleading for membership in the West and to 
resume its much more impressive and elevated historical role as the principal Islamic 
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interlocutor and antagonist of the West.”431  Indeed, as Huntington and Walt predicted, the 
AKP developed a ‘zero problems with neighbors’ or ‘strategic depth’ foreign policy 
predicated on emphasizing Turkey’s unique geography and its former Ottoman historical, 
religious, and cultural affiliations in the Middle East to increase Turkish influence and 
pursue regional hegemony.432  Unfortunately, it was not long after the end of the Cold War 
that conflicts broke out in the Middle East and in the Balkans that cause TFP to transform 
yet again.  
C. TURKEY’S CHANGING ALLIANCE BEHAVIOR AND OPINION OF THE 
WEST: KEY POST–COLD WAR MIDDLE EAST CONFLICTS 
The transformation of the international system from a bipolar to unipolar world 
dominated by the sole remaining super power—the United States—convinced many policy 
makers and scholars that Western-style democracy was the regime type of the new world 
order.433  Shaped by this way of thinking, U.S. foreign policy was embolden to impose its 
democratic ideals in the Middle East.434  Unfortunately, foreign interventionism in places 
since the end of the Cold War have disrupted Ankara’s vision as the regional hegemon and 
impeded the Erdoğan’s neo-Ottoman foreign policy, which emphasized Turkey’s unique 
geography and former Ottoman historical, religious, and cultural affiliations in the Middle 
East to expand its influence and prestige.435  Not only did this negatively shape the Turkish 
ruling elites opinion of the West, but increased Turkey’s perceived external threat level 
disproportionately to the rest of the Alliance. Walt’s BoT provides a possible explanation 
for the disparity between Turkey and the rest of its fellow allies. The continuation of war 
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in the Middle East since 2001 are perceived as a threat to Ankara differently because of the 
proximity, the increased offensive capabilities of state and non-state actors in the region, 
the relative power disparity between Ankara and its neighbors, and the perceived malign 
actions by both Turkey’s traditional rivals and allies.436  Kirişci captures Ankara’s growing 
threat concerns well, writing, “According to a retired Turkish diplomat, the country was 
surrounded by a ‘veritable ring of evil,’ which necessitated a readiness to fight ‘two and a 
half wars’ simultaneously—against Greece, Syria and the PKK.”437   
The Gulf War (1991), the American-led invasion of Iraq (2003–2012), and the 
Syrian War (2011–present) are arguably the three most significant Middle Eastern wars 
that negatively altered the perceptions by the Turkish elite and its populous of the West.438  
They reinforced  Turkey’s skepticism of the Alliance’s security guarantees and its allies 
understanding of Turkish interests. Thus, influencing Turkey’s decision to tether to Russia 
in Syria and purchase the Russian S-400. Ahmet Davutoğlu, the creator of the AKP’s neo-
Ottoman foreign policy, notes, “Assertive nations define threats according to their 
strategies, while non-assertive and submissive nations shape their fragile strategies 
according to their definitions of threats.”439  Perhaps the reason these conflicts negatively 
impacted the perceptions by the Turkish elite and its populous toward the West was caused 
by the its continuing foreign interventionism in the Middle East and the conflicting threat 
level between Turkey and the rest of the Alliance in the Syrian War. All of which can be 
perceived as a threat to the AKP’s foreign policy strategy because of the instability and 
increased national security threats it inflicted on Turkey. 
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1. The Gulf War (1990–1991) 
The outbreak of the Gulf War in 1990 immediately followed the dissolution of the 
Soviet Union. Seeking to assert itself as a regional power, Ankara saw participation and 
support towards the United States and its coalition against Saddam Hussein during the Gulf 
War as an opportunity to boost Turkey’s global prestige.440  According to Hasan 
Kosebalaban, “The Gulf War was a perfect opportunity for Ozal to reassert Turkey’s place 
in the Post–Cold War system and to prove its continued geostrategic significance to its 
chief ally, the United States…Washington presented three demands to Ankara: (1) 
mobilizing troops along its border with Iraq….(2) allowing the United States to use its 
airspace; and (3) contributing troops that would participate in the…war.”441  Turkey 
agreed to the first to demands, but did not contribute troops to the war due to internal 
Turkish political opposition.442  Ankara did however turn off the oil pipelines that carried 
Iraqi oil to the Turkish port of Yumurtalik.443    
Despite Turkey’s cohesiveness to the war effort, the Gulf War exposed significant 
vulnerabilities to Turkey’s nominal AMD. The fear of Iraqi Scud missiles landing on 
Turkish territory unimpeded created great consternation in Ankara.444  In response, Turkey 
requested security and defense assistance from the Alliance.445  However, Germany’s 
concerns over a potential Article 5 obligation to Turkey caused the Alliance to hesitate, as 
discord over the decision ensued.446  Eventually, the Alliance authorized the temporary 
deployment of defensive measures to Turkey, but the discord unveiled small fissures within 
the Alliance. Not only did this increase Ankara’s desire for its own AMD capability, the 
minor resistance it felt by Germany intensified Turkey’s mistrust and skepticism of the 
Alliance’s security assurances when facing a perceived threat. Consequently, the external 
 
440 Kosebalaban, Turkish Foreign Policy: Islam, Nationalism, and Globalization, 122–23. 
441 Kosebalaban, Turkish Foreign Policy: Islam, Nationalism, and Globalization, 123. 
442 Kosebalaban, Turkish Foreign Policy: Islam, Nationalism, and Globalization, 123. 
443 Kosebalaban, Turkish Foreign Policy: Islam, Nationalism, and Globalization, 123. 
444 Egeli, “Making Sense of Turkey’s Air and Missile Defense Merry-Go-Round,” 72. 
445 Yost, NATO’s Balancing Act, 40. 
446 Yost, 40. 
103 
threat level was higher for Turkey due to its proximity to the threat, perceived intentions 
of Iraqi Scud attacks on Turkey, and Turkey’s inability to defend itself with enhanced 
military capabilities. Meanwhile, the internal threat level grew from feelings of distrust and 
skepticism of the Alliance. Ultimately, this combination of variables negatively impacted 
the Alliance’s overall cohesion. Unfortunately, this was to be the first of several such 
incidents between Turkey and the rest of the Alliance in the Post–Cold War Era.   
2. The American-Led Invasion of Iraq (2003–2012) 
The American-led invasion of Iraq was a seminal event that significant altered 
Turkish popular opinion of the United States. The Iraq War greatly contributed to the 
destabilization of the region surrounding Turkey, which increased the country’s national 
security threats from both state and non-state actors.447  Indeed, Kirişci claims, “The U.S. 
intervention in Iraq in 2003 became the source of major conflict and instability that has 
since adversely affected Turkey’s interest.”448  Consequently, the actions taken by Turkey, 
the United States, and the rest of NATO increased the skepticism and distrust between 
Turkey and the rest of the Alliance.   
Like the Gulf War, the United States-led invasion of Iraq in 2003 exposed Turkey 
to external threats on it border. Walt’s variables of proximity, Turkey’s nominal military 
capabilities relative to its neighbors, and Ankara’s perceived intentions by both its allies 
and rivals contributed to Turkey’s increased external threat level that was disproportionate 
to that of the rest of the Alliance. As such, Ankara’s actively voiced its disapproval of the 
United States invasion and urged the Bush Administration to seek diplomatic solutions 
with Saddam Hussein.449  Having failed at convincing the Washington and Bagdad to 
come to a peaceful resolution, the Turkish parliament initially refused the United States to 
use its country as a staging ground to launch the invasion.450  The refusal led to the 
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deterioration of the strategic partnership between Turkey and the United States. On the one 
hand, the United States questioned whether Turkey was a trusted ally. On the other hand, 
Turkey considered the American-led invasion as an act of disregard for Turkish interests 
and concerns.451  
Ankara concerns over the war were justifiable. It feared that the invasion and 
ensuing war would significantly destabilize the region and increase terrorist attacks within 
their country by inciting an increase in PKK attacks on Turkey. Kirişci notes, “Iraq’s 
territorial integrity presented a problem to Turkey, particularly in relation to the Kurdish 
issue. The question was whether an independent Kurdish state would emerge in the event 
Iraq disintegrated…the fact that the PKK was based in northern Iraq and that it had 
terminated the ceasefire with the Turkish state in 2004 alarmed Turkey’s national security 
advisors.”452  Indeed, the American-led invasion did empower the Kurdish regional 
government to be more assertive and reinvigorated the idea of an independent 
Kurdistan.453  Additionally, Turkey had legitimate concerns regarding the potential that 
the Iraqi’s would target Turkey with its Scud missiles, which Turkey’s military had no 
autonomous AMDs for it to defend against. Thus, Ankara requested protective measures 
from the Alliance. Belgium, France, and Germany disapproved of Ankara’s request partly 
because of their opposition to the invasion writ large.454  Their disapproval of the defensive 
measures was not out of spite for Turkey, but instead a politically motivated response 
directed at the United States   
In response to the allies disapproved request, Turkey invoked Article 4 of the Treaty 
in February 2003.455  Eventually, a consensus was reached and Turkey’s fellow allies 
agreed to deployed their defensive measures.456  Despite the decision, the Alliance’s 
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failure to recognize Turkey as part of ‘itself’ added to Turkey’s growing distrust.457  
Additionally, it further convinced Ankara that it could not depend on others to provide for 
its own security. Indeed, Jeremy Shapiro, an observer during this time, concluded, “No 
matter how much the French, Germans, and Belgians insisted that their solidarity with 
Turkey was complete, the way events transpired left an impression of allies unwilling to 
stand together in a time of need.”458  Discussing the considerations of European military 
intervention risk in 1913, Sir Edward Grey, the former British Secretary of State for 
Foreign Affairs, articulately stated, “if the Powers [European nations] were to have 
intervened effectively in recent events, they would have had to use troops; they would have 
had to land those troops, and march them to shoot at the risk of being shot. In your own 
country’s quarrel you do those things, but it is exceedingly difficult to get the Powers of 
Europe, or any of them, to vote money and to use its troops in any cause except one which 
it feels the interests of its own country absolutely requires.”459  The deployment of any 
Allied protective capabilities included that country’s military personnel to operate it. Thus, 
exposing its soldiers to danger. Aside from sending a political message to the United States, 
perhaps this was in part the calculus Belgium, France, and Germany used when considering 
its support to Turkey. If so, then the Alliance’s credibility is worrisome. In any case, the 
way in which Turkey’s insecurities were initially addressed by fellow members of the 
Alliance during the advent of both the Gulf War and Iraq War contributed to Turkey’s 
growing need for its own AMD and further increased its feeling of mistrust with the West.   
Further intensifying the internal threat level during the Iraq War was the infamous 
‘hood incident’ that occurred within Iraq’s Kurdish town of Sulaymaniah between U.S. 
and Turkish forces.460  In July 2003, U.S. Special Forces conducted a raid in Sulaymaniah, 
in which a number of Turkish military and intelligence officers were detained and forced 
 
457 Kirişci, Turkey and the West, 197. 
458 Yost, NATO’s Balancing Act, 40. 
459 Sir Edward Grey, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Statement on War in the Balkans, 
Hansard (Commons), 12 August 1913, col. 2294. “Judy Asks: Is Turkey Weakening NATO?,” Carnegie 
Europe, accessed February 21, 2019, https://carnegieeurope.eu/strategiceurope/73174. 
460 Kerem Öktem, Turkey since 1989: Angry Nation (Nova Scotia: Fernwood Publishing, 2011), 133. 
106 
to wear black hoods over their heads as they were being extracted.461  Kerem Öktem posits 
that the event was “Probably meant as an act of revenge for Turkey’s lack of commitment 
to the war.”462  Irrespective of the intentions of the United States, the event was deeply 
humiliating for Turkey and impacted the state’s national psyche. Moreover, the 
embarrassing incident triggered massive anti-American protests in Turkey and greatly 
contributed to Turkey’s negative opinion of the United States.463  Indeed, a 2007 Pew poll 
illustrates the negative views Turks had of the United States and its foreign policy, stating, 
“9% of Turks support the U.S.-led war on terror, and only 14% think the U.S. considers 
the interests of countries like Turkey when making foreign policy decisions…86% of Turks 
now favor removing U.S. troops from Iraq.”464  According to Soner Cagaptay the Iraq War 
“Added fuel to the Islamist fire in Turkey” and created conspiracy theories that the war 
was a “U.S.-Jewish-Israeli attempt to dominate the Middle East”.465  Indeed, the invasion 
of Iraq significantly altered the Turkish perception of the United States as an imperialistic 
state and increased Turkey’s elites’ skepticism of the United States as a strategic 
partnership, while Turkey’s resistance to support the United States-led invasion was 
perceived as a sense of betrayal by Washington. Combined, the opposing negative views 
of one another caused the internal threat level to further grow. Consequently, the cohesion 
of the Alliance suffered greatly.  
In sum, the events that transpired with the advent of the Iraq War caused Ankara to 
see the external threat level much higher than that of the United States and the rest of the 
Alliance. The proximity to the threat, Turkey’s inferior military capabilities, and its 
perceived intentions by its traditional enemies and allies caused the disparity in the external 
threat level between Turkey and the Alliance. While the internal threat level spiked because 
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of Turkey’s refusal to enable the United States to launch its invasion from Turkey, the 
United States perceived insensitivities to Turkey’s interests and security concerns, the 
Alliance’s initial hesitation to deploy protective measures on Turkey’s behalf, and the 
‘hood incident.’  Consequently, the cohesion of the Alliance suffered greatly.  
3. The Syrian War (2011–present)  
The events following the outbreak of the Syrian War exponentially amplified 
Turkey’s threat perception both internally and externally. The combined threat components 
caused by the Syrian War included: the proximity to the war, disparity in the belligerents’ 
offensive capabilities, and the perceived intentions by Ankara’s foes and its fellow allies 
in Syria significantly increased the Alliance’s internal threat level and heightened Turkey’s 
external threat level disproportionately to that perceived by the rest of the Alliance. Indeed, 
Kirişci contends that “The war in Syria proved to be a key turning point in Turkey’s 
relations with the West.”466  The events following the advent of the Syrian War caused 
Turkey to reassess its value and its trust in the Alliance, as well as formulate a pragmatic 
solution to achieving Ankara’s interests without upsetting key state actors in Syria. 
Consequently, the cohesion of the Alliance has deeply suffered and it has ultimately the 
key factor for Turkey’s shifting alliance behavior from balancing with its fellow allies to 
tethering to Russia in order to appease the stronger state and influence the events and 
eventual outcome of the War in Syria.  
a. Proximity to the War 
Turkey’s proximity to the Syrian conflict has increased Turkey’s external threat 
level asymmetrically to that of the rest of the Alliance. Geographic proximity is an 
important component of a threat because the closer a state is to another, the easier it is to 
project influence on other states. This does not bode well for Turkey, as it shares over 500 
miles of border with Syria.467  According to Walt, proximity is a significance threat 
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component “Because the ability to project power declines with distance, states that are 
nearby pose a greater threat than those that are far away. Other things being equal, 
therefore, states are more likely to make their alliance choices in response to nearby powers 
than in response to those that are distant.”468  The country’s proximity to the war has 
resulted in the death of Turks by both state actors and non-state actors. In June 2012, a 
Turkish reconnaissance plane was shot down by Syrian forces, killing both pilots.469  Yet, 
another incident involving Syrian forces occurred in October 2012, when Syrian artillery 
rounds landed in Turkey killing five citizens.470  Thus, it accelerated Ankara’s urgency to 
pursue enhanced, independent military capabilities, particularly an AMD. Indeed, a NATO 
Mission Report on Syria from 2015, specifically notes that one of the key “contentious 
issues between Turkey and the allies” currently includes missile defense.471  In response 
to the issue between Turkey and the rest of the Alliance over missile defense, NATO 
convened a security council meeting under Article 4 to determine which actions to take.472  
The allies agreed to the deployment of six PATRIOT missile batteries on their behalf of 
Turkey.473  Although this act of Alliance solidarity demonstrated the allies commitment 
to Turkey’s security it was to be short lived. Since 2016, all but one Spanish PATRIOT 
system remains in Turkey and is tasked with defending Incirlik Airbase.474   
Moreover, the refugee crisis emanating from Syria has had a significant impact on 
Turkey, which hosts roughly 3.64 million Syrian refugees.475  The refugee crisis has not 
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only negatively affected the Turkish economy and the country’s sense of security, but also 
facilitated the recent rise of Turkish nationalism and increased Turkish skepticism about 
the West. The apparent insufficient response to Turkey’s Syrian refugee crisis by Western 
nations, specifically European nations and the United States, has allowed Ankara to pursue 
a more independent foreign policy.476   
b. Disparity in Offensive Capabilities Among the Belligerents 
The second threat component that has contributed to Turkey’s alliance behavior is 
the involvement of powerful state actors. Syria has become the battleground for multiple 
external actors who seek competing national interests in Syria. Russia, Iran, Israel, the 
United States, and Turkey are all involved in Syria. Russia and Iran are perhaps the most 
significant actors shaping foreign policies in Syria. Yet, they are traditional rivals of Turkey 
and have expressed their support to the Assad regime in the forms of money, military 
might, and political influence act as a deterrent to international intervention in the war. 
Russia, a permanent member on the UN Security Council, has impeded the UN from acting. 
Moreover, the international community fears that any military involvement in the conflict 
may risk starting a war with Russia or a war between Israel and Iran. Despite these valid 
concerns, Ankara has felt abandon by the West.477   
Turkey’s regional neighbors, all possess more advanced military capabilities than 
Ankara. Russia, Israel, Saudi Arabia, and Greece all possess air forces equal to or greater 
than Turkey’s own. Eight states (Russia, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Iran, Syria, Israel, Saudi 
Arabia, and Greece) near Turkey possess short, medium, and intermediate range ballistic 
missiles capabilities that can range Turkish territory.478  Additionally, six of these eight 
countries (Russia, Azerbaijan, Iran, Syria, Israel, and Greece) also have advanced cruise 
missiles.479  Viewed from Turkey’s perspective, the regional threat environment indeed 
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appears daunting. The potential threats these nations impose, coupled with Turkey’s 
perceived lack of confidence in the Alliance’s solidarity, have significantly contributed to 
Turkey’s security concerns and mistrust—ultimately influencing Ankara’s decision to 
purchase the S-400.  
c. Perceived Intentions and Conflicting Objectives 
The third threat component contributing to the external and internal threat levels is 
the perceived intentions or opposing interests between Ankara and its fellow allies in Syria. 
Their competing interests and activities in Syria have contributed to the relationship’s 
mistrust toward one another. As Walt and Weitsman posit, perceived intentions are a key 
component of what a state deems as a threat.480  This component above all others is 
arguably the reason Turkey choose to tether to Russia and seek to appease Moscow by 
agreeing to purchase the S-400.  
(1) President Obama’s Redline Speech 
One of the persistent complaints by Ankara has been that the United States and the 
rest of its allies have not done enough to end the Syrian War. This is especially the case 
after President Obama declare the use of chemical weapons by the Assad regime would be 
a red line. During a press briefing given on August 20, 2012, President Obama stated:    
The point that you made about chemical and biological weapons is critical. 
That’s an issue that doesn’t just concern Syria; it concerns our close allies 
in the region, including Israel. It concerns us…We have been very clear to 
the Assad regime, but also to other players on the ground, that a red line for 
us is we start seeing a whole bunch of chemical weapons moving around or 
being utilized. That would change my calculus. That would change my 
equation… We have put together a range of contingency plans. We have 
communicated in no uncertain terms with every player in the region that 
that’s a red line for us and that there would be enormous consequences if 
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we start seeing movement on the chemical weapons front or the use of 
chemical weapons. That would change my calculations significantly.481 
Indeed, Kirişci notes, “The first signs of differences over the approach to the Syrian 
war became apparent when Erdoğan reacted sharply to Obama’s failure to act on his ‘red 
lines’ against the use of chemical weapons by the Assad government.”482  The United 
States decision not to respond to the chemical attack on September 2013, left Turkey 
vulnerable to Syria and Russia. The realization that the United States and the Alliance were 
unwilling to commit forces to fight the Syrian military further increase Turkey’s distrust 
of the Alliance, which increased the internal threat level and demonstrated the differing 
external threat level perceptions held between Turkey and its fellow allies. Turkey was left 
to deal with Russia alone in order to achieve its national security interests in Syria.  
(2) U.S. and the Allies: its Main Objective in Syria  
The United States and the Alliance’s stated objective has been to defeat IS in Syria. 
To achieve this objective, the United States has provided supported to the YPG in Syria at 
the behest of Ankara.483  The West’s foreign policy in Syria has infuriated the Turkish 
elite and many of the Turkish citizens because they view the YPG as a splinter group of 
the PKK, a terrorist organization, which Turkey has been in conflict with since 1984.484  
Indeed, President Erdoğan voiced Turkish anger when he stated that the United States was 
turning the region “into a pool of blood” by deciding to ally with the YPG in Syria—
demanding the United States choose either the Kurds or its NATO ally.485  The internal 
threat level with in the Alliance reached new levels in May 2017, when the Trump 
Administration officially announced that the United States would begin arming the YPG 
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in its fight against IS in Syria.486  Thus, as Kirişci contends, “The legacy of the U.S. policy 
in Syria will be seen as one that adversely affected Turkish national security and 
stability.”487  The inability for Turkey, the United States, and the Alliance to agree to a 
mutual security strategy in Syria has significantly altered Turkey’s alliance behavior in 
Syria because their interests are not aligned and Ankara cannot rely on the Alliance to 
guarantee its security if attacked by Russia, Iran, or Syria.  
(3) Turkey: its Main Objectives in Syria 
Meanwhile, Ankara considered the PKK, the PYD, and its military wing—the YPG 
more threatening to Turkey’s national security than IS or other radical Sunni extremist 
organizations. According to Hill and Taşpınar, in Ankara’s view the greatest “terrorist 
threat to Turkish interests is still considered to come from Kurdish separatists of the 
PKK.”488  Thus, Ankara’s primary concern remains to prevent PKK terrorist attacks on 
Turkish soil by creating a buffer zone inside Syria. To achieve this goal Turkey originally 
relied heavily on Islamic proxy groups to attack the Kurdish rebels, facilitating their actions 
by providing these groups with arms, supplies, and a safe haven from which to launch 
attacks from.489  Lisel Hintz offers some insight as to why Ankara is committed to 
defeating the Syrian Kurds, regardless of the United States support, rather than cooperate 
with defeating IS, explaining that the Ottoman Islamists (Erdoğan and the AKP) and the 
Pan-Turkic Nationalists (MHP) identity proposals, both of which currently share a political 
alliance in Turkey, consider support of any kind to the PKK or any of its affiliates as a red 
line that cannot be tolerated.490   
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The decisions and events that occurred following the advent of the Syrian War have 
unequivocally increased Turkey’s threat perception and national security concerns. 
Because of the war’s proximity to Turkey, the disparity in the belligerents’ offensive 
capabilities, and most importantly—the perceived intentions by Ankara’s allies and 
enemies, not only disproportionately influenced the external threat level between Turkey 
and the rest of the Alliance, but increased the Alliance’s internal threat level to new heights.  
Thus, the cohesion of the Alliance had deteriorated to the point where Turkey choose to 
change its alliance behavior from balancing with the Alliance to tethering to Russia in Syria 
to achieve its interests. The next section will delve into the reasons and benefits tethering 
to Russia provided Turkey. The United States non-interventionist policy toward the state 
actors in Syria left Russia as the top power in the war. Because Ankara choose to tether 
and appease Moscow so that Turkey pursue its national interests in Syria.  
4. Erdoğan, the AKP, and its Ottoman Islamist Identity  
Starting with the Gezi Park protests in May and June 2013 an increasingly distinct 
transformation within Turkish politics has occurred that has especially been recognizable 
after the failed coup attempt on Erdoğan in July 2016. Since the protests in 2013, Turkish 
politics have taken on an increasingly despotic, personalistic form of political rule mirrored 
after President Erdoğan.491  Ihsan Yilmaz and Galib Bashirov contend, “President Recep 
Tayyip Erdoğan’s personality and style have come to embody the Turkish nation, the state 
and its economic, social and political institutions” with “four main dimensions: electoral 
authoritarianism as the electoral system, neopatrimonialism as the economic system, 
populism as the political strategy and Islamism as the political ideology.”492  The 
consolidation of Erdoğan’s power reached new heights after the 2018 presidential election, 
after which he was able to purge political dissidents, transform Turkish institutions, and 
assume total command of the military.493  Thus, many of the key founding AKP members 
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(e.g. Abdullah Gül, Ahmet Davutoğlu, and Bülent Arinc) were either forced to resign or 
left willingly.494  Hence, Erdoğan further consolidated his power by filling key 
government positions “with ultra-loyalists, sycophants and yes men…Erdoğan’s 
appointment of his son-in-law Berat Albayrak to the treasury, his childhood friend Mustafa 
Varank to the industry and technology ministry, and Hulusi Akar, the army chief who 
stayed loyal on the night of the coup, to the defence ministry, showed he has little concern 
for diversity of opinion in his cabinet.”495   Indeed, according to Hannah Lucinda Smith: 
The day before Erdoğan is officially sworn in comes the largest single 
round-up of suspected Gülenists, almost two years on from the coup 
attempt. Eighteen thousand people, including soldiers, policemen and 
judges, are either sacked or arrested. The website of the Official Gazette 
crashes as Turks rush to check whether their names are on the list. The 
number of those dismissed now tops more than 180,000. The judiciary has 
lost more than a third of its manpower since the purge began – and under 
the new system, the top judges will be appointed jointly by Erdoğan and by 
the parliament that Erdoğan controls. The state of emergency has been lifted 
– almost two years to the day since it was first brought in – but that will 
make little difference now that Erdoğan has hollowed out the state and filled 
it with his loyalists, and rules by presidential decree anyway. Amendments 
to the anti-terror laws pushed through just before emergency rule ended 
allow the police to detain suspects without charge, for up to twelve days in 
some cases. Local governors, directly appointed by the government, can 
continue to restrict access to public areas on security grounds, and 
demonstrations can be banned on an even broader set of pretexts than under 
the emergency law.496 
It didn’t take Erdoğan long to start exercising his new powers. He had 
announced the cabinet within six hours of being sworn in. By the next 
morning he had issued his first presidential decree, appointing Hulusi Akar 
as the new head of the armed forces and changing the chain of command. 
The military’s higher appointments council, once a group of generals who 
decided who would fill the top positions, was abolished. Now, the 
commanders of the navy, air force and army are all under the direct 
command of the president, and all officers down to the level of colonel are 
appointed by him.497 
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Indeed, Erdoğan’s vision for Turkey is taking on a quasi-sultanistic political regime 
type.498 
Yilmaz’s and Bashirov’s description of the changes that have occurred under 
Erdoğan and the AKP align with the Ottoman Islamist identity proposal put forth by Lisel 
Hintz, in which she describes the Turkish ruling elite as becoming “Increasingly hierarchal, 
patriarchal, and personalistic organization that refuses to tolerate public questioning of any 
of its actions.”499  According to Hintz, Ottoman Islamists have certain ‘red lines’ that are 
unacceptable, including “questioning the judgement of those in political 
authority…disrespecting the principles of Sunni Islam,” and “ethnic nationalism, in terms 
of the politicization of ethnicity for secessionist goals.”500  Indeed, Erdoğan has 
proclaimed that Turks who defy his will are in fact enemies of the state because by defying 
him, they are defying the will of the nation.  
Moreover, Ottoman Islamists place primacy on Turks behaving as conservative, 
pious Muslim. The AKP and Erdoğan’s value on piety has been illustrated by past speeches 
and statements regarding their distain of women who show too much cleavage and wear 
red lipstick.501  In their view, part of a conservative Muslim means accepting paternalism 
as the acceptable Turkish societal behavior.502  In other words, a woman should be 
subordinate to a man, and a pious Muslim woman’s role in the family is to cook and bare 
children.503  Thus, the Turkish ruling elites’ adherence to Ottoman Islamism, which puts 
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a primacy on the principles of Sunni Islam, combined with the elites glorification of the 
former Ottoman Empire, and skepticism of the West help in the understanding of what 
Ankara perceives to be a threat. Smith posits: 
Erdoğan’s personal views on Brussels have always been far muddier than 
those of his AKP co-founders. He fits more naturally with the leaders of 
Muslim countries, who tend to look up to and flatter him, while among the 
leaders of Europe he appears awkward and surly. Turks’ views on the EU 
have also shifted, so that now most say they do not want to join compared 
to the two-thirds who were in favour in 2002. Doubtless that is partly down 
to the endless agitations of Turkey’s pro-Erdoğan media (one tabloid 
newspaper published a front page of Angela Merkel mocked-up as Hitler 
during the height of the row between the two countries in 2017). But as the 
EU bloc is engulfed by economic woes, squabbling over refugees, and its 
own rising swell of populism, it no longer looks the good bet it was at the 
start of the AKP’s tenure. Turks believe they have other relationships they 
can turn to, in Russia, the Balkans – and post-Brexit Britain.504 
There can be little doubt of the negative implications that perceived intentions, 
along with the other threat components of proximity, power, and offensive capabilities 
have had on the Alliance’s internal threat level and the differing perceptions of the external 
threat level between Turkey and the rest of the Alliance after the advent of the Syrian War. 
Both alliance theory variables have greatly eroded the Alliance’s cohesion. Consequently, 
the differing perceptions of the AKP in comparison to the Kemalists (Republican 
Nationalist identity proposal) who ruled throughout the majority of the Cold War, 
contributes to the understanding of Turkey’s changing alliance behavior. 
5. Turkey Tethering Behavior  
The ongoing war in Syria has remained a profound concern for Russia and Turkey. 
Although both countries have deep-seated interests in Syria, these interests are in direct 
opposition to one another. Beyond their shared interest for stability in Syria, Ankara and 
Moscow envision distinct outcomes for a post-war Syria. They remain diametrically 
opposed on the future of Assad. Ankara is committed to his removal, while Moscow has 
vowed to ensure he remains in power. Ankara’s top concern in Syria remains the terrorist 
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threat posed by the PKK and the fear that the Syrian Kurds will garnish enough support or 
consolidate enough power to establish a Kurdish autonomous region bordering Turkey.505  
Russia’s main interest in Syria is to project itself as a global power broker and to gain 
international recognition as a legitimate great power by ensuring the Assad regime 
survives.506 
Turkey’s tethering behavior toward Russia in Syria began after Turkey shot down 
a Russian SU-24 in November 2015.507  The incident was met with extreme punitive 
measures by Moscow that deeply impacted Turkey’s economy due to its heavy dependence 
on Russian imports, tourism, construction, and energy.508  Putin’s coercive tactics were 
indeed effective. According to Henri J. Barkey, “Within a few months [of the SU-24 
incident] Erdoğan and company not only reversed course, but, incredibly, they blamed the 
shootdown on pilots whose allegiance was not to Turkey but to Erdoğan’s nefarious enemy, 
the Gülen movement. Turkey was subsequently forced to apologize to Russia.”509  
Moscow’s punitive measures caused Ankara to reassess its policy in Syria. Ankara  realized 
that the United States may be its strategic partner, but Russia was its strategic neighbor that 
Turkey was beholden to.  
Ankara recognized to achieve its top national security interest of being a participant 
in the shaping of the final outcome of the Syrian War, it would require Ankara to appease 
Moscow and rely on Putin’s benevolence.510  By tethering to Russia, Turkey has gained 
Moscow’s permission to pursue its key interests in Syria with little risk of Syrian, Iranian, 
or Russian retribution to the TSK operations in Syria. This has enabled Ankara to address 
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its greatest fear—a Kurdish controlled region in Syria by gradually establishing a buffer 
zone in Syria.511  The buffer zone not only bolsters Turkey’s security against the PKK and 
it affiliates, but also will enable Ankara to begin repatriating the roughly 3.6 million Syrian 
refugees it has been hosting.512   
Turkey’s decision to tether resulted from a combination of factors, including 
Ankara’s high external threat level in comparison to its fellow allies; shared mistrust 
between Turkey and the rest of NATO, which increased the internal threat level; and the 
AKP’s Ottoman Islamist ideology. Hintz holds, “Turkey’s relationship with Russia today 
hinges upon the economic, energy, and security interests the latter can help the former 
meet, but Moscow expects to get something in return.”513  What did Moscow want in 
return for its benevolence?  Arguably the cost to Ankara was its purchase of the S-400. As 
Moira Goff-Taylor posits, “The Russian S-400 air defense system is driven in part by 
Ankara’s desire to curry favor with Moscow.”514  Ankara debatably had to demonstrate its 
appeasement to Moscow by purchasing the S-400 in order to receive its blessing to conduct 
military operations in Syria.515   
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Table 4. Summary of the Variables Influencing Turkey’s Alliance Behavior 
in the Post–Cold War. 
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This chapter clearly demonstrates that Turkey’s national security has been heavily 
reliant on the United States and the Alliance for guaranteeing its security assurances and 
for providing military arms since the end of the Second World War. Yet, since the Cuban 
Missile Crisis and its ‘Turkey-for-Cuba trade,’ Ankara’s distrust and skepticism that the 
Alliance would fulfill its chief purpose of collective defense in Turkey’s time of need. 
Pontificating on the Prussian dynasty, Gordon A. Craig once wrote, “Alliances to be sure, 
are good, but forces of one’s own still better. Upon them one can rely with more security, 
and a lord is of no consideration if he does not have means and troops of his own.”516  Like 
the Prussian Hohenzollern dynasty, perhaps the Turks are simply trying to ensure they can 
provide and ensure they can achieve their own security needs and interests. Turkey’s 
changing alliance behavior and decision to purchase the S-400 was culminated with the 
events that occurred after the advent of the Syrian War. However, the rising internal threat 
level gradually began to surpass the Alliance’s shared external threat level beginning with 
the end of the Cold War. This phenomenon continued to worsen with the Middle East 
conflicts in the Post–Cold War system. Finally, the rise of the AKP (2002–present) and its 
Ottoman Islamist ideology influenced Turkey’s apparent misalignment with the Alliance 
that is observed today. The rising further disillusionment that the Alliance is committed to 
Turkey’s security and interests has increased the internal threat level partly because Turkey 
and the rest of NATO do not share the same external threat level in Syria, nor the same 
objectives. Consequently, Ankara’s changed alliance behavior from balancing with the 
Alliance to tethering to Moscow is a result of the erosion of the Alliance’s main function 
in the eyes of Ankara. Moscow identified the rift in the Alliance and Moscow exploited the 
rift by allowing Turkey to tether to it in order for Ankara to achieve its interests in Syria at 
the cost of purchasing the S-400. The opportunistic foreign policy move by Putin is likely 
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V. CONCLUSION 
This study set out to answer the question: what factors led to Ankara’s security 
cooperation with Moscow in Syria and its decision to acquire the S-400 despite the 
assessment of the United States and its other fellow NATO allies that both decisions 
jeopardize the integrity, security, and overall cohesion of the Alliance?  For the purpose of 
the study, both Ankara’s informal alliance with Moscow and its decision to purchase the 
S-400 fall under alliance behavior. Using the theoretical framework discussed in Chapter 
II, the evidence suggests Turkey’s changing alliance behavior is the result of structural 
changes to the international system, increasing security threats that were not mutually 
perceived by the Alliance as a whole, and the rise of the AKP with its Ottoman Islamist 
ideology.  
During the Cold War, Soviet expansion resulted in a shared high external threat 
level within the Alliance. This external threat level suppressed the internal threat level. 
Thus, the cohesion of the Alliance remained strong. However, with the structural 
alternation of the international system caused by the end of the Cold War, Turkey gradually 
began to adopt interests divergent from those of the rest of NATO. The actions during the 
Gulf War (1990–1991), the Iraq War (2003–2012), and the Syrian War (2011–present) 
increasingly revealed a mutual distrust between Turkey and the rest of the Alliance and 
reciprocal indifference to their interests that was accelerated by the rise of the AKP and its 
Ottoman Islamist ideology.  
Turkey’s disillusionment with the Alliance’s security assurances peaked during the 
Syrian War. No longer did Turkey and the rest of the Alliance have a shared external threat 
level because of the Middle East’s increasing destabilization. Walt’s threat components 
(proximity, power, offensive capabilities, and perceived intentions) significantly increased 
Turkey’s threat perception disproportionately to that of the other allies. The disparity in the 
external threat level, increasing mistrust between Turkey and the West over domestic 
policies, the rise of Ottoman Islamist ideology, as well as the changing perception of the 
Turkish elites’ perception of itself and the West caused the Alliance’s internal threat level 
to surpass the external threat level, which resulted in the significant deterioration of the 
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Alliance’s cohesion. This growing skepticism is illustrated in the February 2020 Pew 
Research Center’s poll of the individual NATO member citizens’ opinion of NATO.517  
The finding show that Turkey had the lowest view of the Alliance with a 21% approval 
rating.518  The results of the poll indicate a “sharp decline in Turkish favorable view and 
solidarity in the Alliance.”519  Indeed, Kristian Brakel asserts that Turkey’s “trust in 
Western allies has reached rock bottom.”520  Regardless of who is to blame, the erosion of 
trust in any relationship has significant implications. For NATO to be successful, security 
assurances must be guaranteed, or the cohesion of the Alliance will continue to fracture. 
As Michael F. Altfeld  keenly observes, “Alliances that fail to increase [their] partners’ 
security levels almost never form [or last]”.521  Perhaps this is how Turkey feels with 
regard to the war in Syria.  
Nevertheless, the perceived abandonment by the Alliance in Syria, combined with 
the AKP’s identity proposal that is anti-Western, likely influenced Ankara’s decision to 
find alternative partners to ensure Turkey’s national security interests in Syria.522  
Consequently, Ankara’s changed alliance behavior from balancing with the Alliance to 
tethering to Moscow is likely a result of the failure of NATO to perform its main function 
of collective defense—or as Weitsman would call it the erosion of the Alliance’s cohesion, 
which she “defines as the main function of collective defense. the ability of alliance 
members to mutually agree on objectives, interests, strategy, and to coordinate member 
activities to achieve the agreed upon ends.”523   
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By tethering to Moscow, Ankara has been able to pursue its security interests more 
easily in Syria and aims to participate in the shaping of a post-war Syria.524 However, there 
is risk in such alliance behavior. First, the behavior puts Turkey at risk of being isolated 
and possibly sanctioned by its fellow NATO allies. Second, it jeopardizes the security and 
solidarity of the Alliance writ large. Third, for Turkey’s tethering behavior to work, Ankara 
is dependent on Moscow’s continuing benevolence.525 
Moscow’s munificence likely came at a cost to Ankara and the Alliance. The cost 
of Ankara’s tethering arguably was the agreement to purchase the Russian S-400.526  
Admittedly, there is no way to truly prove that the S-400 was indeed the price Ankara had 
to paid for Moscow’s appeasement. Moreover, due to Erdoğan’s Ottoman Islamist 
ideology, it is possible that the decision to purchase the S-400 was mutually beneficial to 
both Putin’s strategic goals of weakening NATO and Erdoğan’s security interests. Wight, 
in his book, Power Politics, explains that “the chief duty of each government is regarded 
as being to preserve the interests of the people.”527  If one agrees with the assessment that 
Erdoğan adheres to the tenets of Hintz’s Ottoman Islamism, then it can be said that 
Ankara’s shift from balancing to tethering to Russia and its decision to purchase the S-400 
is founded on Erdoğan’s belief that he embodies the Turkish nation and its  interests. In 
other words, his personal security is the chief duty of the state because he believes that he 
embodies and expresses the will of the people.  
Nevertheless, Putin’s maneuver to exploit the fissure between Turkey and the rest 
of the Alliance was brilliantly executed. The opportunistic foreign policy that Putin devised 
“has Erdoğan exactly where he wants him. He knows that Erdoğan will not dare to criticize 
him and, having alienated many in Washington, Erdoğan’s options are limited. Instead, 
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Erdoğan and his minions in the government and his press will continue to denounce the 
United States as Turkey’s primary enemy…Putin...is laughing all the way to the bank.”528 
A. TURKEY STILL IMPORTANT TO NATO 
Despite Turkey’s apparent misalignment with its traditional allies, Turkey’s value 
in NATO remains important. Noting the important role Turkey played, Retired U.S. 
ambassador James F. Jeffrey stated, “In the Post–Cold War mess…almost all our [U.S.] 
conflicts Georgia, Ukraine, Bosnia, Kosovo, Iran nukes, Syria, Gaza…they all involved 
Turkey and we could not have done the things we did had Turkey been uncooperative or 
opposed to it—it’s that simple.”529  Turkey’s strategic location has enabled the Alliance 
to conduct counter-terrorism operations and defeat Islamic extremists in Africa and the 
Middle East. Turkey continues to be a defender of Europe’s eastern and southern flank, 
just perhaps in different terms. For example, Turkey hosts the largest Syrian refugee 
population—roughly 3.64 million.530  By hosting the majority of Syria’s refugees, Turkey 
is continues to serve as a buffer state and to safeguard Europe’s southeastern frontier from 
being consumed by a flood of refugees.531  If Turkey decided to allow the refugees to pass 
through its borders unimpeded, it would likely lead to a significant immigration crisis in 
Europe. Subsequently, the crisis would arguably cause a surge in populist, xenophobic 
political opposition, a rise in anti-EU sentiment, and ultimately weaken NATO—all the 
while, bolstering Moscow’s desire to be viewed as a great power and strengthen its 
revisionist interests through the weakening of the Alliance’s cohesion and undermining its 
international legitimacy.532   
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B. TURKEY AND RUSSIA 
Despite Ankara’s recent alliance behavior, the informal alliance between Turkey 
and Russia is unstable at best because it was created to solve short-term, tactical issues in 
Syria—none of which address the key underlying issues of the future of the Kurds in Syria 
and of Assad’s regime. Hintz keenly observes that the improved security relations between 
Ankara and Moscow “Came only after substantial Russian coercion, suggesting that the 
new closeness between Russia and Turkey may be more pragmatic than ideological.”533  
In other words, there is still reason to believe the diverging relationship between Turkey 
and the West can still be salvaged. Still, there should be a reasonable understanding that 
Turkey will continue to value the Russian relationship for a variety of domestic reasons 
and on the basis of its foreign policy interests at some level regardless of Turkey’s position 
in NATO.  
Instead, what is should be more concerning is Erdoğan’s Ottoman Islamist 
ideology. Understanding Erdoğan and his AKP perceptions are pivotal to managing the 
Alliance for the time being. As this study has discussed earlier, many of the founding 
members of the AKP have left the party because of Erdoğan’s quasi-sultanic regime 
transformation. This is a hopeful sign for the West because it indicates not all Turkish elites 
are favorable to his vision for a new Turkey. Yet, until he is gone, the West will need to 
accept his seemingly erratic foreign policy. Indeed, Kirsci explains that “Turkish foreign 
policy is likely to be shaped by Erdoğan’s priorities and preference in the foreseeable 
future. Turkish foreign policy is likely to oscillate between the pragmatism called for by 
mundane realism, on the one hand, and the ideological impulses of ‘new’ Turkey, steeped 
in political Islam and rising nationalism, on the other.”534 
C. CONCLUSION 
The dilemma the Alliance now faces is bigger than Turkey’s changing alliance 
behavior alone. What is currently at stake is the legitimacy and further erosion of the 
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Alliance’s cohesion. Turkey’s decision to purchase and the potential for the operational 
employment of the S-400 will likely weaken the Alliance’s security and cohesion. 
Consequently, tensions between Turkey and its fellow allies will increase. Regarding 
foreign aid and penetration, Walt’s evidence suggests “That the usual U.S. concerns about 
foreign penetration are…not a significant danger, because such efforts almost always fail 
when other incentives for alignment are lacking. A greater problem may well be the 
manipulation of U.S. foreign policy by elites whose interests may not always be identical 
with those of the nation as a whole.”535  Despite Turkey’s changing alliance behavior, the 
NATO ally remains a vital member of NATO. Its strategic location, large army, and 
military installations provide necessary means to enhance the security of the Alliance. 
Meanwhile, the Alliance continues to be beneficial for Turkey. It is largely dependent on 
U.S. foreign military sales to obtain weapons and parts for its existing equipment. 
Furthermore, Turkey’s economy is deeply embedded in—and reliant on—Western 
international economic institutions, particularly the European Customs Union.536  
Although it is theoretically possible for Turkey to offset an equipment loss by meeting this 
requirement through arms sales with Russia, Turkey will not be able to find a replacement 
for its economic integration with the West. Russia is an economically backward country 
that is overly reliant on natural resources to provide for its economic budget.537  Moreover, 
Russia lacks the attraction of foreign investment and technology vis-à-vis the West. Thus, 
Russia suffers from ‘brain drain,’ as many of Russia’s youth search for opportunity 
abroad.538  How the West, specifically the United States, decides to respond to Turkey’s 
S-400 purchase and its recent alliance behavior will likely determine the intensity of the 
tensions between Turkey and the West and possibly the future of the Alliance at large.  
Seventy-one years since the founding of NATO, the Alliance has demonstrated its 
continued utility and resolve. With the reemergence of the great power competition, it is 
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vital that Turkey and the West find a diplomatic solution to change Turkey’s current 
divergent trajectory and maintain the Alliance’s solidarity. A continuation of the present 
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APPENDIX A. DEFINITIONS AND TERMINOLOGY  
Defining key and reoccurring alliance theory terminology is critical for enhancing 
the reader’s understanding and increasing the transparency for how the thesis makes use of 
the terms. Because these terms will be used extensively throughout the thesis, it is 
necessary to provide a section dedicated to important alliance terminology. The first section 
provides definition of general terms that are widely accepted by alliance theory scholars. 
The section discusses important forms of alliance behavior. Although, each behavior is 
distinct and can likely lead to differing outcomes, it is important to note that regardless of 
the decision a state makes, each behavior exhibited is in response to a perceived threat.539 
A. GENERAL TERMINOLOGY 
• Alignment:  The concept of alignment among states is a broad 
phenomenon that subsumes alliances.540  Alignment is the “expectations 
of states about whether they will be supported or opposed by other states 
in future interactions.”541  The phenomenon of alignment generally occurs 
when a state “brings its policies into close cooperation with another state 
in order to achieve mutual security goals.”542  
• Alliance (military): “An alliance is a formal or informal arrangement for 
security cooperation between two or more sovereign states.”543  The 
purpose of the alliance is “to further (militarily) the national security of the 
participating states” by combining the capabilities of the member states 
with “an implicit or explicit agreement to come to the other’s aid 
 
539 Walt, The Origins of Alliances, 22. 
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Organization 45, no. 1 (1991): 123. 
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[militarily] or to maintain benevolent neutrality in the event of war.”544  
Alliances may be offensive, defensive, wartime, and/or peacetime in 
nature.545 
• Cohesion: “Cohesion is the ability of alliance members to mutually agree 
on objectives, interests, strategy, and to coordinate member activities to 
achieve the agreed upon ends.”546 
• Informal Alliance: See Alliance definition 
• Power: Power (aggregate power) is a state’s or an alliance’s total 
resources which are composed of the size of population, access to natural 
resources, economy, industrial production, military size and capabilities, 
strategic position, geographical reach, prestige, political influence, state 
institutional efficiency, education, technological capabilities, and moral 
cohesion (national unity).547  “The power of other states can be either a 
liability or an asset, depending on where it is located, what it can do, and 
how it is used.”548  
• Rapprochement: Rapprochement is “a situation in which the relationship 
between two countries…becomes more friendly after a period during 
which they were enemies.”549 
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Learner’s Dictionary at OxfordLearnersDictionaries.Com,” accessed April 13, 2020, 
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• Threat: The components of a threat “are a function of power, geographic 
proximity, offensive capabilities, and perceived intentions.”550  Walt and 
Weitsman emphasize the criticality of understanding perceived intentions 
because ultimately “a threat is an inherently perceptual concept.”551   
• Security Dilemma: Security Dilemma “is a situation in which actions 
taken by a state to increase its own security cause reactions from other 
states, which in turn lead to a decrease rather than an increase in the 
original state’s security.”552 
• Social Engineering: “Social engineering encompasses the exercise of all 
possible state policies aimed at changing a given society…tantamount to 
the enforced maximization of ethnic, religious, economic, cultural (in 
other words: identity) homogeneity by any means.”553  These methods are 
top-down policies implemented by the political elite on the population.554 
• Sovereignty: Sovereignty is the belief that absolute political authority 
belongs to individual states within its territorial borders and no higher 
level of power or authority exists above the state within the international 
system.555  
• Vital Interest: A vital interest is a national interest that a state “deems 
essential to its continued independence” and “will go to war to 
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defend.”556  A state’s vital interests “are what it thinks them to be and not 
what another power says them to be.”557 
B. FORMS OF ALLIANCE BEHAVIOR  
• Balancing: Balancing is a form of alliance behavior that is performed by a 
state by allying itself with one or more states to oppose a prevailing 
threat.558   
• Bandwagoning: Bandwagoning is a form of behavior in which the state 
chooses to alignment with the source of the threat or danger.559  There are 
two distinct forms of bandwagoning—offensive and defensive. Offensive 
bandwagoning is alignment with a dominant state in order to share in the 
spoils of victory. Offensive bandwagoning is often motivated by greed. 
Defensive bandwagoning is alignment with an aggressive state in order to 
avoid danger. This behavior is often motivated out of fear and is 
considered a form of appeasement.560   
• Buck-passing: Buck-passing is a form of alliance behavior a state may 
choose to avoid the cost of confronting the threat by passing the burden to 
other alliance members. This behavior is more likely to occur when the 
state passing the burden is weak and assumes its fellow allies are readily 
available to accept the costs.561    
• Free-riding: Free-riding is an alliance behavior conducted by a state by 
relying on its allies to shoulder the burden of security, while offering little 
or no assistance toward the task. It is often exhibited by weak states with 
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little to contribute and hold a high level of confidence that fellow allies 
will assist in providing security.562   
• Hedging: “Hedging is a tactic designed to reduce some of the risk inherent 
in more full-fledged alliances.”563 A state may choose this behavior in 
order to keep its options open between opposing sides. It generally entails 
low levels of commitment to either side and provides a state greater 
flexibility or bargaining power with outside external actors at a low risk to 
self.  
• Tethering: “Tethering is a strategy to manage relations with one’s 
adversary by drawing closer to it via agreement.”564  This form of 
behavior is distinct because its driven by mutual antipathy. Tethering 
allows rivals to control conflicts of interest and reduce threat levels 
between one another—if only for a temporary period of time.  
C. PERCEPTUAL DEFINITIONS  
• Value: A value is “a preference for one state of reality over another. 
Values do not specify what is but rather what ought to be.”565 
• Belief: A belief is “a conviction that a description of reality is true, proven 
or known. A belief is not the same as a value.” 566  
• Cognition: Cognition is “a data or information received from the 
environment. Cognitions are key elements in establishing perpetual 
systems and in changing these systems.”567 
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• Identity Proposal: An identity proposal is an identity-based group that 
competes for acceptance as the national identity for its citizens.568    
• Hegemony: Hegemony is both the political authority to restrict and 
enforce norms of prescribed and proscribed behavior and also provides a 
fulfillment of a group’s “sense of existence by being able to realize their 
(identity-based) interests in practice.”569  
• Social Identity: Social identity is “that part of an individual’s self-concept 
which derives from his knowledge of his membership in a social 
group…together with the value and emotional significance attached to that 
membership.”570  This offers an individual a mechanism to generate self-
esteem enabling one to fulfill a need for distinctiveness.571 
• Constitutive Norms: Constitutive norms “provides guidelines for 
membership within and appropriate behavior for the in-group, defining 
who ‘we’ are and how we should behave.”572 
• Social Purpose: Social purpose “defines group interests, the goals that the 
in-group believes it should achieve.”573 
• Relational Meaning: Relational meaning “defines the in-group’s relation 
to various out-groups; some of these relations may be friendly while 
others may be hostile, fearful, and so forth.”574  
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• Cognitive Worldview: Cognitive worldview “provides an overarching 
sense of the group’s role in the international sphere.”575 
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APPENDIX B. THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY (1949)576 
Washington, D.C., - 4 April 1949 
 
The Parties to this Treaty reaffirm their faith in the purposes and principles of the Charter 
of the United Nations and their desire to live in peace with all peoples and all governments.  
 
They are determined to safeguard the freedom, common heritage and civilisation of their 
peoples, founded on the principles of democracy, individual liberty, and the rule of law. 
They seek to promote stability and well-being in the North Atlantic area.  
 
They are resolved to unite their efforts for collective defence and for the preservation of 
peace and security. They therefore agree to this North Atlantic Treaty:  
 
ARTICLE 1 
The Parties undertake, as set forth in the Charter of the United Nations, to settle 
any international dispute in which they may be involved by peaceful means in 
such a manner that international peace and security and justice are not 
endangered, and to refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of 
force in any manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations.  
 
ARTICLE 2 
The Parties will contribute toward the further development of peaceful and 
friendly international relations by strengthening their free institutions, by bringing 
about a better understanding of the principles upon which these institutions are 
founded, and by promoting conditions of stability and well-being. They will seek 
to eliminate conflict in their international economic policies and will encourage 
economic collaboration between any or all of them.  
 
ARTICLE 3 
In order more effectively to achieve the objectives of this Treaty, the Parties, 
separately and jointly, by means of continuous and effective self-help and mutual 
aid, will maintain, and develop their individual and collective capacity to resist 









The Parties will consult together whenever, in the opinion of any of them, the 




The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or 
North America shall be considered an attack against them all and consequently 
they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the 
right of individual or collective self-defence recognised by Article 51 of the 
Charter of the United Nations, will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking 
forthwith, individually and in concert with the other Parties, such action as it 
deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the 
security of the North Atlantic area. Any such armed attack and all measures taken 
as a result thereof shall immediately be reported to the Security Council. Such 
measures shall be terminated when the Security Council has taken the measures 
necessary to restore and maintain international peace and security. 
 
ARTICLE 6 (1) 
For the purpose of Article 5, an armed attack on one or more of the Parties is 
deemed to include an armed attack: 
 
• on the territory of any of the Parties in Europe or North America, on the 
Algerian Departments of France (2), on the territory of or on the Islands under the 
jurisdiction of any of the Parties in the North Atlantic area north of the Tropic of 
Cancer; 
• on the forces, vessels, or aircraft of any of the Parties, when in or over these 
territories or any other area in Europe in which occupation forces of any of the 
Parties were stationed on the date when the Treaty entered into force or the 
Mediterranean Sea or the North Atlantic area north of the Tropic of Cancer. 
 
ARTICLE 7 
This Treaty does not affect, and shall not be interpreted as affecting in any way 
the rights and obligations under the Charter of the Parties which are members of 
the United Nations, or the primary responsibility of the Security Council for the 
maintenance of international peace and security. 
 
ARTICLE 8 
Each Party declares that none of the international engagements now in force 
between it and any other of the Parties or any third State is in conflict with the 
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provisions of this Treaty, and undertakes not to enter into any international 
engagement in conflict with this Treaty. 
 
ARTICLE 9 
The Parties hereby establish a Council, on which each of them shall be 
represented, to consider matters concerning the implementation of this Treaty. 
The Council shall be so organised as to be able to meet promptly at any time. The 
Council shall set up such subsidiary bodies as may be necessary; in particular, it 
shall establish immediately a defence committee which shall recommend 
measures for the implementation of Articles 3 and 5. 
 
ARTICLE 10 
The Parties may, by unanimous agreement, invite any other European State in a 
position to further the principles of this Treaty and to contribute to the security of 
the North Atlantic area to accede to this Treaty. Any State so invited may become 
a Party to the Treaty by depositing its instrument of accession with the 
Government of the United States of America. The Government of the United 
States of America will inform each of the Parties of the deposit of each such 
instrument of accession. 
 
ARTICLE 11 
This Treaty shall be ratified and its provisions carried out by the Parties in 
accordance with their respective constitutional processes. The instruments of 
ratification shall be deposited as soon as possible with the Government of the 
United States of America, which will notify all the other signatories of each 
deposit. The Treaty shall enter into force between the States which have ratified it 
as soon as the ratifications of the majority of the signatories, including the 
ratifications of Belgium, Canada, France, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, the 
United Kingdom and the United States, have been deposited and shall come into 




After the Treaty has been in force for ten years, or at any time thereafter, the 
Parties shall, if any of them so requests, consult together for the purpose of 
reviewing the Treaty, having regard for the factors then affecting peace and 
security in the North Atlantic area, including the development of universal as well 
as regional arrangements under the Charter of the United Nations for the 






After the Treaty has been in force for twenty years, any Party may cease to be a 
Party one year after its notice of denunciation has been given to the Government 
of the United States of America, which will inform the Governments of the other 
Parties of the deposit of each notice of denunciation. 
 
ARTICLE 14 
This Treaty, of which the English and French texts are equally authentic, shall be 
deposited in the archives of the Government of the United States of America. 
Duly certified copies will be transmitted by that Government to the Governments 
of other signatories. 
 
1. The definition of the territories to which Article 5 applies was revised by 
Article 2 of the Protocol to the North Atlantic Treaty on the accession of 
Greece and Turkey signed on 22 October 1951.  
2. On January 16, 1963, the North Atlantic Council noted that insofar as the 
former Algerian Departments of France were concerned, the relevant 
clauses of this Treaty had become inapplicable as from July 3, 1962.  
3. The Treaty came into force on 24 August 1949, after the deposition of the 
ratifications of all signatory states. 
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APPENDIX C. PROTOCOL TO THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY 
ON THE ACCESSION OF GREECE AND TURKEY577 
The Parties to the North Atlantic Treaty, signed at Washington on April 4, 1949, 
 
Being satisfied that the security of the North Atlantic area will be enhanced by the 
accession of the Kingdom of Greece and the Republic of Turkey to that Treaty,  
 
Agree as follows: 
 
ARTICLE 1 
Upon the entry into force of this Protocol, the Government of the United States of 
America shall, on behalf of all the Parties, communicate to the Government of the 
Kingdom of Greece and the Government of the Republic of Turkey an invitation to 
accede to the North Atlantic Treaty, as it may be modified by Article 2 of the 
present Protocol. Thereafter the Kingdom of Greece and the Republic of Turkey 
shall each become a Party on the date when it deposits its instruments of accession 
with the Government of the United States of America in accordance with Article 
10 of the Treaty. 
 
ARTICLE 2 
If the Republic of Turkey becomes a Party to the North Atlantic Treaty, Article 6 
of the Treaty shall, as from the date of the deposit by the Government of the 
Republic of Turkey of its instruments of accession with the Government of the 
United States of America, be modified to read as follows: 
 
For the purpose of Article 5, an armed attack on one or more of the Parties is 
deemed to include an armed attack: 
 
1. on the territory of any of the Parties in Europe or North America, on the 
Algerian Departments of France, on the territory of Turkey or on the 
islands under the jurisdiction of any of the Parties in the North Atlantic 
area north of the Tropic of Cancer; 
 
577 NATO, “Protocol to the North Atlantic Treaty on the Accession of Greece and Turkey” of The 
North Atlantic Treaty (NATO, October 22, 1951), 4, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/
official_texts_17120.htm. (NATO). 
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2. on the forces, vessels, or aircraft of any of the Parties, when in or over 
these territories or any other area in Europe in which occupation forces of 
any of the Parties were stationed on the date when the Treaty entered into 
force or the Mediterranean Sea or the North Atlantic area north of the 
Tropic of Cancer. 
 
ARTICLE 3 
The present Protocol shall enter into force when each of the Parties to the North 
Atlantic Treaty has notified the Government of the United States of America of its 
acceptance thereof. The Government of the United States of America shall inform 
all the Parties to the North Atlantic Treaty of the date of the receipt of each such 
notification and of the date of the entry into force of the present Protocol. 
 
ARTICLE 4 
The present Protocol, of which the English and French texts are equally authentic, 
shall be deposited in the Archives of the Government of the United States of 
America. Duly certified copies thereof shall be transmitted by that Government to 
the Governments of all the Parties to the North Atlantic Treaty. 
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APPENDIX  D. PRESIDENT JOHNSON’S LETTER TO ANKARA578 
54. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Turkey  
Washington, June 5, 1964, 12:15 a.m.  
1296. Deliver İnönü soonest following message from President: 
Dear Mr. Prime Minister: 
I am gravely concerned by the information which I have had through Ambassador Hare 
from you and your Foreign Minister that the Turkish Government is contemplating a 
decision to intervene by military force to occupy a portion of Cyprus. I wish to 
emphasize, in the fullest friendship and frankness, that I do not consider that such a 
course of action by Turkey, fraught with such far-reaching consequences, is consistent 
with the commitment of your Government to consult fully in advance with us. 
Ambassador Hare has indicated that you have postponed your decision for a few hours in 
order to obtain my views. I put to you personally whether you really believe that it is 
appropriate for your Government, in effect, to present an ultimatum to an ally who has 
demonstrated such staunch support over the years as has the United States for Turkey. I 
must, therefore, first urge you to accept the responsibility for complete consultation with 
the United States before any such action is taken. 
It is my impression that you believe that such intervention by Turkey is permissible under 
the provisions of the Treaty of Guarantee of 1960. I must call your attention, however, to 
our understanding that the proposed intervention by Turkey would be for the purpose of 
supporting an attempt by Turkish Cypriot leaders to partition the Island, a solution which 
is specifically excluded by the Treaty of Guarantee. Further, that Treaty requires 
consultation among the Guarantor Powers. It is the view of the United States that the 
possibilities of such consultation have by no means been exhausted in this situation and 
that, therefore, the reservation of the right to take unilateral action is not yet applicable. 
I must call to your attention, also, Mr. Prime Minister, the obligations of NATO. There 
can be no question in your mind that a Turkish intervention in Cyprus would lead to a 
military engagement between Turkish and Greek forces. Secretary of State Rusk declared 
at the recent meeting of the Ministerial Council of NATO in The Hague that war between 
Turkey and Greece must be considered as ‘literally unthinkable.’ Adhesion to NATO, in 
its very essence, means that NATO countries will not wage war on each other. Germany 
and France have buried centuries of animosity and hostility in becoming NATO allies; 
nothing less can be expected from Greece and Turkey. Furthermore, a military 
intervention in Cyprus by Turkey could lead to a direct involvement by the Soviet Union. 
I hope you will understand that your NATO Allies have not had a chance to consider 
whether they have an obligation to protect Turkey against the Soviet Union if Turkey 
 
578 Johnson, “President Johnson’s Letter to Prime Minister Inonu,” June 5, 1964. 
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takes a step which results in Soviet intervention without the full consent and 
understanding of its NATO Allies. 
Further, Mr. Prime Minister, I am concerned about the obligations of Turkey as a 
member of the United Nations. The United Nations has provided forces on the Island to 
keep the peace. Their task has been difficult but, during the past several weeks, they have 
been progressively successful in reducing the incidents of violence on that Island. The 
United Nations Mediator has not yet completed his work. I have no doubt that the general 
membership of the United Nations would react in the strongest terms to unilateral action 
by Turkey which would defy the efforts of the United Nations and destroy any prospect 
that the United Nations could assist in obtaining a reasonable and peaceful settlement of 
this difficult problem. 
I wish also, Mr. Prime Minister, to call your attention to the bilateral agreement between 
the United States and Turkey in the field of military assistance. Under Article IV of the 
Agreement with Turkey of July 1947, your Government is required to obtain United 
States consent for the use of military assistance for purposes other than those for which 
such assistance was furnished. Your Government has on several occasions acknowledged 
to the United States that you fully understand this condition. I must tell you in all candor 
that the United States cannot agree to the use of any United States supplied military 
equipment for a Turkish intervention in Cyprus under present circumstances. 
Moving to the practical results of the contemplated Turkish move, I feel obligated to call 
to your attention in the most friendly fashion the fact that such a Turkish move could lead 
to the slaughter of tens of thousands of Turkish Cypriots on the Island of Cyprus. Such an 
action on your part would unleash the furies and there is no way by which military action 
on your part could be sufficiently effective to prevent wholesale destruction of many of 
those whom you are trying to protect. The presence of United Nations forces could not 
prevent such a catastrophe. 
You may consider that what I have said is much too severe and that we are disregardful 
of Turkish interests in the Cyprus situation. I should like to assure you that this is not the 
case. We have exerted ourselves both publicly and privately to assure the safety of 
Turkish Cypriots and to insist that a final solution of the Cyprus problem should rest 
upon the consent of the parties most directly concerned. It is possible that you feel in 
Ankara that the United States has not been sufficiently active in your behalf. But surely 
you know that our policy has caused the liveliest resentments in Athens (where 
demonstrations have been aimed against us) and has led to a basic alienation between the 
United States and Archbishop Makarios. As I said to your Foreign Minister in our 
conversation just a few weeks ago, we value very highly our relations with Turkey. We 
have considered you as a great ally with fundamental common interests. Your security 
and prosperity have been a deep concern of the American people and we have expressed 
that concern in the most practical terms. You and we have fought together to resist the 
ambitions of the communist world revolution. This solidarity has meant a great deal to us 
and I would hope that it means a great deal to your Government and to your people. We 
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have no intention of lending any support to any solution of Cyprus which endangers the 
Turkish Cypriot community. We have not been able to find a final solution because this 
is, admittedly, one of the most complex problems on earth. But I wish to assure you that 
we have been deeply concerned about the interests of Turkey and of the Turkish Cypriots 
and will remain so. 
Finally, Mr. Prime Minister I must tell you that you have posed the gravest issues of war 
and peace. These are issues which go far beyond the bilateral relations between Turkey 
and the United States. They not only will certainly involve war between Turkey and 
Greece but could involve wider hostilities because of the unpredictable consequences 
which a unilateral intervention in Cyprus could produce. You have your responsibilities 
as Chief of the Government of Turkey; I also have mine as President of the United States. 
I must, therefore, inform you in the deepest friendship that unless I can have your 
assurance that you will not take such action without further and fullest consultation I 
cannot accept your injunction to Ambassador Hare of secrecy and must immediately ask 
for emergency meetings of the NATO Council and of the United Nations Security 
Council. 
I wish it were possible for us to have a personal discussion of this situation. 
Unfortunately, because of the special circumstances of our present Constitutional 
position, I am not able to leave the United States. If you could come here for a full 
discussion I would welcome it. I do feel that you and I carry a very heavy responsibility 
for the general peace and for the possibilities of a sane and peaceful resolution of the 
Cyprus problem. I ask you, therefore, to delay any decisions which you and your 
colleagues might have in mind until you and I have had the fullest and frankest 
consultation. 
Sincerely,  
Lyndon B. Johnson 
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